Contents

Editorial: Are We Truly Global?
Vinoth Ramachandra

The Judgment of God: The Problem of the Canaanites
J. P. U. Lilley

Understanding Pauline Studies: An Assessment of Recent Research [Part Two]
Stanley E. Porter

Post/Late? Modernity as the Context for Christian Scholarship Today
Craig Bartholomew

A Japanese Perspective on the Trinity
Nozomu Miyahira

Book Reviews

Book Notes
Editorial: Are We Truly Global?

Vinoth Ramachandra is the IFES Regional Secretary for South Asia. He is the author of the already acclaimed The Recovery of Mission and Gods that Fail (both Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996).

It is 15 August, and India has begun her 50th year of independence from British rule. I am travelling by train from Bangalore to Madras, musing on the day’s media offerings. The President’s address to the nation is on all the front pages. He reaffirms India’s ‘national sovereignty’ and her ‘right’ to pursue whatever policy she chooses. The context is India’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a refusal which has led to vilification in many sections of the Western media. The Indian position is that the treaty must be tied to a definite timetable for the eventual dismantling of all nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers (namely, the USA, Britain, France, Russia, and China).

I am deeply disturbed, as well as fascinated, by the underlying issues. On the one hand, I admire the Indian government’s courage in standing up to Western hypocrisy and hegemony. But, on the other hand, I believe that the desire to imitate the nuclear powers is itself demonic, stemming from false and foolish notions of security and power. The Cold War between India and Pakistan has served to legitimate the massive squandering of both human and material resources in the midst of enormous deprivations. Technological research that carries potential military benefits has no difficulty attracting funds, while other research that tackles problems of poverty and social decay languishes for lack of funds.

Moreover, what do slogans such as ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘the right to self-determination’ mean in a nuclear age? Radioactive fall-out, like other ecological disasters, does not respect political, ethnic or geographical boundaries. ‘A self-determining democracy’ is what every Western nation imagines itself to be; and it is what many in the South aspire to be. But if democracy means the right to participate in decision-making that affects my life and my community, then the conditions of late modernity seem to make democracy an impossible goal. A decision to build more nuclear reactors in India, for instance, affects the life-chances of people in neighbouring countries who share the risks while receiving none of the benefits. Similarly, American ‘domestic’ issues such as taxation, subsidies for farmers, interest rates and military spending have major repercussions on the economies of other nations. Yet the thought that other nations should be consulted for their views on what goes on in American politics, perhaps as a matter of moral principle, would be regarded with sheer surprise (if not righteous indignation) by even the most globally conscious of American citizens.

Here we touch on what sociologists have come to call globalization: the stretching of social relations across spatial boundaries, so that what affects me may have its origin not in my immediate neighbourhood but in some remote corner of the globe. While this process has been going on for the past couple of centuries, its scope and pace have
intensified in the past couple of decades. I can communicate with a stranger in Tokyo more often (via my computer) than with my next-door neighbour. A reckless speculator on the New York futures market can precipitate the collapse of an African economy. The growth of an industrial conglomerate in South Korea can put workers in Chicago on the dole. The lucrative child adoption market for tourists in Asia is linked to falling sperm counts among European males, and the anti-social behaviour of children in a Sri Lankan village to the fashion of having foreign housemaids in Hong Kong and Singapore. We are increasingly interrelated, for better and for worse …

At the same time as we become aware of our global inter-dependence and vulnerability, we also experience the erection of new barriers between peoples. Ethnic nationalisms are on the rise, from Quebec to Fiji. In global perspective, both ‘Little England’ and ‘Fortress Europe’ are birds of the same feather. Countries with the most sophisticated communications systems are also the most insular, as anyone who has lived in the US or Britain will testify. For all the explosion in tourism and cable television, the American and European media still propagate the image of the South as a ‘black hole’ of squalor, war, famine and ecological disaster. Images of America and Europe that predominate in the South are of Hollywood glamour, sexually ‘loose’ women, uninhibited consumption and an effete Christianity. We tend to be exposed to the worst in each other’s cultures. Those who seek to build bridges of mutual learning and understanding are in short supply.

Given that the gospel is the story of God’s bridge-building work, isn’t it one of the responsibilities of a theological seminary to produce men and women who are bridge-builders? Alas, theological institutions in the West, by and large, seem ill-equipped to meet the challenges of globalization. The academic curriculum rarely reflects the changing nature of the world in which we live. Church History courses, for example, usually pay little attempt to the movement of the Church beyond its European or American expressions, despite the fact that Christianity in Asia predates that of many European (and certainly American) societies and, more importantly, that the ‘centre of gravity’ for the global Church has shifted in this century to the countries of the South. The only situation in which the typical theology student is likely to learn about other cultures, religions and the world of international politics is if he or she follows a course on ‘mission’ (or ‘missiology’ as it is called in North America). In the more academic institutions, these courses either do not exist or are optional electives. The idea that all biblical study and theological reflection should have a missionary dimension seems too radical a notion for the theological academy …

In a recent book on cross-cultural ethics, the American missionary-theologian (shouldn’t this be a tautology?) Bernard Adeney reminds us that the ‘social dynamic of Christianity is no longer primarily Western’ and that ‘the Bible and the West and God and society all look incredibly different when seen from Latin America, Asia or Africa’. He believes that ‘the best hope for a sustained critique of the current international order stems from a Christian social dynamic’, but is sceptical that this will come from the West. Why? Because the ‘centre of vital Christianity is in the Third World, and that is where the vision of the kingdom is best understood’.¹

I am inclined to think that this is rhetorical exaggeration. But I have some sympathy

for Adeney’s frustration with the insularity of his fellow-Christians in the West. In an increasingly inter-dependent world and a global Church that is now truly multicultural, and with access to communication tools that our forebears never imagined (let alone possessed!), there can be no excuse for remaining imprisoned within one’s own ecclesiastical and cultural blinkers.

To be ‘contextual’ in our theology is vitally important, but ‘contextualization’ is not the same as parochialism. The ‘context’ in which we all labour today is one on which other contexts impinge, in bewilderingly complex ways. Hence our need to support and encourage each other to (in the words of the old adage) ‘think globally while acting locally’. If we all, from North and South, are to be a truly global Christian community, we should heed the call of the late Kenyan theologian John Mbiti to ‘embrace each other’s concerns and stretch to each other’s horizons’.

Many today find difficulty, on ostensibly Christian grounds, with the concept of divine judgment, and thus find it hard to accept judgments in the OT as the work of the Christian God. The case of the Canaanites causes particular difficulty because of the involvement of Israel in carrying out the judgment.

The Israelite invasion of Canaan, as described in the book of Joshua and based on instructions in the Pentateuch, was like many another barbarian invasion in the course of history - at least from the viewpoint of those who suffered from it. The moral issues arise from taking the theological dimension seriously, i.e. from claiming that the OT is revelation of the one true God and that he directed the invasion. If our outlook is based on accepting the NT as a manual of Christian lifestyle, with principles of forgiveness and service grounded in a gospel freely available, we may find it difficult to see how the invasion of Canaan can be fitted into the same theological framework. Was Marston right after all - was this the work of another and inferior deity?

To put it another way, if we could see the policy of exterminating the Canaanites merely as a phase in the development of religion (whether 'primitive' or 'deuteronomistic'), we could attribute it to human misapprehension of the character of God; but if the instructions in the Law came from God, then, regardless of any debate about their historical context, we have a theological problem. Stone considers that this problem already exercised the author of the book of Joshua, and argues that 'one important, but generally unnoticed, effect of the interpretive reshaping of Joshua is a disquiet with “holy war”, directing readers to modes of appropriation other than martial and territorial'.

We cannot be content to limit our enquiry to an academic question of understanding the OT historically; we must also ask how the Scripture applies to Christians as they interact with the world, especially with forces that oppose them. If the biblical treatment of the Canaanites does not provide a model, what does it say to us? And how do we explain the basis on which we determine its relevance? I propose to examine the Canaanite question against the background of other OT examples of judgment: to make some suggestions for understanding the biblical text and the situation which it describes; and to consider briefly the implications for Christians in pagan (or post-Christian) society.

Judgment in the Old Testament

- The idea that God does not judge is by no means a modern one: Zephaniah had to contend with it (Zp. 1:12). As a proposition it is untenable: if no penalty is enforced, law becomes ineffective, and the purposes and ideals of the law must for ever be frustrated by human self-will. The Bible witnesses to God's willingness to persuade men; but no biblical writer describes a 'god' whose will is ultimately limited to what he can achieve by persuasion. The basic principles of divine intervention in conflict situations were stated by G.E. Wright as follows: (a) God works in this world mediatelty through chosen agents, whether they know it or not; (b) the divine use of an agent confers no special righteousness or merit on the agent. God uses people as they are.

Judgment on individuals and communities

- In human society, judgment attaches responsibility and blame to individuals. The law may be broken by groups, but charges can only be brought against individuals. It is considered unjust to punish family and friends of the guilty.
unless they are themselves accessory to the crime (although it may be unavoidable that they also suffer consequences). The principle is endorsed by God in his revelation to Ezekiel (ch. 18); cf. Deuteronomy 24:16, cited in 2 Kings 14:6. The proverb about 'sour grapes' may have misinterpreted Exodus 20:5, which speaks of the sins of the fathers being visited on the children 'to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me'.

In practice, we do experience corporate punishment, although we tend to interpret it as misfortune rather than in terms of the operation of law and judgment. The Bible provides case-studies of such punishment, illustrating three modes of involvement: Firstly, there is individual sin prejudicing the welfare of the community; secondly, there is individual sin leading the community astray; and finally, we can find the community generally adopting wrong standards.

From the first class, we may cite Achan's theft of devoted objects at Jericho, and David's insistence on holding a census. In both cases the immediate consequences fell on the community. After the 'ban' had been violated, the attack on Ai could not be allowed to succeed, even though the army as a whole was innocent. David held leadership and responsibility; his sin could not be treated as a private matter. Even his treatment of Uriah led to disasters for Israel; much more so did his public transgression (2 Sa. 24).

The classic instance in the second class is that of Jeroboam. He goes down in history as the man 'who caused Israel to sin' (1 Ki. 14:16 and a further 17 times in Kings), but clearly his lead was accepted by the community as a whole, which suffered the consequences, down to the fall of Samaria.

In the third mode of involvement, the community identifies itself with evil so that it passes beyond hope of redemption. In a sense, the whole world is under this condemnation, expressed historically in the flood and prophetically in 'the end of the age' (Mt. 13:40; cp. 24:37ff.). The charge lies more particularly against societies which have abandoned moral restraint, wallowed in vile religion, or gloriied in oppressive political power. The Canaanites, by the testimony of the biblical authors and their own literature, came into this class.

The involvement of Israel, however, makes the Canaanites something of a special case. Before examining this, it may be useful to review the other principal instances of judgment on Gentile societies. I do not include Israel, because its status as a covenant community raises additional issues, although at times it is dealt with in the same way as Gentiles (Amos 4:10-12).

**Judgments on Gentile societies**

The case of Sodom is the clearest instance of divine judgment by natural agency on a community. The setting and language in Genesis 18 denote a judicial investigation (vv. 20ff., 'outcry'; and Abraham's famous plea that 'the Judge of all the earth' could not destroy the righteous with the wicked). There are strong parallels with the flood: Christ cited both as types of final judgment (Lk. 17:26-29). There was a last call to escape, and provision for a remnant. The outcome proved, in the light of the interview with Abraham, that the community was beyond redemption.

With reference to Egypt, the language of judgment, already used in Genesis 15:14, appears in Exodus 7:4 and 12:12. Here 'the gods' are judged, referring perhaps to the bestial representations of Egyptian divinities. However, the theme is essentially one of deliverance from oppression, in a confrontation between the true God and the powers of darkness; this is clearly echoed in Psalm 78. Egypt is called to account for its treatment of Israel rather than for its moral or religious corruption.
The Canaanite question

This brings us back to the Canaanites and to the situation in which the Israelites were commissioned to exterminate them. Being concerned primarily with the prescriptive material, I shall not discuss the historical reconstruction of the origins of the state of Israel. This is not to deny the importance of the subject: but whether one visualizes peaceful penetration, social revolution, or any other theory which minimizes or denies invasion, the attitude to the Canaanites inculcated by the Law requires not only a historical setting but also a theological explanation.

To take an extreme example, since Niels Lemche is persuaded that the Pentateuch is essentially a post-exilic composition and that it generally misuses the term ‘Canaanite’ in an unhistorical sense, and since the pentateuchal emphasis on the exodus from Egypt and the eviction of the Canaanites is an anachronism in the post-exilic context, he is driven to refer the whole construction to the Jewish diaspora in Egypt. Thus the practical application of the doctrine is entirely removed from the world of war and invasion: but we must still face the theological and ethical implications of that doctrine.

Similarly, theories of the development of the Pentateuch will not remove the theological problem. For instance, writing on the basis that Deuteronomy was compiled in the latter part of the seventh century BC, S.R. Driver accounts for its anti-Canaanite polemics ‘partly, no doubt, because they formed an element in the older legislation (Ex. 23:31-33) . . . but chiefly because . . . they were a significant protest against the fashions of the age’. He does not postulate an anti-Canaanite pogrom under Josiah, but senses ‘the intensity of the author’s convictions on the subject’, and apparently grants that ‘older legislation’ would have carried the same message.

Much more recently, and more radically, A.D.H. Mayes regards Deuteronomy as representing Mosaic authorship in order to authorize and legitimate its teaching, and states that ‘this presentation as speech of Moses brought with it the fictional setting of pre-settlement times’. Nevertheless, he goes on to treat ‘holy war’ as a
reality, even though 'Holy War theory represents a deuteronomistic interpretation . . . of past events.' The problem of understanding the theory therefore remains, even if one supposes that it was never actually put into practice.

It becomes evident that neither by rewriting the history of Israel's origins, nor by identifying stages in the compilation of the Pentateuch, can one avoid the need to give an account of the prescriptions for dealing with the Canaanites which will enable us to understand their purpose correctly. I propose therefore to set aside the historical and literary questions, and to examine the texts – primarily the pentateuchal texts – as they stand.

Instructions given in the Pentateuch

The principal texts are Exodus 23:20-33, Exodus 34:11-16, Deuteronomy 7:1-6 and Deuteronomy 12:1-4, 29-32. Some phrases recur in Leviticus 18:20, Numbers 33:51-56, Deuteronomy 18:9-13 and Deuteronomy 20:16-18. The instructions can be considered under two heads: dealing with the people, and abolishing their religion. The second group is fairly simple: in the four main passages, apart from some minor variations of expression, Exodus 23:24 and 34:13f. cover the same points as Deuteronomy 7:5 and 12:3, 30 (cf. also Dt. 7:16, 25). The general injunction not to 'follow their practices' (Ex. 12:24), implied again in Exodus 34:15, is effectively repeated in Deuteronomy 12:4, 31 as regards worship, while Leviticus 18:3, 20:23 and Deuteronomy 18:9 carry it into the realm of ethics and particularly of occultism. The first group of instructions, for dealing with the people, will repay closer attention.

The crux of the problem

Common to most of the passages are the phrase 'I will drive out' (various words used) and a warning not to be ensnared or led into sin (in Dt. 12. connected directly with worship). The deuteronomistic passages are complementary. Inasmuch as chapter 7 is part of the introduction while chapter 12 is specific law. On the other hand, Exodus 34 recapitulates chapter 23 with some abbreviation. One can therefore see a very close correspondence between Exodus and Deuteronomy, taking each as a whole.

The phrase 'I will drive out' is closely connected with the oft-repeated assurance that the Lord had given Israel the land of Canaan. This theme is especially prominent in Deuteronomy 1-6, which is not concerned with the idolatry of the Canaanites as such: here the threat to faithful worship is expected from within (4:25) or from abroad (6:14). However, the implication that the Canaanites must be 'thrust out' (6:19) is inevitable.

The other phrases which occur in one or both of the Exodus passages are also found in Deuteronomy 7, except for Exodus 23:33: 'Do not let them live in your land'; on the other hand, Deuteronomy 7:3 adds: 'Do not intermarry' (implied in Ex. 34:15f.) In practical terms this amounts almost to the same thing, but in 7:2 the point is sharpened into the first application of hērem in this context. The term reappears in Deuteronomy 20:17, as exephegetic to the phrase 'you shall not leave alive anything that breathes.' Both expressions are common in Joshua, where we read of these instructions being put into effect. and it is important to understand the meaning of hērem.

'Devoted' or 'under the ban'

The essential significance of hērem is irrevocable dedication of an object or person. It is seen clearly in Leviticus 27:28f., where the term (NIV 'devote') is contrasted with 'dedicate' (vv. 14-27, haqqēs); the latter usage leaves open the possibility of redemption. This related to voluntary offerings, but in a few instances 'devotion' was applied to what would normally have been taken as plunder. It was not intended to be applied to the spoils of Canaanite cities.
It had nothing to do with the standing instructions to destroy idolatrous cult-objects, neither was it a hallmark of the so-called ‘holy war’. Failure to observe the evidence on these points has led to widespread misunderstanding and confusion even in standard commentaries.

With regard to persons, ‘irrevocable dedication’ implies that the options of enslavement and of treaty are not available. This follows from the prohibition of social intercourse, given in more detailed terms in the texts cited above. The Canaanites in general would never accept the Israelite doctrine of God and submit themselves to its discipline; the exceptional case of Rahab only points the contrast. A whole way of life is at stake. Debased religion has corrupted Canaanite thought and practice from seed-time to harvest, and no way will they be persuaded to abandon it. Their society is ripe for judgment.

Understanding the judgment

The invasion as judgment

We are presented, then, with a situation which is practically unparalleled in Scripture: judgment is decreed on a society, and Israel is commissioned to execute it. It is so unusual, and apparently so far outside Christian terms of reference, that we may have some difficulty in understanding that this could be the will of God.

As to the judgment itself, we need to appreciate more fully the character of Canaanite society as known to us from biblical and extra-biblical sources. The strictures of W.F. Albright are not universally accepted. For example, Dr J. Gray attempts to show that Canaanite religion anticipated many biblical ideals, even if what predominated in Canaan was in fact the fertility-cult relating to the recurrent seasonal crises in the agricultural year. Man’s efforts to enlist Providence in supplying his primary need, his daily food and the propagation of his kind. Dr Gray is clearly seeking to justify or at least excuse the cult, on the very grounds on which it stands condemned biblically; the God of grace is not to be ‘enslaved by man’s efforts’.

Let us illustrate further the style of this defence. Gray claims that the Canaanites were emotionally involved in their myths, which were a form of proto-drama; in places ‘the whole bawdy, farcical tone is just that of Greek comedy ... Their gods were like the Greek gods, glorified human beings ... Granted that this intense anthropomorphism is rather the work of the artist using his poetic licence, the fact remains that there was no moral purpose in the fertility-cult. That is not a reproach; it is a natural limitation.

This is not the place to examine Gray’s attempts to connect Canaanite and Israelite practice, or to answer his polemic against the biblical representation of Canaanite religion. It is enough to remark that his defence can be made, to our reading public, in terms such as we have quoted, and that it appears to rest mainly on the prior claims of cultural appreciation over moral (let alone religious) considerations. We have to face the question whether we believe, and are prepared to maintain, that a true appreciation of history has room for the possibility of divine judgment being executed in particular situations, and that in such judgment, the pretensions of culture might be set aside.

This position is taken by W.L. Alexander, commenting on the policy of extermination:

If Israel had no divine command to this effect, no-one would pretend to justify this part of their policy. If they had, it needed no justification ... when a nation has given way to such nameless and shameless wickedness that its land groans beneath the burden of its crimes, it is a mercy to the world when the evil is stamped out ... no nation has any absolute right to itself or its land. It holds its existence subject to God’s will, and to that will alone; and if it is good for the world that it should give place to others, he will cause it to pass away.
It is my contention that the Invasion of Canaan should be seen in this light, rather than as an expression of a general principle of holy war against sinners and unbelievers.

**Israel as God's agents**

This theme of judgment exhibits a relatively low profile in our texts, and is certainly not to be regarded as motivating Israel. We read in Genesis 15:16 that a return from Egypt would be deferred until 'the sin of the Amorites' had reached its full measure' (סאה'. In Leviticus 18:24ff. and 20:22 the land is said to have been defiled, so that it 'vomit its inhabitants' and (18:25) 'I punish it for its sin'. Thus in Deuteronomy 9:4, 'it is on account of the wickedness of these nations that the Lord is going to drive them out before you'. In both Leviticus and Deuteronomy the Israelites are warned not to congratulate themselves on their own virtue, but to fear lest they come under the same judgment.

So, when we come to specific instructions to make no terms with the Canaanites (e.g. Dt. 20:16-18), the Israelites are not encouraged to see themselves as God's avenging angels. Craigie says:

_There are two reasons for this total destruction, only one of which is stated in this context. The unsated reason is that the Israelites were instruments of God's judgment; the conquest was not only the means by which God granted his people the promised land, but was also the means by which he executed his judgment on the Canaanites for their sinfulness (see 9:4). The second reason, which is stated, appears in v.18: if the Canaanites survived, their unholy religion could turn Israel aside from serving the Lord._

**Reasons for the policy**

What then can we say about the rationale of the directions given in the Law for dealing with the Canaanites?

The Sinai Covenant, modelled as it may have been on accepted forms of Near Eastern treaty so that Israel could grasp its purpose, was a very special kind of covenant. Yahweh would not accept a place in a pantheon to deal on equal terms with the gods of other nations: much less would their representatives be allowed in his territory. Therefore, not only is the worship of other gods prohibited, but the idea of treaty with the Canaanites is impossible; for such a treaty would involve reciprocal invocation of each other's deities.

Under the covenant which constituted them as God's people, Israel acquired title to the land. This is explicit in Exodus and strongly developed in Deuteronomy, and of course goes back to the covenant with Abraham. Possession of the land means control of it and of all that goes on in it, so that the national life may be developed in accordance with the covenant. Allens, as such, are not excluded - indeed, provision is made for them and Israel is required to see that they are not neglected or oppressed - but they must conform to the law of the land; and this includes the first and second commandments. 1 Kings 11:7f. illustrates the point.

It is easy enough to see that the prohibition of idolatrous worship involves the destruction of its visual aids; but if the pagan altars are eliminated, what will the pagans do? After all, their idolatrous worship is also a matter of conviction, not just a pastime which they could regretfully abandon. The Sinai Covenant, therefore, by its very nature, requires the eviction of pagans from Israelite territory, both because their worship cannot be allowed to co-exist with that of Israel, and because there can be no basis for a treaty relationship with them. On the other hand, they cannot be deported; Israel is not going to be an imperial power with the resources and authority to move populations around...
So, while the primary intention is 'I [or, you] will drive them out', this leads inevitably to 'you must devote them'. I am not suggesting that this implication was avoided in the first place, but I think it important to establish that the prior objective was to possess and cleanse the land.

**Constructive purpose**

'The gift of the land was an essential factor determining the policy to be followed towards the Canaanites, what has the Law to say about God's purpose in this gift? It went far beyond the common Near Eastern theme of conquest promising the glory of the conqueror's god: beyond Jephthah's démarche to the king of Ammon (Jg. 11:24), 'whatever the Lord our God has given us, we will possess'.

In Deuteronomy 4:32ff. Moses declares that Israel's unique experience of deliverance 'out of another nation' testifies to the uniqueness of the one true God (vv. 35, 39). 'He loved your forefathers and chose their descendants' (v. 37) - not to exercise power, but so that their obedience to the covenant would 'show your wisdom and understanding to the nations' (v. 6), who would 'see that you are called by the name of the Lord' (28:10). One must therefore question the assertion by A.D.H. Mayes that 'Deuteronomy expresses no sense of Israel with a mission to the world'. Israel is to be 'qullah', the Lord's treasure, and 'qādōs', a holy people (Ex. 19:5f.; cf. also Dt. 26:18f.): the Lord is glorified not in mere power, but in wisdom and in the quality of life which results from keeping his laws.

God called Israel to witness to his power and uniqueness, by non-idolatrous worship: to his holiness, by an appropriate lifestyle: to his justice, by fair laws protecting the disadvantaged. It would be quite misleading to express all this in purely negative terms of prohibitions and restrictions. The stringent rules against idolatry presuppose that Israel is a worshipping community, and must be read with the laws governing the conduct of festivals. The rejection of Canaanite practices is matched by repeated assurances that God will ensure the prosperity of his people (e.g. Ex. 23:25). Divination and necromancy are prohibited because the Lord intends to reveal his will through prophecy, as befits the dignity of his creation (Dt. 18:14ff.). God's purpose is to have people reconciled to himself in a covenant relationship, replacing fear and uncertainty with love and confidence, people who understand what the Lord's will is and enjoy the benefits of obeying it. Consistent with this is the strong emphasis in Deuteronomy on responsible self-government and stewardship of resources.

To fulfill this purpose, Israel needed total control and total responsibility within its geographical boundaries for three reasons. Firstly, the theology of worship was so entirely different from that in paganism, that the two could not be combined. Secondly, human instincts being what they are, it was necessary to take a strong line against 'visual aids' prejudicial to a right understanding of God. Thirdly, the personal and social ethics required by the covenant were incompatible with many practices accepted and deep-rooted in paganism. Therefore the covenant could not permit any social intercourse or treaty relationships, or indeed any co-existence, with the former inhabitants of the land.

W.L. Alexander puts this in perspective for us: 'When we come to think of what vast importance for the world was the choice of one people who should serve as leverage for the rest, we discern the reason for the imperative injunctions ... as to the policy which Israel was to pursue with reference to the peoples of Canaan.'

**Contemporary relevance**

Thus far I have been seeking to understand a historical situation on the basis of a biblical world-view, as a study which is important for faith and worship. There is another dimension of relevance, which Dr C.J. Wright stressed in his editorial (Themelios, January 1994, p. 3): 'these things were written for our instruction'. What has Deuteronomy, and in particular its teaching about Canaanites, to say to
us for whom 'the Baalism of Canaan ... is alive and well in our society'?

We live in a world where sexual licentiousness and perversion, together with false worship and outright idolatry, are as prevalent as they were in Canaan – or in NT Corinth or Rome. We are involved in that society, and we risk being dragged along by it and falling to maintain the God-fearing community which the Church ought to be. What are we to do with our Canaanites? Can the Law of Moses give us any directions?

Of course, it is obvious that the NT attitude to idolaters is different. Paul says plainly: 'What business is it of mine to judge those outside the church?' To dissociate from idolaters you would have to leave this world' – and then how would we fulfill our commission to preach the gospel? But if we simply say that 'the gospel has made the difference', we have no clear basis for applying the OT – only a kind of filter to strain out what we think has ceased to be relevant.

I suggest that the key to interpretation lies in identifying what has changed, and what has not changed, as between the status of Israel around 1000 BC and our own. In three ways, at least, the Church is differently placed. (a) We serve under a new covenant, in terms set out by Jeremiah (31:33-34). Our remit is to proclaim a message of renewal and reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:17-21). (b) We are not a territorial people as Israel was. We hold no property otherwise than under the secular law. (c) We have no political identity or status. Neither force nor birth can make a Christian. We cannot implement a Christian state: the attempts which have been made are proof of that.

As to the unchanged factors, I would stress the following: (a) God has not changed in himself. He was and is unique, holy, compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, abounding in love and faithfulness, forgiving wickedness yet maintaining righteousness: life, power and judgment flow from him alone. (b) He requires our exclusive loyalty. He is not head of a pantheon, neither does Jesus sit on a committee of mediators. (c) We are still 'a people'. Our social life and ethics within the Church, and the way we worship, are essential parts of our witness to Christ. (d) We are still vulnerable to temptation: 'the sinful nature desires what is contrary to the Spirit' (Gal. 5:17), and we need to be careful what we hear and see, and how we think.

Conclusions

Having thus reviewed the provisions in the Law for dealing with the Canaanites and their religion, and having tried to assess their relevance in a Christian context, I propose the following:

1. The biblical directions for the occupation of Canaan and the eradication of Canaanite religion reflect God's purpose to establish a holy people with a political identity under the old covenant.

2. As members of the body of Christ under the new covenant, we are not in a position to occupy any territory or impose any laws against immorality or idolatry, but we are required to maintain holiness and true worship in the Church.

3. To this end, we ought to avoid cultural links and interests which would undermine our faith or holiness, and prejudice our witness to the glory of God, and we ought to be unashamed to say why we avoid them. We have to resist the trend in our pluralist society which places culture above criticism.

Such a policy will meet opposition because it has negative aspects. We have to insist that negatives are necessary in order to achieve and maintain positives: Christians cannot say 'yes' to everything.

The extermination policy is usually considered ‘deuteronomistic’, and this is often taken to imply that it was promulgated in the late seventh century; for an extreme view, see A. Rofe, ‘Laws of warfare’, JSOT 32 (1985), pp. 23–44. Neither step in this argument is beyond controversy.

Stone, op. cit., p. 28. Stone demonstrates that the Joshua narrative is articulated to emphasize that the Canaanites were destroyed because they resisted the purposes of Yahweh. It is not clear that this makes any significant difference to the ‘mode of appropriation’. He goes on to argue (p. 35) that the deuteronomistic expansion shifted the emphasis to a call for Israel to obey the Torah, but the passages cited (Jos. 1:1–9; 8:30–35; 23:1–16) are hardly sufficient to change the thrust of the narrative.


Stone, op. cit., p. 26, on theories of peaceful penetration: ‘While expunging the moral problem from history, this approach does not remove the problem from the text.’ Again (p. 27), ‘the received text of Joshua ... does not depict Israel as ... engaged in a revolutionary class-struggle’.

N.P. Lemche, The Canaanites and their Land (JSOTS 110; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), pp. 167f. It may be rather difficult to explain how such a source could produce ‘literary works which were to become normative for the whole Jewish community’ (p. 169). Lemche acknowledges the problem and there ends the discussion.


A.D.H. Mayes, The Story of Israel between Settlement and Exile (London: SCM, 1983), p. 157 n. 3. The use of the term ‘holy war’ may be taken to imply that the invasion was represented as undertaken by God’s command, which is the point under discussion. It is another question whether the term itself (which is not biblical) describes a biblical concept accurately. The practice of war usually had religious aspects, but the Identification of a form of ‘holy war’ is very dubious; see P.C. Craigie, The Problem of War in the OT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), p. 49, and K. Lawson Younger, Ancient Conquest Accounts (JSOTS 98; Sheffield: Almond, 1990), pp. 258–60. The application of ‘the ban’ (hārem) is not a distinctive feature as many commentators have supposed; see below, and note 11.

Mayes, Deuteronomy, finds an inconsistency between vv. 2 and 3: ‘Had [v.2] been carried out, or had it been intended ... the following verse would be superfluous’ (p. 183). It is more logical to read vv. 2b–3 as spelling out the Implications of 2a. J. Ridderbos, Deuteronomy (Bible Student’s Commentary; Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), p. 12, explains by reference to v. 22, but this is less realistic: the application of hārem could hardly follow a period of shared occupation, so v. 22 implies the gradual extension of boundaries and reduction of Canaanite cities.

kōl n’sāmāh, which I take as referring to human life. The word is never used of animals except in Gn. 7:22, and even this is not certain; see T.C. Mitchell, Vetus Testamentum (VT) 11 (1961), pp. 177–87. See also M. Weinfeld, ‘The ban on the Canaanites in the biblical codes and its historic development’, VT Suppl. 50 (1993), pp. 142–60. He finds a shift of terminology in Deuteronomy as compared with Exodus, prescribing extirpation rather than eviction, and concludes that the deuteronomistic view is ‘utopian’, although he admits that ‘the radical policy against the old inhabitants of the land characterizes the times of Saul’ (p. 156) and traces an early application of hārem to that period. It
is not altogether correct that the prescriptive passages in Deuteronomy tend to use 'destroy' rather than the 'drive out' of Exodus (the term 'dispossess' occurs in 12:29 and 18:12), but in any case the distinction seems somewhat academic: the option to go quietly was, as Weinfeld points out (p. 154), a Rabbinic invention reflecting conditions under the Hasmonaean.

The principal cases are: (a) Hormah (Nu. 21:26), where the destruction was made under a vow invoking divine assistance; (b) the law of an apostate Israelite community (Dt. 13:15-17); (c) Jericho (Jos. 6:17), by Joshua's orders; (d) the Amalekites (1 Sa. 15), by Samuel's orders.

The Talmud points out in Sifre Deuteronomy (tr. R. Haimer; New Haven, CN: Yale U.P., 1986), Piska 201, that Dt. 20:17 might have been read in this sense but that it is stated expressly in 6:10ff. that the Israelites were to acquire 'houses filled with all kinds of good things.' The text actually refers to the population.

For justification of this view of bērem, see J.P.U. Lilley, 'Understanding the bērem.' Tyndale Bulletin 44.1 (1993), pp. 169-77.

I have in mind here the deliberate use of hah'rēm, the verb derived from bērem, in its full religious significance (as in Dt. 7:2), to which the inscription of Mesha's line 17, provides a parallel: see D. Winton Thomas (ed.), Documents from Old Testament Times (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 197. There is clearly a weakened or derived sense meaning simply 'destroy' (Lilley, op. cit., pp. 176ff.).

W.F. Albright, Archaeology and the Religion of Israel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1956), pp. 68-94: 'Sacred prostitution was apparently an almost invariable concomitant of the cult of Anath' (p. 75).


Ibid., p. 136 (my italics).

Fresh debate on this subject arises from the inscriptions recovered at Qumran at 'Ajrud in the Negeb which appear to refer to Yahweh and his asherah' (though the reading and interpretation are under discussion). S.M. Olyan, 'Asherah and the cult of Yahweh in Israel' (SBL monograph 34: Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), p. 13, has gone so far as to infer that 'the asherah was a legitimate part of the cult of Yahweh: this could well have been so, even in Judah, under a king who favoured a pluralist religion. See R. Hess, 'Yahweh and his asherah?', in One God, one Lord, ed. A.D. Clarke and B.W. Winter (Cambridge: Tyndale House, 1991), p. 533.


Thus Mayes, Deuteronomy, p. 183, commenting on Dt. 7:2 'make no treaty'. See also Ex. 23:13.

Ex. 22:21, and frequently thereafter.

The verb hah' rēm occurs only once in our leading passages (Dt. 7:2), and is there expanded in terms of 'no treaty, no mercy'; the context of the only other occurrence in Deuteronomy (20:17) is not dissimilar. See note 11 above.

Mayes, Deuteronomy, p. 56.

Eph. 5:17.

E.g. 16:18; 17:8; 20:19; 22:6; 24:19.


1 Cor. 5:9-13.

Stanley E. Porter

In the first part of this article, I gave a general survey of Pauline studies. In this second part, I wish to go briefly through the Pauline corpus book by book and comment on a number of volumes that I have come across that might be of interest to Themelios readers. For each Pauline book, I first cite the commentaries that I think may be of use, noting especially their level of difficulty, perhaps their theological orientation, and something about the required knowledge of Greek. Then I briefly discuss monographs and other studies on these Pauline books.

Romans

Romans is undoubtedly the most widely and intensively studied of the Pauline letters. Four commentaries are worth noting. The first is by Joseph Fitzmeyer, the well-known and justly respected Catholic scholar. His commentary in the Anchor Bible Series does not require knowledge of Greek, although some knowledge does help when it comes to some discussions in the notes. Fitzmeyer emphasizes the theological dimension of the book along traditional lines (for which he is to be commended) and provides excellent bibliographies throughout. His introduction provides a commendable survey of major Pauline issues. He does not deal much with the new perspective on Paul. This is an excellent place to start studying the letter, especially by reading through the summary sections. Douglas Moo has written one volume of a two-volume commentary on Romans. Moo takes a traditional Reformed standpoint, and so consciously disputes the new perspective on Paul. The commentary is based on the Greek text (a syntactical diagram of the Greek text is promised in volume 2). The commentary is both heavily exegetical and heavily theological. Although at times it tends to dissolve into atomistic, verse-by-verse exegesis, there is much of great value to inform understanding of the text. Peter Stuhlmacher's commentary, translated from German, focuses upon the righteousness of God, as seen in his relation to Jews and Gentiles, Israel and the community of faith, thus emphasizing the Jewish background to the letter. Romans 9–11 consequently get their due. Designed for students and not requiring Greek, the commentary treats the material in blocks. There are also a number of excursuses on particular theological topics. Reference to secondary literature is kept to a minimum. Lastly, Hendrickson are to be commended for publishing a translation of the classic commentary by Adolf Schlatter, first published in 1935. Schlatter emphasizes the righteousness of God in this commentary (his influence on Stuhlmacher is to be noted, especially as Stuhlmacher writes an appreciative foreword to this version), which requires some knowledge of Greek to understand it fully.

There are three Introductory works on Romans to be noted. The first is a revised and greatly expanded version of The Romans Debate, first published in 1977. This has become a standard work for the study of Romans, gathering together representative essays on introductory questions. The new edition doubles the content of the first edition, bringing the discussion up to date and including, among others, essays on the new perspective on Paul. A range of scholarly opinion is represented, and this is simply compulsory reading for those starting to study Romans. Robert Morgan has produced a guide to Romans, which is more than simply a brief introduction. Included are what amounts to a small commentary (the largest chapter in the book), an introduction to the letter’s purpose, a miniature Pauline theology, and a history of the book’s reception. There is also a small, annotated bibliography. The book’s clear purpose is to bring study of Romans up to date in the major areas of recent discussion.

Among the monographs the following merit mention. Walter Wilson has written Love without Pretense, which examines Romans 12:9-21 in the light of
Hellenistic-Jewish Wisdom literature. Included is a lengthy and useful discussion of maxims and gnomic statements in ancient literature, with useful definitions and examples. He is less convincing, and perhaps too prone to accept others' conclusions, when dealing with Romans. Don Garlington's The Obedience of Faith is unfortunately a study of the concepts of obedience versus disobedience in a variety of Jewish literature, with only 20 pages devoted to Paul, where he admits that the exact phrase under discussion does not appear before Paul. One must ask whether so much emphasis on background studies is really necessary. Mark Seifrid's Justification by Faith is an attempt to redeem this concept in Paul, especially Romans, in the light of recent discussion. He argues for its forensic nature and corrects the new perspective on Paul. He cites the Qumran document 1QS and Psalms of Solomon as appropriate background for these findings, claiming that they show that divine mercy did not necessarily exclude obedience as a prerequisite to salvation and that Paul may well have been accurately depicting his Judaistic adversaries. Seifrid's discussion of Romans 7:14-25 is thorough and maintains the traditional temporal distinctions regarding Paul's present and past experience but not on the basis of the verb tenses alone, a significant improvement over most interpretation. James Walters argues that ethnic issues stand at the heart of Romans, and he attempts to clarify the social and religious context of the city in order to understand the purpose of Paul's writing. Richard Bell discusses the jealousy motif in Romans 9-11. He argues that the basis of this idea is Paul's use of Deuteronomy 32. The jealousy motif is seen as a preparation for the return of Christ by provoking Israel to emulate the Gentile Christians. This is part of Paul's apocalyptic thinking. Although marred by some dubious linguistics, including the confusion of word and concept, in all this is a very informative study of an important section. John Moore wrestles with rationality in Paul, using a model from the semiotic theory of Umberto Eco and modern rhetoric. Rather than defining the enthymematic elements of Paul's thought, as one might expect in an ancient rhetorical analysis, Moore in essence treats the macro-logical structure of the book. He provides a useful service in articulating the logical progression of various competing interpretations of Paul's line of thought, and extends this analysis over Romans 1-8. The discussion is extremely hard going at times, but there are a number of useful insights, although this study may be more about logic than about Paul. Anthony Guerra's Romans and the Apologetic Tradition is an able defence of Romans as a piece of protreptic literature, i.e., a form of persuasive literature advocating a particular lifestyle. This study is a model of clarity, not getting bogged down in unnecessary secondary literature, and includes a very useful discussion of the entire book of Romans from this standpoint. As a result, one certainly gets the big picture regarding Romans.

The Corinthian letters

The Corinthian letters have also attracted a significant amount of recent writing. There are three commentaries to mention. The first is the first volume of two on 2 Corinthians by Margaret Thrall for the International Critical Commentary Series. This is one of the standard, if not the premier, English-language, Greek-text-based commentary series. It is now in the second generation, and Thrall's work replaces a one-volume commentary by Plummer. Thrall offers a lengthy Introduction, in which she outlines especially various views on the unity of the letter. She then comments on the first seven chapters of the book. The value of the commentary is in the mass of information that is accumulated, including lengthy bibliographies and detailed discussions of various views regarding partition of the letter and, consequently, Pauline chronology. She also includes charts of others' opinions. Thrall opts for three letters: 2 Corinthians 1-8, 9, and 10-13. Less convincing, however, is her exegesis at various points. There is a wealth of grammatical discussion that does not enter into her commentary, even though it is a commentary on the
Greek text, and she seems too willing to consider evidence that is not entirely germane (e.g. rhetorical outlines of chs 8 and 9). Although the commentary is a good guide to the major issues of the discussion, readers will want to make sure that they make up their minds for themselves on various exegetical issues. Ben Witherington III tries to wed two different kinds of critical approach in his recent socio-rhetorical commentary. As a result, the commentary is not a detailed exposition, gliding fairly quickly over a number of issues. Partition theories of 2 Corinthians is one example. Witherington essentially assumes the unity of the letter, using rhetoric to prove his point. The introduction contains a useful discussion of what is known regarding the social setting of the Corinthian letters, with an annotated bibliography of pertinent sources. Unfortunately, to my thinking, Witherington apparently accepts the theory that these letters can be analysed as speeches in epistolary form, so he offers a rhetorical outline. Although the idea is an interesting one, I am not sure that the final product merits the effort. (Readers will want to beware of some of the comments on Greek grammar.) Kevin Quast has written an introduction to the Corinthian letters, apparently designed for study groups (there are questions at the end of each chapter). Although the format looks fairly elementary, there is a lot on offer in this volume, especially as a brief overview to the books or as a refresher. Quast offers a brief introduction to Paul and the city, with a chronology, and then briefly comments on the letters section by section. He gives an abundance of brief charts on various topics and issues. He concludes with an informative discussion of the Pauline letter form (finding four parts) and a brief description of Paul’s theology. The little extras are what make this book worthwhile. Craig Blomberg has written a commentary in the NIV Application Commentary Series. The exegesis and application are very basic.

Monographs and studies of the Corinthian letters include some very good work. These sometimes rely heavily on inscriptions, papyri and archaeological evidence. Use of these primary texts certainly adds to the studies’ relevance, although it does not necessarily guarantee the accuracy of their conclusions. Andrew Clarke has written on leadership in Corinth, on the basis of 1 Corinthians 1-6. This short, concise study is bound to incite some disagreement, since he distances his historical-social method of analysis from social-scientific criticism, claiming that he is going to analyse the primary sources apart from an established social theory. His conclusions are probably correct – the Corinthian church was a mixed community, with some in the upper social echelons who were involved in a number of practices that were all too typical of the Roman society of the time, such as benefaction. Verlyn Verbrugge tries to show how Paul changed his strategy in raising the collection from the Corinthian church. After identifying a commanding letter in 1 Corinthians 16:1-2, Verbrugge shows how that did not produce the desired results. He then shows how Paul used the requesting letters in 2 Corinthians 8 and 9 (he partitions 2 Corinthians in a way similar to Thrall), letters that were written after 2 Corinthians 10-13. Although Verbrugge presents interesting evidence from the papyri, especially on fundraising in the ancient world, he fails to prove the existence of the commanding letter or his chronology. Peter Gooch studies the eating of idol food at Corinth. After discussing the archaeological evidence, he outlines Paul’s position as one that advocated abandoning laws regarding circumcision and kosher food. Nevertheless, Paul also maintained that there should be no contact with other gods, which led to his position and argument in 1 Corinthians 8-10. Gooch further maintains that the Corinthians apparently ignored Paul’s instructions, since food offered to idols was very much a part of the social environment of Corinth. Although some of the distinctions that Gooch makes regarding differences in the contexts of 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, and in Paul’s positions, need to be weighed further, he marshals some very interesting evidence from the NT and later church writers. In a collection of essays on Pauline Theology, papers presented at the Society of Biblical Literature’s annual meetings 1989-91 are gathered together. There is more cohesion to this volume than the one above, with two essays each offering more comprehensive overviews of the theology of 1 and 2 Corinthians (authors of papers include Gordon Fee and Tom Wright).
Bibliographies for each of the books are included. In One Loaf, One Cup, five essays presented in 1988 at a conference on the Eucharist are printed together. Although the authors represent various traditions and are analysing different dimensions of the principal texts, there is a significant amount of overlap and coherence, especially as regards seeing 1 Corinthians 11:23-26 as reflecting normative Christian practice. Brian Rosner is a man determined to make his point in Paul, Scripture and Ethics. His point is not an easy one to make, try as he may. He claims that there has been negligence in finding a scriptural basis for Paul's ethics, and examines 1 Corinthians 5—7 with the intention of finding the scriptural background to these Pauline ethical admonitions. Find them he does, especially in Deuteronomy, although they are mediated through various later Jewish Interpretations of the biblical text. Although there is some good discussion of the basis of Pauline ethics and how to discerning use of the OT, there is some special pleading and overlooking of other significant factors. By contrast, J. Albert Harrill examines manumission of slaves in early Christianity in the context of Roman social and economic, rather than legal structures. He examines two key passages, 1 Corinthians 7:21 and Ignatius, Ad Polycarp 4:3. He finds that both of them endorse the idea that, if offered the opportunity of freedom, the slave should take it. Harrill's argument is based upon detailed exegesis, as well as extra-biblical evidence. His conclusions are contrary to those of many other recent studies of slavery. Although his case is not airtight, since the Greek evidence is slim, he certainly presents an argument worth considering, on a topic of significant practical application regarding early Christianity and contemporary Christian ethics.

Galatians

The rest of the Pauline letters have not been nearly so well served in the last few years as Romans and Corinthians. Galatians, for example, has had three commentaries published on it, that I note here. The first two provide a suitable contrast to each other. Dieter Lührmann's commentary, first published in German in 1978 and revised in 1988, is brief but highly readable and very useful as an introduction to the letter. He adopts a Lutheran approach that is consistent with traditional interpretation of the book, with distinctions drawn in Paul's thinking between faith and law. Lührmann offers an awful lot of good explanation of the various pericopes, recognizing the limitations of what we can reconstruct from the letter concerning, for example, the Jerusalem meeting, but offering a sympathetic treatment of Paul and his mission. In contrast is James Dunn's commentary on Galatians. As might be expected from what has been said above, this volume offers an interpretation of Paul's letter from Dunn's new perspective on Paul. Hence the emphasis is not upon the kind of contrast between faith and law that Lührmann emphasizes but on the place of defining rituals, with Paul abrogating such things as circumcision, food laws and Sabbath observance as necessary for those of the faith community. Dunn's commentary too is very readable, and the introduction is informative. Neither commentary requires knowledge of Greek, although there is some reference to the Greek in Dunn's. Also to be noted is Walter Hansen's commentary on Galatians. Hansen finds a via media in many respects, appreciating the new perspective on Paul and incorporating Betz's rhetorical analysis with changes, while also adopting traditional and conservative conclusions regarding chronology in relation to Acts, destination and the like. Since this commentary is in a series designed for pastors, it reads well and can offer insights on the passages, although it is not detailed in exegesis. There is virtually no reference to Greek.

Two other books also require mention. The first is also by Dunn, and is a small theology of the book of Galatians. He relies upon the exegesis of his commentary mentioned above, but develops the theological issues here. He organizes the theological discussion in a very useful way, selecting issues of
agreement or disagreement between Paul and those who are his opponents at Galatia. The result is an illustration of the shared beliefs and experiences of Paul and those of the church, something often overlooked because of the sometimes polemical nature of the letter, as well as its presentation of the matters of dispute. The views held in the commentary seem to be exemplified here, including the new perspective on Paul. Nevertheless, even if one does not accept this perspective, the book has much to offer. Hendrikus Boers offers an innovative study of Galatians and Romans (which could have been discussed above under Romans). Using what he calls textlinguistics and semiotics, and inspired by some earlier interpreters, Boers offers a macro-structural analysis of Galatians and Romans (i.e. the structure of each book in its entirety). His macro-structural analysis enables him to find the semantic deep structures of Paul’s thought – opposition between justification by faith and through works of the law, Jewish privilege and Gentile salvation as contrary values, the differentiation between good and evil, the problem of the law and the opposition between the spirit and the flesh, and the revelation to Israel as the foundation of salvation for all human beings. Many of the issues mentioned in these survey articles are touched upon in this volume, including rhetorical criticism, various theological concepts, and the issue of the coherence and centre of Paul’s theology. One should not expect to find detailed exegesis of passages in this volume, nor an introduction to textlinguistics. Although it is commendable that textlinguistics is being applied to the biblical text, this model is unrepresentative of the field, since it is based upon a model by the linguist Noam Chomsky (Appendix I discusses this model), and the descriptive conventions of Johannes Louw. It fails to deal with what most of those who work in that field would call textlinguistics. More pertinent are Boers’s observations on Paul’s thought, especially the sets of oppositions brought to the fore by his semiotic model. Whereas these appear to be contradictory, especially the idea that Paul accepts justification both through works and by faith, these can, according to Boers, be explained in the light of Paul’s purpose of proclaiming a Christainity in which no particular group is privileged over another. The conclusions are consistent with the new perspective on Paul.

The prison epistles

If we consider the so-called prison epistles of Paul together, the following books are worth noting. The most important commentary I have seen on these letters is by Peter O’Brien on Philippians. In the New International Greek Testament Commentary Series, it not only requires Greek to be fully appreciated, but is a detailed exegetical commentary with abundant reference to secondary literature. Although the introduction is relatively short compared to the rest of the commentary, it provides the basic information. O’Brien opts for authorship in Rome late in Paul’s imprisonment there, against partition theories that Philippians is made up of several letters, and for personal rivalry and antagonism to Paul, as opposed to Judaiters as the opponents. The commentary usually offers detailed analysis, including 85 pages on Philippians, 2:6-11 alone (15 per cent of the commentary). The conclusions are consistently conservative. Despite the fact that I find myself frequently disagreeing with O’Brien’s conclusions or his reasons for his conclusions, and missed quite a few important references to the secondary literature, I highly recommend this commentary as the place to go to find out what the range of scholarly opinion on a given issue is. To be noted also is Ben Witherington III’s commentary on Philippians. Whereas O’Brien is inclusive in his approach, briefly mentioning rhetorical criticism, Witherington has sold out to ancient rhetorical analysis. Finding inspiration from the work of Duane Watson (see above), Witherington provides an analysis of the letter as if it were an ancient speech or oration in epistolary form. Although Witherington does offer an able defence of many of the traditional conclusions regarding the book, including using rhetorical criticism to ‘prove’ the letter’s unity, there are a number of judgements that I simply cannot accept. Some of these are matters of interpretation of the autobiographical element present in the book at various places (e.g. Phil. 3:1-7).
and others are on the basis of his dependence upon ancient rhetorical analysis. Knowledge of Greek is not necessary for using this commentary, although some of Witherington's decisions are based upon his understanding of the Greek text, though not always convincingly. It is also worth noting that the commentary on Philippians by Moisés Silva has been re-issued by a new publisher. Although brief, it discusses the Greek text in an enlightening way.

I have come across two commentaries on Colossians. They are very different in scope and approach. Petr Pokorny has produced a commentary reviewed by me in this journal, whose substance I need not repeat here. Although he rejects Pauline authorship of the letter, Pokorny takes seriously the relationship of the letter to the Pauline corpus, outlining the trajectory of Paul's thought. The commentary utilizes the Greek text, but knowledge of Greek is not necessary. At many places there are useful insights, although I am not convinced by Pokorny's arguments for non-Pauline authorship. Besides debatable statements regarding the use of a scribe, and failure to address fully the issues of pseudonymity, Pokorny spiritualizes the issue of the continued usefulness of Colossians in the church. I think we need better explanations than that. By contrast, Murray Harris's grammatical commentary on Colossians and Philemon is less a commentary than, as the series title implies, a set of exegetical exercises. After the briefest of introductions to Colossians, in which he argues for Pauline authorship primarily on the basis of its relationship to Philemon, Harris offers a verse-by-verse exegetical guide, including comments on structure, parts of just about every word, comments on the phrasing, translation, expanded paraphrase, bibliography and preaching outlines, with an outline of the entire book at the end. He does the same with Philemon. The value of this commentary, which is heralded as the first of twenty in the series, is obvious, for getting the nuts and bolts of the language. Obviously it requires some previous knowledge of Greek. There are two distinct limitations, however. The first is that Harris offers theological judgements throughout, but it is often very difficult to see how they emerge from the text read apart from a previous theological framework. The second is that since Harris restricts himself to traditional grammatical tools and categories, much of the recent work in the area is not recognized or even cited. This is not a substitute for further linguistic study. Worth noting as well is Robert Wall's commentary on Colossians and Philemon. Wall is one of the most able canonical critics of the NT, and this comes through especially in the introductions in his commentary. He faces the issues of authorship squarely, concluding that Paul probably was the author of both books, but he also raises important issues regarding canon and the importance of theological issues, rather than historical ones, in its formation. Although I have entered into debate with Wall over these issues, I appreciate his raising them in a commentary, and hence his making canonical criticism a part of the exegetical enterprise. While in places he appears to follow too closely Harris's judgement on the Greek and Barty's on slavery, in all this is a very satisfying English-language commentary for preachers.

Martin Kitchen has written an intriguing commentary on Ephesians, mixing literary, historical and social-scientific approaches, according to the remit of this series. It is not a traditional commentary, offering two chapters on introductory issues, including a lengthy discussion of pseudonymous authorship of the letter, which the author defends, and then five chapters on commentary. These chapters do not attempt to comment on the entire book but select what the author sees as important concepts and sections. He begins with an extended word study of the word translated in Ephesians 1:10 as 'to bloom up', and uses this as the governing rubric for the commentary. Although the author raises a number of interesting questions regarding what it means for a book to be both historical and literary, as well as what it means to write a commentary, there are a number of unresolved issues here. This is probably not the commentary to go to first for an overview of the letter.
So far as monographs or books are concerned, there are four to consider. The first is by Karl Donfried and Howard Marshall on the Thessalonian letters, Philippians and Philemon. Although designed to be a short theology of these books, in many ways the volume resembles more standard introductions. Donfried, writing on Thessalonians, works from a rhetorical analysis of the letters. He discusses the major critical issues, concluding that 2 Thessalonians is not authentically Pauline. There is only one chapter on theology, and such topics as 'sanctification' and eschatology and apocalypse are given surprisingly short shrift. Marshall's treatment seems to fulfill the goal of the series more fully. He works from an epistolary form, and has generally good chapters on the supposed hymn of Philippians 2:6-11 and other theological topics, clearly emphasizing the christological dimension of the book (and questioning the new perspective on Paul). His discussion of Philemon recognizes that Paul is consciously constructing his argument to maximize its effect, a point that warrants further comment. In the same series, the volume by Andrew Lincoln and Alexander Wedderburn treats Ephesians and Colossians (although the biblical books are treated in reverse order in the volume, despite the authorial order on the cover and title page). Wedderburn's discussion of Colossians is very much in the mode of a standard introduction, including discussion of background issues and relating Colossians to the rest of the NT. (He accepts that the letter is not by Paul, although this is not adequately discussed, to my mind.) The supposed hymn of Colossians 1:15-20 is central to the letter's theology, in Wedderburn's analysis, a point that is worth making. Lincoln's analysis of Ephesians reflects the perspective of his recent commentary. Although he used to accept Pauline authorship of Ephesians, Lincoln now accepts pseudonymous authorship. This volume is consistent with that viewpoint, and addresses the issue of the letter's background and its relationship to the rest of the Pauline corpus and the NT. The largest chapter is devoted to the theology of Ephesians, and it is a very instructive chapter. Lincoln concentrates on those addressed by the letter, and defines who they are, where they came from in relation to salvation, where they are going eschatologically, and how they should live in an ethical sense. Since he concentrates upon the language of the text, this is a very effective introduction to the thought of the letter. Ernest Beat has provided a guide to Ephesians, which in many ways amounts to a short commentary. In the first substantive chapter he introduces the critical questions, essentially through a discussion of authorship, weighing both sides of the question. The second substantive chapter is a summary of the contents of the letter, almost a small commentary in itself. And the third deals with major themes, such as the Church. A last volume worth comment is Ephesos Metropolis of Asia, a volume of essays from varying perspectives (including archaeology, social history, Greco-Roman religion, and Hellenistic art and architecture), providing a wealth of information on a city important to the Pauline missionary movement. This is an interesting background study.

The Pastoral Epistles

The Pastoral Epistles have been a neglected area of Pauline studies. The reason has been that they have long been considered to be pseudonymous, and probably a lot later than other supposedly pseudonymous Pauline letters, such as Ephesians. In his recent commentary in the New International Greek Testament Commentary Series, George Knight courageously bucks the tide and argues strongly for Pauline authorship. Although I do not think that he always makes the most convincing case, sometimes relying too much on the opinions of others, I think that he is probably right in his conclusions. The exegesis is heavily dependent upon knowledge of the Greek, especially since Knight uses lexical tools as his main avenue of exegesis (counting word frequency, etc.). The result is an exegesis that is sometimes a little wooden and not as sensitive to recent developments regarding epistolary conventions, Greek grammar and literary features as it might be. Knight usually faces hard decisions squarely, although at a few points he takes what I consider to be a more theological than exegetical solution. In all, however, this is
a highly readable commentary that does not get bogged down in unnecessary arguments, and provides a fair study of the issues involved. Philip Towner is to be commended for facing the evidence against Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles in his commentary designed for pastors. Even though he concludes that Paul probably wrote them, he stresses that what they teach is more important. Unfortunately, the commentary itself will probably prove a disappointment for those who are looking for clearly stated exegetical conclusions. At more than a few places, Towner seems to shy away from the force of the passage, and at several crucial places he states that a theological application cannot be made on the basis of the passage apart from consideration of a larger theological framework. As sensible as this advice is, the constant recourse to the other side of the hermeneutical circle is bound to leave the reader unsatisfied.

As a last volume I mention Frances Young's short theology of the Pastoral Epistles. As noted above, perhaps more than any other Pauline letters, the Pastoral Epistles occupy a troubled place in Pauline studies, neglected and overshadowed by other letters. Consequently, they do not receive the attention they deserve, whether they are Pauline or not. Of course, the fact that the majority of scholars believe them to be clearly pseudonymous does not decrease their attractiveness for scholarly discussion. Young has had an opportunity to set much of this situation right in this short theological guide. I do not think that the opportunity has been seized, however. There is an unfortunate detachment from the latest — and some of the most important — bibliography, and the result is a lack of coming to grips with these letters in the way they deserve. There seem to me to be too many assumptions regarding date and authorship, as well as a number of generalizations (often without adequate support) regarding the contexts, perspective and theology. In her attempt to show the relevance of the letters, Young does raise some interesting issues regarding the ethics of reading. These comments are worth thinking about.

Conclusion

This survey has not been able to provide any more than a cursory glance at a number of recent works in Pauline studies. More space would not have helped the situation greatly, however, since this kind of article can only ever point in the direction of a number of books (or away from some others). It is worth summarizing at this point some of the major themes and issues that have emerged from this variety of books. I have sought to comment both on the usefulness of the volumes, and on their contents.

With regard to their usefulness, the books I have cited in the two parts of my survey fall into a number of categories, which I hope I have indicated clearly. Some of the volumes are introductory in nature, and can be consulted at almost any time for a variety of purposes, including getting basic information for Paul, starting reading on a subject, or simply gaining the pleasure of reading a book in a field of interest, whether that interest is well-informed or simply rudimentary. A good volume in this regard is the introduction to Paul by C.K. Barrett. Some of the volumes are more focused upon particular books within the Pauline corpus. These usually take the form of commentaries, although there are a number of other guides as well. Commentaries are difficult reading, and it is an unusual person who enjoys sitting down and ploughing through an entire commentary from cover to cover. In many ways, their best use is as reference tools. I have tried to offer some information on the level of their comments. Whereas one can probably benefit most from reading at or above one's level of knowledge, it is probably not advisable to read commentaries below one's level. Thus if one has some Greek, those commentaries strictly on the English text will usually not be nearly as fulfilling as those on the Greek text. Some of the volumes are focused upon particular topics. Sometimes these
are topics that span a portion of Paul’s mission or a number of books in the Pauline corpus, or sometimes they concentrate upon a particular book. Sometimes the topics can be quite highly specialized. I have spent less time with these kinds of volumes because their use is restricted. If one is interested in this particular topic or the particular book addressed, of course they are valuable reading. But they are probably not the first or even the second book one wants to pick up.

As regards content: in surveying this material, some of which I have gone back to and re-read after first reading it some time ago, I have been struck by a number of issues, some of which need further investigation. The first is that there are a number of major presuppositions governing much of the work that is done in Pauline studies. For example, there are those who accept the Sanders and Dunn new perspective on Paul. It is not surprising that those who do so exegete the text with this in mind and find support for this hypothesis. There are others, however, who do not accept this hypothesis. My impression from reading the works above is that the new perspective has now become the governing hypothesis, and that those who accept it do not feel nearly as much compelled to defend it as those who disagree with it feel compelled to respond to it. In any case, the final word is far from stated on this topic, as recent research (some cited above) indicates. Another of the presuppositions is with regard to Pauline authorship. As noted above, a number of scholars simply accept the seven-book Pauline corpus, and their work is not as concerned with the other six books. Again, some simply assume this; others feel compelled at least to explain, if not defend, their choice, while others dispute it altogether. Even though many consider these matters settled, with the recent discussion of canonical issues coming into prominence, the final word again remains unspoken.

A second feature to notice is the lack of balance in quantity of writing on the various topics and books. It is obvious that certain of the Pauline letters attract more attention than others. There are a variety of reasons for this, many of them historical in nature. Certain books have been at the centre of Pauline study for a number of years, while others’ positions have become more tenuous in recent times, especially in the light of reassessment of the authenticity of Pauline authorship. The same is true, however, regarding a number of topics. One can see that not only does the new perspective get discussed, but the rhetoric of the Pauline letters has also become a topic of frequent discussion. Other topics, for example Pauline chronology, are not nearly so widely discussed.

Thirdly, and following on from the point above, there is the place of ancient rhetoric in recent Pauline studies. Whereas a previous generation of scholars was concerned with defining Pauline epistolary form, especially in the light of publication of numerous papyri from Egypt, recent discussion has tended to place rhetorical analysis of the letters alongside, if not in place of, this epistolary analysis. There are a number of assumptions being made by those scholars who utilize the categories of ancient rhetoric to analyse the Pauline epistles, although these are often not debated. More attention certainly needs to be devoted to the issue of the legitimacy of applying ancient categories of speeches to letters and the claims made for such applications, especially since the ancients did not seem to do it.

Lastly, the amount of work on Paul’s world, including not only his Jewish world, which has been studied for some time, but also the Greco-Roman world in which he lived and travelled, is to be welcomed. We appear to be gaining significant insights into the more thoroughly integrated nature of this world, in which it is difficult to make simple generalizations or create stereotypes about the differences between Palestine and the rest of the Greco-Roman world. These background studies have direct implications for studying the Pauline cities, and also implications for studying particular passages in Paul’s letters. Although technical language-based studies are only a small part of this discussion, with the resources available more can certainly be done. The emphasis upon appreciation of the social world of the first century adds an important dimension to our knowledge of the theological dimension of Paul’s thought.
in Dispute at Colossae (JSNTS 96; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994); T.W. Martin, By Philosophy and Empty Deceit: Colossians as Response to a Cynic Critique (JSNTS 118; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996).


51 E. Best, Ephesians (NT Guides; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993).


54 P.H. Towner, 1-2 Timothy and Titus (IVP NT Commentary Series; Leicester: IVP, 1994).

55 F. Young, The Theology of the Pastoral Letters (NT Theology; Cambridge: CUP, 1994).
Craig Bartholomew

Craig Bartholomew is post-doctoral fellow in the Centre for the Study of Religion, Cheltenham and Gloucester College of Higher Education.

Introduction

Scholarship is always historical, in the sense that it is crafted by particular humans at a particular time and place. Christian scholarship is of course no exception to this rule. Thus Christians in academia, using the insights of God’s word, need to work as hard as anyone to understand the historical context in which they work, so that they might craft integra Christion theory at their point in history. Once we try to think about the context in which we are doing our scholarship, the word postmodern is unavoidable. Go to any major bookshop, especially the sociology section, and you will see what I mean. Postmodern is the word in vogue to identify the context in which we in the West live and think as we head towards the end of the second millennium. In this article we shall try to unravel what ‘the postmodern turn’ involves and examine the challenge it presents for the practice of Christian scholarship at this time.

The term ‘postmodern’

Postmodernity is an unusually slippery word, used nowadays in a bewildering variety of ways - 'the adjective “postmodern” has now been applied to almost everything, from trainer shoes to the nature of our subjectivity - from “soul to soul” as the rappers might say'. Although this fuzziness may reflect the instability of the postmodern era, it easily obscures the important issues at stake in the antithetical notions of postmodernity available today.

The term ‘postmodern’ was used as early as the 1870s and ‘postmodernism’ first appeared in the title of a book in 1926. Bertens points out that after the 1870s “Postmodern” resurfaced in 1934, in 1939, and in the 1940s. From then on sightings began to multiply. There is, however, very little continuity between these early uses and the debate on postmodernism as it gets underway in the course of the 1960s. The contemporary debate about postmodernism begins in the 1950s and 1960s as a reaction to modernism in the arts. Modernism meant different things in different art forms, and different things to different critics. Consequently, early postmodernism took different forms. Depending on the artistic discipline, then, postmodernism is either a radicalization of the self-reflexive moment within modernism, a turning away from narrative and representation, or an explicit return to narrative and representation. And sometimes it is both. The common element in this early postmodernism of the late 1950s and ‘60s is reaction and an attempt to transcend the limits of modernism in the arts. The debate about what would subsequently be called postmodernism took off between 1963 and 1967, key figures being Leonard Meyer, Ihab Hassan, William Spanos, Susan Sontag, Leslie Fiedler and Robert Venturi.

There is not the space here to look at postmodernism in the arts in any detail. To give us a taste, we will glance briefly at Hassan’s early understanding of postmodernism. Ihab Hassan is no longer a significant player in the postmodern debate, having of late turned to the American pragmatist tradition. However, in the 1960s and ‘70s he was very influential in giving the term ‘postmodernism’ wide circulation, influencing, inter alia, Lyotard. Particularly in the literary-critical field, his influence was so great that his work was the starting point for any treatment of literary postmodernism between the mid-1970s and ‘80s. Hassan proposed the notion of a postmodern literature of silence which is anti-representationalist and anti-modernist in its move towards disorder and attack on form. Initially, he saw this as a strand within
modernism but increasingly came to see post-war variants of the literature of silence as qualitatively different from the pre-war ones. This postmodern literature of silence 'strives for silence by accepting chance and improvisation; its principle becomes indeterminacy. By refusing order, order imposed or discovered, this kind of literature refuses purpose.'

From 1971 onwards Hassan promoted and engaged in a new anti-criticism, or what he called 'paracriticism'. This is an attempt to recover multi-vocation in which association and aphorism replace argument. In this way criticism will offer the reader empty spaces, silence, in which the reader can meet him- or herself in the presence of literature. Around this time, Hassan extended his critique to culture at large, although it was only in 1978 that he adopted the term 'postmodernity'. In the light of subsequent debates about postmodernity, Hassan’s notes are very suggestive but tend to be a catalogue of non-mainstream American culture. By 1978 he had come to see immanence and indeterminacy as characterizing the postmodern age. Immanence is the capacity of mind to generalize itself in the world, to act upon both self and world, and so to become more and more immediate, its own environment. The tendency ... depends, above all, on the emergence of human beings as language animals, homo pector or homo significans, gnostic creatures constituting themselves, and increasingly their universe, by symbols of their own making.

Such immanence is closely linked to the severing of the referential aspect of language referred to in Hassan’s literature of silence. Indeterminacy relates to 'heterodoxy, pluralism, eclecticism, randomness, revolt, deformation.' Immanence and indeterminacy are thus at the heart of the new postmodern epistème, in Hassan’s view. Hassan has thus come very close to a poststructuralist position, although his seeming to hold open the possibility of return to a referential era represented a more conservative stance. Indeed, he balked at the radical implications of his position and, as we mentioned, turned to the American pragmatist tradition.

The two terms, 'postmodern' and 'postmodernism', thus alert us from the outset to the complexity of the 'postmodern' debate. Philosophical (ideas), cultural (arts, religion) and social (capitalism, politics, communications revolution) shifts are all ingredients in the postmodern pie, and any respectable analysis of postmodernity must focus on these different strands and their entanglement. The postmodern turn results from the interaction between philosophical, cultural and social developments. This does not of course mean that the postmodern debate has no earlier roots. A cursory reading of Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard, key theorists of the postmodern, makes their dependence upon Nietzsche, Heidegger and the likes, clear. In his brief summary of the progenitors of contemporary theorizing of the postmodern, Lyon singles out Nietzsche, Marx, Heidegger, Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard and Simmel as 'streams feeding into the postmodern river'. Little in theories of the postmodern is new, but it is the widespread disillusionment with modernity and the embrace of previously minority anti-modern positions that makes the present different. In the latter sense, Bertens is correct to situate the start of the specifically postmodern debate in the early 1960s in American cultural and literary criticism.

Theories of the postmodern: some examples

Up until the 1980s, the debate on postmodernism was generally confined to the arts and architecture, although, as we saw with Hassan, the debate was being extended to a general critique of Western culture. 1981-84 changed the general restriction of postmodernism to the arts, when philosophers began to address the postmodern debate in all seriousness. Jürgen Habermas set the ball rolling with his 1980 Adorno lecture entitled 'Modernity versus Postmodernity'. And Habermas is regarded as the main target of Jean-François Lyotard’s 'La
Condition postmoderne', published in English in 1984. A huge volume of literature on postmodernity continues to snowball, representing a plurality of views often deeply at odds with each other. We will limit ourselves to an overview of the theories of the postmodern of Habermas, Lyotard and Derrida, once we have given some indication of the nature of modernity.

Habermas has reacted strongly to the postmodern notion of the end of modernity, proposing instead that we think of modernity as an unfinished project. This concern over modernity, which is central to the postmodern debate, alerts us to the shift in the discussion from modernism in the arts to a broader social and cultural critique about Western society as a whole. Modernism in the arts is 'generally' agreed to refer to the period 1890-1930, so that modernism is a reaction to that artistic modernism. Modernity, which is under discussion in the postmodern debate, refers, by contrast, to the whole Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment period, roughly 1789-1989. The concept 'modernity', although it describes the changes in Western culture from the late sixteenth century onward, only achieved wide circulation in the 1970s. Since so much of the postmodern debate centres on an evaluation of modernity, let me sketch briefly what modernity entails.

Modernity refers to the social order and perspective upon the world that emerged out of the Enlightenment. Some of the major characteristics of modernity are:

- Unprecedented change and positive espousal of this, closely related to the Industrial Revolution.
- Rejection of the authority of tradition and belief in the power of unaided human reason to produce freedom. Remember Kant's 'Dare to know!'
- Belief in progress.
- A deeply anti-Christian bent. As Gay explains: '... The philosophers rudely treated the Christian past rather as Voltaire treated the plays of Shakespeare – as a dunghill strewn with diamonds, crying out to be pillaged and badly needing to be cleaned out.' Certainty was to be sought in areas other than religion, which was privatized.
- Global consequences: the industrial and economic influence of modernity has been immense; think of job differentiation, rationalization, urbanization, military developments and secularism. Hardly any country of the world has been left untouched.

Lyon sums up modernity as follows:

"Modernity is all about the massive changes that took place at many levels from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, changes signalled by the shifts that uprooted agricultural workers and transformed them into mobile industrial urbanites. Modernity questions all conventional ways of doing things, substituting authorities of its own, based in science, economic growth, democracy or law. And it unsettles the self: if identity is given in traditional society, in modernity it is constructed."

Increasingly, however, the double edge to this development has been in the foreground; alienation and exploitation accompany this economic and industrial development; meaninglessness and aloneness (the society of strangers), and destruction of the environment have become the order of the day. Modernity has entered a crisis, and postmodernity is its name. Several scholars regard modernity as in crisis. According to David Lyon The postmodern, then, refers above all to the exhaustion of modernity. In his book on humanism, Carroll concludes, 'Our story is told. Its purpose has been simple, to shout that humanism is dead, has been so since the late nineteenth century, and it is about time to quit. Let us bury it with appropriate rites, which means honouring the little that was good, and understanding what went wrong and why.' A final example: Stephen Toulmin says
of modernity. "What looked in the nineteenth century like an irresistible river has disappeared in the sand, and we seem to have run aground... we are now stranded and uncertain of our location. The very project of Modernity thus seems to have lost momentum, and we need to fashion a successor programme."

Modernity is in crisis, but the answer, according to Habermas, is to get it back on track, not to abandon it. Habermas acknowledges the problem of "logocentrism" and "foundationalist" understandings of rationality but still argues that, politically, a privileging of rationality is indispensable. He proposes that we conceive of rationality as 'communicative reason'. Problems have developed in modernity because theoretical, practical and aesthetic reason have become separated from each other, and capitalist modernization has resulted in theoretical reason dominating the other two modes. The structures of language itself offer a way out of this impasse. Habermas elaborates on this with his philosophy of intersubjectivity revolving around communication and consensus. "Progress comes about by unearthing attempts to achieve an ever more enlightened consensus on the basis of reasoned debate, not by way of a permanent crisis that refuses to resolve itself."  

Habermas's defence of the project of modernity continues to be one of the major boundaries of the postmodern debate. Linda Hutcheon has perceptively pointed out that at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the '90s the postmodern debate was increasingly bounded on the one side by Habermas and on the other by Jean-François Lyotard. 20 Lyotard's 'The Postmodern Condition' is a study of the condition of knowledge in the highly developed societies. 21 Lyotard uses 'postmodern' to describe that condition.

According to Lyotard, the postmodern condition is characterized by incredulity towards metanarratives. Metanarratives are those large narratives that undergirded and legitimated the knowledge enterprise in modernity. An example of this is the Enlightenment narrative according to which the consensus reached between two people is true if they are both operating rationally. 22 Science may appear to have very little to do with narrative, but as Lyotard points out,

to the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimize the rules of its own game. It then produces a discourse of legitimation with respect to its own status, a discourse called philosophy. I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.

Legitimation of knowledge always requires some narrative, but, in the postmodern context, such narratives are incredible: "The narrative function is losing its function, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements... Each of us lives at the intersection of many of these, however, we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable." 23 The postmodern condition thus strikes at the heart of the possibility of transcendent, objective legitimation. Language games have replaced metanarratives and these always have only local and limited validity. "The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation." 24

However, the decision-makers in our society continue to try to manage this pluralistic and fragmented situation in terms of a single language game, namely performativity. Knowledge has been profoundly affected by the replacement of
the production of material goods with information as the central concern in advanced societies. Society is being computerized and instrumental rationality dominates others forms of reason. The production of proof ... falls under the control of another language game, in which the goal is no longer truth, but performativity - that is, the best input/output equation.

Lyotard is clear that the attempt to find a larger narrative in performativity is as incredible as previous metanarratives. He rejects any attempt to work towards consensus with regard to what is true knowledge. Lyotard argues that Habermas's notion of consensus is based on the narrative of emancipation. However, political emancipation is achieved through dissensus, not consensus, and Lyotard proposes an apprenticeship in resistance. Communication will always be a struggle. In Lyotard's view, and in place of Habermas's consensus he suggests 'general agonistics' and 'paralogical activity'. Both these concepts are Lyotard's terms for affirming new and different moves in language games as opposed to the notion of consensus. The only moves not permitted in a language game are those of terror. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honour of the name.

Jacques Derrida has become a household word as regards postmodernism. As Thisleton points out, 'Deconstruction in literary theory is often perceived as the strongest philosophical context of post-modernism, and Derrida as one of its most forceful exponents in this dual area.' Certainly Derrida has been an important figure in promoting the idea of language as the bottom line of reality, textual instability (see below), and the inability of language to represent reality accurately, themes which have become central to much postmodernism. Caution is required, however, in positioning Derrida as a postmodern theorist. Norris has insisted that we distinguish Derrida's work from the more anti-rational work of Rorty and Baudrillard, pointing to his thorough and close analysis of texts and his concern with philosophical argumentation.

The genre of Derrida's writings is not easy to classify, and this is related to his unusual understanding of the relationship between philosophy and literature. Derrida refuses to privilege philosophy as the dispenser of reason and focuses on language, with all its disruptiveness, as the basis of both philosophy and literature. Derrida deconstructs Saussure's view of language to expose the disruptiveness of language. Against Saussure, he argues that language can only represent a representation of the world. Saussure's distinction between signifier and signified depends on an absolute term, beyond the play of signs, which anchors meaning. Without such an anchor, the endless play of signification becomes apparent.

Philosophy cannot dispense with language and is thus as subject to the disruptiveness of language as is any discourse. In the history of Western philosophy, thinkers have been able to impose their concepts on other disciplines only by ignoring the disruptive effects of language. By undermining/deconstructing this whole between philosophy and other modes of discourse, Derrida 'provided a whole new set of powerful strategies which placed the literary critic, not simply on a footing with the philosopher, but in a complex relationship (or rivalry) with him, whereby, philosophic claims were open to rhetorical questioning or deconstruction.' Indeed, in so far as literary texts are in touch with their rhetorical nature, they are less deluded than philosophers who deny their embeddedness in language.

Derrida's deconstructive approach rests therefore on his philosophy of language. Language as 'writing' is the bottom line of reality and is Derrida's means of opposing logocentrism. Derrida moves to this point by critiquing Saussure's privileging of spoken over written language. He discerns a whole metaphysics of pure self-presence (i.e., an assumption of an absolute term which guarantees meaning) underlying Saussure's favouring of spoken language, a position which has a long history in the Western philosophical tradition. Contra Saussure, Derrida argues
that writing is the precondition of language and thus prior to speech. It is important to note that he is using writing to mean something different from mere inscription. In *Of Grammatology* he says, "We say "writing" for all that gives rise to inscription ... cinematography, choreography, ... pictorial, musical, sculptural "writing"." Norris explains Derrida's notion of writing as follows:

The term is closely related to that element of signifying difference which Saussure thought essential to the workings of language. Writing for Derrida is the 'free play' or element of undecidability, within every system of communication. Its operations are precisely those which escape the self-consciousness of speech and its deluded sense of the mastery of concept over language. Writing is the endless displacement of meaning which both governs language and places it for ever beyond the reach of a stable, self-authenticating knowledge.

If this is difficult to understand, that is part of Derrida's intention: he does not want the meaning to be pinned down, as the elusiveness of his use of difference indicates, its meaning remaining suspended between 'difference' and 'defer'. Derrida applies his understanding of writing to Rousseau's 'Essay on the Origin of Languages' and Levi-Strauss's nature-culture distinction in order to show how both texts suppress writing which nevertheless remains present and having set this in the foreground, deconstructs their texts. In terms of deconstructive method, Norris comments on this work of Derrida that: 'Once again it is a matter of taking a repressed or subjugated theme (that of writing), pursuing its various textual ramifications and showing how these subvert the very order that strives to hold them in check.' Such self-engendered paradoxes in texts, Derrida calls 'aporia'.

Language as the bottom line of reality neither has underlying ground to support it, nor has any meaning beyond itself. Consequently, Derrida resists any attempt to centre philosophy. The Western tradition has identified a number of different possible centres which provide a foundation for language. However, for Derrida, all these centres take their place within the universe of signs and they cannot escape the endless chain of signifier and signified. Centres are functionally indispensable but they are always only provisional; Derrida calls this approach *decentering* and the refusal to acknowledge the provisionality of our centres, *logocentrism*. Here we encounter a major theme of postmodern thinking, what Lyotard refers to as the rejection of metanarratives. Fragmentation and transience characterize postmodernity, accompanied by thorough-going pluralism. For Derrida, there is no grounding of language; language has no ground external to itself that is not illusory. Here he follows Heidegger in absolutizing language and refers to language as 'the bottomless chessboard' to indicate the lack of any foundation and the fact that play has no meaning outside of itself. Habermas and Norris disagree strongly about how to evaluate Derrida and how to position him among postmodern theorists. For Habermas, Derrida is particularly interested in standing the primacy of logic over rhetoric, canonized since Aristotle, on its head. Norris argues that Habermas misreads Derrida, who retains a concern for rigorous analytical work and careful philosophical argumentation. This is true, but it does seem that there are major tensions in Derrida's work between this emphasis and the sea of textuality amidst which all is adrift.

Our survey of three key theories of the postmodern has been all too brief, and no attention has been paid to theorists of the importance of Jameson, Baudrillard, Rorty, Michel Foucault and Zygmunt Bauman. However, the purpose of the survey is simply to put our discussion of postmodernity and OT hermeneutics in this broader philosophical context. These broader issues continually impinge on the special sciences, but they are often unknown.
The postmodern turn as a time of foundational crisis

As I have stressed, there are many layers to the postmodern turn. Socially, postmodernity is related to shifts in capitalism at the end of the twentieth century and to the communications revolution. Culturally, we have glanced at the shifts in the arts, and, of course, the media are deeply involved in the communications revolution. Religious renewal is also part of the mix. In this section I want to focus on philosophical aspects of the postmodern turn, while being alert to this as only one aspect of the total. I suggest that, philosophically, the postmodern turn represents a time of foundational crisis as the tensions and internal contradictions of modernity play themselves out.

1. Postmodernity has raised all sorts of questions about our capacity to know and how we know and whether we can accurately represent reality, i.e. about epistemology. The possibility of universal objective knowledge is considered by many to be impossible. Much postmodern theory is strongly anti-realist and considers all knowledge to be local, communal and a human construct. Such epistemological scepticism is captured very clearly in Lyotard’s notion of ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’. The corollary of this scepticism has been a profound suspicion of the hidden agendas of ‘neutral’ modern knowledge; what is claimed to be objective and value-free has come to be seen as a mask for powerful ideologies. The consequence of this scepticism is an awareness of inevitable pluralism in knowledge and consequent fragmentation. Certainty and truth are regarded by many with great suspicion – paradoxically, the one thing that radical postmodern thinkers seem quite sure of is that there are no metanarratives! There is widespread disagreement about the role of rationality and whether or not knowledge can be grounded. Some, like Norris, Habermas and Gellner, seek to reconstruct the project of modernity. Others would seek a genuinely postmodern position in which rationality is always perspectival. Still others, like MacIntyre, seek to do justice to the perspectival nature of rationality while holding on to more universal perspectives.

2. Epistemology is closely related to ontology, and here, too, postmodernity has undermined the broad consensus of modernity. One would expect that incredulity towards metanarratives would leave little room for much ontological reflection, but of course this is unavoidable. All philosophical analysis inevitably carries with it ontological presuppositions, whether consciously or not. A common ontological presupposition in postmodern theory is that language is the most fundamental aspect of reality. Derrida is a good example of this view. Much postmodern theory has little room for any notion of an order in reality existing apart from human construction. Scepticism about human knowing goes hand in hand with a high view of the human community as constructing the worlds in which we live. This, too, reflects a particular ontology.

3. Epistemology and ontology are inseparable from anthropology, in the sense of the nature of humankind. The rationalistic, autonomous view of the human which was so dominant in modernity has been undermined, and a plurality of alternatives proposed. Rorty, for example, suggests that we should think of the moral self as ‘a network of beliefs, desires, and emotions with nothing behind it – no substrate behind the attributes. For purposes of moral and political deliberation and conversation, a person just is that network.’ For Foucault, the human person is ‘no more than a kind of rift in the order of things, or, in any case, a configuration whose outlines are determined by the new position he has so recently taken up in the field of knowledge ... man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, ... that will disappear as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.’ In several postmodern thinkers, Freud’s anthropology has been revised and renewed. If thinkers like Baudrillard play down the possibility of the human subject acting in any significant way, others stress the possibility of human self-creation.
Epistemology, ontology, anthropology: that so much postmodern theorizing is related to these areas indicates the extent to which the philosophical foundations of modernity are in crisis. In many respects, postmodernity is the name we give to this foundational crisis, which Neil Smith captures poignantly when he writes, *The Enlightenment is dead, Marxism is dead, the working class movement is dead... and the author does not feel so well either.* Postmodernity is characterized by pluralism, uncertainty, instability and fragmentation. The old certainties seem to have gone, with no unified vision to replace them, even as capitalism hurries on into a revolutionary information phase.

However, it seems to me better to refer to what is being called postmodernity as *late* or *high* modernity. Harvey suggests that modernity is characterized by a rejection of tradition and embrace of change, as well as confidence in the ability of reason to lead to new certain truths. The capacity of reason to do this has been undermined, so that we are left with change, flux and instability. Such an analysis helpfully alerts us to the fact that the roots of modernity have been called into question, but they have not all been abandoned. Human autonomy, for example, tends to remain as firmly entrenched as ever, the difference being that we now perhaps have to *learn* to live with, or even perhaps celebrate, the uncertainties and limitations. Mary Hesse alerts us to the lingering legacy of modernity in the postmodern debate when she writes: *The liberal consensus has so successfully established itself as the ideology of Western intellectual culture, that it has become almost invisible as the presupposition of every postmodern debate.* And it ought not to be forgotten that the nihilistic and relativistic side of postmodern theory is only one aspect of the contemporary situation. Chris Norris detects something of a reaction to the extremes of postmodernism among some of its proponents, namely Said and Kristeva, and he himself has undertaken a major project aimed at rehabilitating a form of realism.

Certainly, if modernity is a reaction to and immanentizing of a Christian worldview, then postmodernity shows little sign of openness to recovering Christian perspectives on reality. David Lyon says:

> Today, the human is being displaced, decentred, and the grip on the future seems once more up for grabs. While this opens the door for everything from Foucault’s play of power to the Age of Aquarius, it also renders more possible the possibility that Providence was not such a bad idea after all. Perhaps postmodern apocalypticists will have to make space for a vision of a (re)newed earth, that antique agent of social change, and the original partner of final judgement.

And John Milbank has argued that only Christian theology provides an alternative route to contemporary nihilism. However, these voices are in the minority.

**The postmodern turn and Christian scholarship**

The complexity and the comprehensive nature of the challenge of postmodernity will be obvious from the above. The postmodern debate raises a myriad of issues that Christians need to address and wrestle with. In this concluding section, I shall simply state the challenge that the postmodern turn presents to Christians to produce integrally Christian scholarship.

The danger of the postmodern turn, at least philosophically, is relativism, and the loss of any notion of ‘true truth’. The plus, in my view, is its undermining of the myth of neutrality so central to modernity and the reopening of discussion about foundations. Christians have always had the resources to recognize that scholarship is never neutral but is always shaped by the religious presuppositions and worldview of the academic involved. However, such has
been the dominance of modernity with its myth of neutral, rational objectivity, that many Christians succumbed to the pressure of doing Christian scholarship beneath the Cartesian umbrella. The general tenets of modernity seemed so obvious that they tended to be taken for granted and assumed, rather than examined from a Christian perspective. These same tenets are now, however, being attacked from many sides. Certainly, within academia, postmodernity provides us with an opportunity to rethink the foundational areas of epistemology, ontology and anthropology and to give an account of our presuppositions. A scientific approach to reality which imposes an inductive method of fact-collecting upon disciplines cannot simply be assumed to be appropriate; if it is the desired approach, and I for one would not recommend it, then it will have to be argued for. The modern consensus has been loosened, at least philosophically. Thus, amidst contemporary scholarly pluralism, one needs to consider where one positions oneself philosophically and account for one's position. For Christians, this positively provides the impetus to explore the ontological, epistemological and anthropological implications of a Christian perspective on reality. In short, the postmodern turn challenges Christians to produce integrally Christian scholarship, rather than scholarship which is an uncritical synthesis of different and conflicting perspectives upon reality. All theory construction carries with it philosophical presuppositions, and Christians need to ensure that this is in line with the gospel in their academic labours. The postmodern turn provides the gap, as it were, for Christians to hear the call to scholarship coram Deo once again. And, of course, this applies to Christians in all disciplines, and not just in theology. The foundational philosophic crisis of postmodernity is being felt all over the academy, thereby reminding us that integrally Christian scholarship is required in all disciplines. In his exhilarating 'The New Testament and the People of God', Tom Wright has given us a taste of how attention to the foundations can positively reshape a discipline. 'I suggest that for Christians in academia, the postmodern turn presents the challenge and opportunity to do this type of work in all disciplines: re-examine the foundations and find a way of constructing an integrally Christian edifice in that area while remaining deeply in dialogue with contemporary proponents of the discipline. Such labour would do much to reduce the 'scandal of the Evangelical mind'.

The fact is that important shifts are taking place and, whatever our precise interpretation of postmodernity, as David Lyon says, 'the concept of postmodernity is a valuable "problematic" that alerts us to key questions concerning contemporary social changes. I see it,' he says, 'as a concept that invites participation in a debate over the nature and direction of present-day societies, in a globalized context, rather than one describing an already existing state of affairs. ... The important thing is to understand what is happening ...' Postmodernity as a concept certainly invites Christians to examine closely the nature and direction of their academic endeavours.

A reader's guide to (some) Christian texts on postmodernity

The literature on postmodernity is constantly expanding. As a help for readers wanting to get into this discussion and to develop a Christian perspective on postmodernity, here is a short list of relevant books. The * indicates the titles I would suggest starting with.

Colin E. Gunton 1993. The One, the Three and the Many, God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: CUP). A thorough theological diagnosis of the condition of modernity with proposals for a theological remedy along trinitarian lines. Highly recommended!

Brian D. Ingraffia 1995. Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology. (Cambridge: CUP). In this penetrating text, Ingraffia explores the postmodern opposition to theology evidenced in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida and argues that they all critique the ontotheology that resulted from the Hellenization of biblical theology. Christian thinkers ought not to follow postmodern theory, according to Ingraffia,
but should reverse the ontotheological route by recovering a theology of the cross, and developing Christian critical theory which is built on revelation and guided by a hermeneutics of faith.

Roger Lundin 1993. *The Culture of Interpretation. Christian Faith and the Postmodern World.* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans). Superbl Lundin takes an account of contemporary culture by exploring the historical background to some of its central beliefs and considering the implications of these. He starts with a look at current developments in education and the university, and then focuses specifically on two nineteenth-century American authors, Emerson and Hawthorne. Subsequent chapters deal with Marxism and poststructuralism, and the implications of the culture of interpretation for Christian faith.


Thomas Oden. 1990*. *After Modernity...What? Agenda for Theology* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan); 1992. *Two Worlds: Notes on the Death of Modernity in America and Russia,* (Illinois: IVP); 1995. *Requiem. A Lament in Three Movements* (Nashville: Abingdon). Oden has returned from the theological wastelands of modernity to (re)discover evangelical orthodoxy. His recent works are as result fresh and vital, with a keen sense of where the battle-lines are. Although I think Oden has too quickly pronounced modernity dead, the feast of his writings should not be missed.


Anthony Thiselton 1995. *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark). Thiselton responds to the serious challenge that the postmodern turn presents to Christian theology, and pays particular attention to understandings of the 'self' and its relationship to society. This important book contains a particularly useful analysis and critique of Don Cupitt's theological development against the background of modernity and postmodernity (Part III).

B. Walsh and R. Middleton, 1995. *Truth is Stranger Than it Used to Be. Biblical Faith in a Postmodern Age* (London: SPCK). A thorough and creative text from the authors of the very useful *The Transforming Vision*. I would, however, be cautious about their particular narrative proposal, with respect to the authority of Scripture.


---

1 This article is a revised version of a paper presented to the Gloucestershire Philosophical Society, October 1995, and to the Biblical Studies Seminar, Cheltenham and Gloucester College of Higher Education, March 1996.


4 See ibid. and Margaret Rose, *The Post-Modern and the Post-Industrial* (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp. 3–20, on the earliest uses of the term 'postmodern'.

5 Cf. Wheale, op. cit., pp. 15–32.

6 See Bertens, op. cit., pp. 3–5.
See the many references to representation and anti-representation in *ibid.* Briefly, the crisis of representation in postmodernity relates to the question of whether or not we can adequately represent the real.


That is, to the sort of postmodern views held by Barthes, Derrida, De Man, etc., who 'develop' structuralism in such a way as to undermine the possibility of accurately representing the world. For a useful overview of poststructuralist theories, see Raman Selden and Peter Widdowson, *A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory* 3rd edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 125-73.

David Lyon, *Postmodernity* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), p. 7, proposes that we use 'postmodernism' in relation to cultural and intellectual phenomena and 'postmodernity' in relation to putative social changes. Thus postmodernism would refer to the reaction to modernism in the arts and to the current epistemological crisis resulting from the shaking of foundationalism. Postmodernity relates more to whether or not a new kind of information and consumerist society is emerging after/out of modernity. This is a useful distinction but it is important to remember that the cultural, intellectual and social coherence and are not easily separated.

*ibid.*, pp. 7-11.

Bertens, op. cit., p. 17. comments that 'The debate on postmodernism as it has been variably defined since the 1960s has its origins in American literary and cultural criticism and it is from there that it moves into all the other fields and disciplines where it has in the last twenty-five years manifested itself.' Of course, the specifically postmodern debate is connected with, and indeed an expression of, ongoing and developing disquiet with modernity, and thus connects with all evaluations of modernity.


Generally needs to be stressed; cf. Wheale, op. cit., pp. 15-32.


See below for a discussion of the extent to which postmodernity remains modern. As regards the origin of modernity, I suspect its roots are to be found in the Renaissance.


*ibid.*, p. 21.

Lyon, op. cit., p. 6.


Toulmin, op. cit., p. 3.

'Logocentric' refers to that Western notion of reason which aims at pure, unmediated access to truth and knowledge.
'Foundationalist' is often used too loosely in the postmodern debate. 'Classic foundationalism' is the view that a belief is properly basic if it is self-evident to me or immediately self-evident from my experience. It is classic foundationalism that has increasingly been undermined this century, but this is not the same as saying that epistemology or truth have been undermined. See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: OUP, 1993) pp. 176-93.

Bertens, op. cit., p. 117.

Bertens, op. cit., p. 122. Inevitably it is not easy to talk of boundaries where postmodernity is concerned. Contra Hutcheon, Lyotard may not be the opposite boundary to Habermas. Chris Norris (What's Wrong with Postmodernism? London: HarperCollins, 1990, p. 165) argues that 'no one is as extreme as Baudrillard in his opposition towards truth claims. He acknowledges that Lyotard has made similar claims, but 'In Lyotard's case there has been a marked shift of emphasis, from a work like The Postmodern Condition where enlightenment values are seen as the source of manifold errors and evils, to those recent texts where a certain (albeit heterodox) reading of Kant is applied to questions of history, politics and interpretation.'


ibid., p. xxiii.

ibid., p. xxiii.

ibid., p. xxiv.

ibid., p. 37.

ibid., p. 47.

ibid., p. 60.

See especially ibid., pp. 60-67.

ibid., p. 82.


Christopher Norris helpfully defines deconstruction as 'to draw out conflicting logics of sense and implication, with the object of showing that the text never exactly means what it says or says what it means'. See Norris's essay in C. Norris and A. Benjamin, What is Deconstruction? (London, New York: Academy Editions/St Martins Press, 1988), p. 7.


Norris, 1991 op. cit., p. 28.

ibid., p. 31.

Cf. ibid., pp. 32-41.

ibid., p. 39.

Cf. ibid., p. 49.

See footnote 26 above.


Habermas, op. cit., p. 187.

See Bertens, op. cit., for a useful overview of these theorists.

See D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), and David Lyon, The Information Society: Issues and Illusions (Cambridge:
Polity, 1988), for a discussion of these themes.
For example, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Gattari, Lacan.
Quoted in Harvey, op. cit., p. 325.
Harvey, op. cit.
In an excellent essay, Keith Sewell puts his finger on this point: 'While the enlightenment ideal of the autonomy of reason might have fallen, the western intellectual tradition continues to be subject to the delusion that we ... are the authors and originators of meaning ... This is the individualistic romanticism of postmodernity.' See Keith Sewell, 'The eclipse of history and the crisis of the humanities' (Victoria, Australia: The Research Press, 1995) p. 17, 18.
Mary Hesse, 'How to be postmodern without being a feminist', The Monist (1994), p. 457.
Christopher Norris, Truth and the Ethics of Criticism (Manchester: MUP, 1994).
Lyon, 1994 op cit., p. 5, suggests a shift from providence (pre-modern) to progress (modernity) to nihilism (post-modern). David Ray Griffin maintains that 'Modernity rejected the Christian form of this story as mythological but retained the notion of a single movement in history (the modern West), which is alone meaningful and outside of which there is no salvation, now understood as economic and technological progress'. See Griffin's chapter, 'Postmodern theology and a/theology: a response to Mark Taylor', in D. R. Griffin, W. A. Beardslee and J. Holland, Varieties of Postmodern Theology (Albany: SUNY, 1989), p. 32.
Lyon, 1994, op cit., p. 86.
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). I am intensely aware that the nomenclature 'pre-modern, modern and postmodern' is inadequate. On the one hand, it privileges the 'modern' too much, and secondly it is far too blunt a tool for the surgical work that cultural analyses require. It is a bit like trying to do surgery with a scalpel within the Reformational philosophic tradition of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, considerable work has been done in developing more sophisticated and integrally Christian tools for this type of analysis. For a taste of a Dooyeweerdian analysis of postmodernity see Danie Strauss, 'The modern scientific dispensation and the spiritual climate of contemporary - "postmodernism"' (unpublished paper presented at the Calvin College Philosophy Department, 23 October 1995). I am not aware of a Vollenhovenian analysis of postmodernity, but for a useful outline of its basic method see Calvin Seerveld, 'Towards a cartographic methodology for art historiography', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 No. 2 (1980), pp. 143-54.
Lyon, 1994 op. cit., pp. 84, 85. Cf. also Lyon's statements that 'the question of postmodernity offers an opportunity to reappraise modernity, to read the signs of the times as indicators that modernity itself is unstable, unpredictable, and to forsake the foreclosed future that it once seemed to promise' (ibid., p. 70). 'The idea of postmodernity may yet turn out to be a figment of overheated academic imagination, popular hype, or disappointed radical hopes. But it is worth pursuing because it alerts us to a series of highly important questions. It raises our sensitivity and helps us see certain issues as problems to be explained' (ibid., p. 4). On the 'problematic value' of postmodernity cf. also Rose, op. cit., pp. 178, 179.

See also the earlier companion volume: David F. Wells No Place for the Truth Or Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).
Nozomu Miyahira

Dr Miyahira, who earned his doctorate on the doctrine of the Trinity, is currently Visiting Scholar at Green College, Oxford.

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity has traditionally been expressed in terms of three persons and one substance or being. This belief and formulation is taken for granted by orthodox Christians. But a question may emerge when we take into consideration the fact that, although the gospel itself is universally relevant, unrestricted to any particular place or time, this formula was originally elaborated in the ancient Greco-Roman world, using the terms available in those days and intelligible within that mindset. Is this formula relevant today to Christians with other cultural backgrounds? With this question in mind, I shall set out the reasons why Japanese Christians may use another formula: God is three betweennesses, one concord. I shall do so in two steps: first, I shall explain some Japanese conceptualities, and secondly, I shall seek parallels for them in the orthodox Christian tradition.

Japanese concepts of humanity and community

Historically, the traditional trinitarian formula played a role in distinguishing orthodoxy from heresy. In fact, however, the important point is not so much the formula itself, as what trinitarians intended to express through it. Studying deeply the ancient, heated argument over the doctrine of the Trinity, and in the course of serious argument against the anti-trinitarian Servetus, John Calvin wrote calmly and tersely about trinitarian terms, in his celebrated Institutes of the Christian Religion. I could wish they were buried, if only among all men this faith were agreed on: that Father and Son and Spirit are one God, yet the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but that they are differentiated by a peculiar quality.' For him, two things are crucial in this definition: unity and difference in God. These are of primary importance; the terms that signify them are secondary. This will lead those in whom a cultural mindset other than the Greco-Roman is ingrained, to say that they may use their indigenous terms provided that they signify unification and differentiation as properly and accurately as possible. When they take this route, they have an advantage. They can begin to understand the mystery of the Trinity through the terminology congenial to their mindset. Besides, they can in their turn contribute to the elucidation of the Christian understanding of God as Trinity, by introducing subtle modifications to the traditional expression of the doctrine as they use their own, native, terms.

In Japan, the original trinitarian terminology, and even its translated terms, such as 'Ikaku' for 'person' and 'Jittai' for 'substance', is arcane and misleading. This is partly because these translated terms are not indigenous ones, historically used in the actual life of people over a long period of time. So I wish to explore the possibility that we make use of indigenous Japanese terms in order to express the unity and difference in the trine God. Let us now look at the terms that are potentially suitable as differentiating and unifying concepts.

Human betweenness

Obviously, there is no old and indigenous term in Japan for the Christian trine God. But the Japanese have long nursed a term for humanity. How can we make it useful for theology?

The traditional and indigenous Japanese term for a human or humanity is 'ningen'. If we translate this directly into English, it can be expressed as 'human betweenness'. In Japan, we tend to think of humans as being what they are in their interrelationship: they are living, as we should put it, 'between' one another. This notion is inextricably interwoven with people's work in rice
agriculture, in which a very large number of the Japanese were engaged for about 2,000 years, until the end of the war. Rice agriculture is so labour-intensive that it necessarily demands mutual co-operation. Moreover, workers follow the same pattern of rice cultivation every year. All this means that work with the same people is carried on again and again, because the nature of rice agriculture keeps workers inescapably bound to the same fields. Therefore, people always find themselves in relation to each other or, as we might put it, 'between' one another.

In this century, the first major attempt to examine 'ningen' was made by Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960), 'the best philosopher of ethics of modern Japan', in his book Ethics as the Study of Man, published in 1934. According to this work, the Chinese characters for 'ningen' used to mean, not 'humanity' but 'the world of humanity' or 'the community', and it came popularly and erroneously to mean a 'human' or 'humanity' in Japan about 1,000 years ago. Watsuji thought that this event shows how the Japanese understand humanity; their understanding is drawn from the context of community existence (pp. 14, 18f.). He regarded this as an event of great importance, since it brings into clear relief the fact that the Japanese mindset tends to think of humanity and community on the same level. On this basis, he defined 'ningen' as 'hito no aida', or 'between humans', with reference to the fact that they live closely together in a community.

Watsuji attempted to explain, from a Buddhist perspective, how the understanding of community and of humanity are closely related. He interpreted the relation between community and humanity as a dialectical relation of the whole to its parts (pp. 19ff.). For instance, pupils (parts) depend on the school (the whole) in that, without the school, there is nothing to attend and so they can no longer be pupils, whereas the school depends on the pupils in that, without any pupils, there is no longer a school. In Buddhism, this kind of argument is called 'absolute denial'; through this denial, parts and whole are seen in their dialectical relation.

The second major attempt to interpret humanity in terms of betweenness was made by a psychiatrist, Kimura Bin (1931- ) in his Between Man and Man, published in 1972. Here, he argued that a self becomes aware of itself when it meets what is not itself (pp. 14ff.). It is the distinction between the self and the non-self that enables the self to be so called. There is no self without the non-self. Both self and non-self appear simultaneously. But before they appear, there must be something which caused this encounter. For the sake of convenience, Kimura uses the terminology 'between man and man' to describe this something (p. 15). This does not describe the relationship which holds between two independent individuals who meet each other. Rather, it signifies the atemporal and spaceless field from which the relations between self and non-self, between 1 and thou, come into existence (pp. 15ff., 65).

There is a relationship here to Western thought. Kimura was stimulated by Martin Buber, who stated that

The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man. What is peculiarly characteristic of the human world is above all that something takes place between one being and another the like of which can be found nowhere in nature ... Man is made man by it ... It is rooted in one being turning to another as another, as this particular other being, in order to communicate with it in a sphere which is common to them but which reaches out beyond the special sphere of each. I call this sphere, which is established with the existence of man as man, but which is conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere of 'between'. Though being realized in very different degrees, it is a primal category of human reality ... Where I and Thou meet, there is the realm of 'between'.
The atemporal and spaceless field of which Kimura speaks is more concretely expressed in terms of space, in 'girl' relation to others (pp. 35ff., 69). 'Girl', which describes the typical Japanese social obligations necessary for smooth relations between self and non-self, controls the Japanese pattern of social and moral behaviour to a great extent. The usual ways in which the Japanese fulfill 'girl' are to repay others' kindness and to live up to others' expectations (p. 40). The 'girl' relation originated in the repayment and exchange of kindnesses in the context of the farm work of Japanese rice agriculture. It was taken for granted that if one was helped with farm work by others, one was expected to be ready to offer help in return. To what extent one should repay kindness depends on what kind of relationship one has with the other. Whether this is a relationship of equality or subordination does not depend solely on the status of the one or the other; it depends, also, on their interaction, their 'betweenness'. This betweenness of humanity is not some abstract idea; it embraces a very significant reality which determines Japanese human behaviour (p. 65). In this respect, moral duty is not determined vertically, in relation to God, but is horizontally situated 'between man and man' (p. 39).

When this betweenness is viewed in terms of time and, in particular, retrospectively regarded in terms of the self and parents, grandparents and ancestors, the riddle of Japanese ancestor worship is easy to understand (p. 69). From the genetic standpoint, the first non-self which the self temporally meets is the parents, who also encountered their parents as non-selves. Again, there is a connection here with Western thought. John Macmurray wrote that 'genetically, the first correlate of the Self is the mother; and this personal Other ... is gradually differentiated in experience till it becomes the whole community of persons of which I am an individual member.' Macmurray also offered an explanation of ancestor worship:

The ritual head of an existing family or kinship group is inadequate as a representation of the community. For the community has a history which links it with the past, and this community with the past cannot be represented by an existing member of the group. The chief is only the temporary representative of the tribal community, himself related to the representative of a unity which spans the generations. The universal Other must thus be at least the original and originating head of the community, the original father of the kinship group. This explains the development of religion as ancestor worship.

In Japanese thought, the self, in terms of its concrete existence, is in crucial relation to its ancestors. But this does not mean that its existence depends unilaterally on its parents and ancestors. Rather, it is grounded 'in between' itself and them. Parents are parents in virtue of their relation to their children; children are children in virtue of their relation to their parents. Parents depend on their children for their parenthood. One's existence as the child of parents depends on the field which brought into existence their relation, or their betweenness. Ancestor worship is one way of expressing deference towards this betweenness. So the Japanese do not find the existence of the self just within their own, or another's, self, but between them. The Japanese term for self, 'jibun', clearly reveals this implication. Kimura points out that the Western concept of the self denotes its individuality and substance. This self keeps its identity and continuity eternally. But 'jibun' literally means not only 'self' but also 'share', so designating the self's share of something which transcends the self, rather than any attribute or substance with an eternal identity (p. 154). That is, the Japanese concept of 'jibun' carries within it its share of the field in which it participates in its relation to others. In brief: 'jibun' is the fusion of the self and its relation to others, the self and its betweenness. Indeed, human betweenness is primary; what I am now is determined between man and man, or self and its partner. In contrast to the Western understanding of humanity, in Japan, relation precedes the individuality of the subject and not the other way around (p. 144).

The third major attempt to articulate a Japanese concept of humanity was that of
a scholar in Japanese studies, *Hamaguchi Esh" (1931–), in *The Rediscovery of "Japaneseness"*, published in 1977. This described the image of the Japanese with the help of a conceptual scheme excavated from an inherently Japanese perspective. According to this portrayal, Westerners, irrespective of the contexts in which they find themselves, tend to behave on the basis both of what they believe to be a consistent norm determined from within and, at the same time, a sense of public values. The Japanese, on the other hand, worrying about the way in which they are seen by others, usually behave so as to adjust to the particular context in which they find themselves, along with other people. In other words, the Western concept of humanity is individualistic, signifying the ultimate indivisible and independent units which comprise society, whereas the Japanese concept of humanity is contextual, relational and communal. Therefore, Hamaguchi coined a new term – 'kanji', or 'contextual' – which signifies this Japanese, as opposed to Western, view of humanity, with its contrasting 'individual' (pp. 62ff.).

Hamaguchi calls this contextual point of view 'outside-in' (p. 305). 'Outside-in' and 'inside-out' are technical terms used by aircraft pilots. While in flight, they look inside-out, viewing the window of the cockpit in front of them as their perceptual frame of reference. In this case, they perceive the horizon moving against the aircraft. But when they make a final approach to an airport, they change their perceptual frames of reference from inside-out to outside-in. The outside-in perspective takes the horizon as the fixed perceptual frame of reference. Now it is the aircraft that is moving in relation to the horizon and the pilots must do their best to keep the aircraft horizontal. This perceptual frame is obviously essential for safe landing. Hamaguchi applies these two frames of reference to human behaviour. 'Inside-out' is a form of behaviour in which people base their behaviour on some criteria derived from within themselves, and form independent and proper judgements of an event outside themselves. In the 'outside-in' form of behaviour, people act on the basis of the situation outside themselves, contextualizing their behaviour according to the human relations involved in the situation. Thus, roughly speaking, Westerners' behaviour is characteristically inside-out, but it is typical of the Japanese to behave in the outside-in manner (p. 308).

It is natural that the difference between the individualist and the contextual understandings of humanity, between the inside-out and outside-in points of view, is reflected in the distinctive virtues respectively emphasized by Westerners and the Japanese. For the contextual Japanese, who take context and relation to others more seriously than their proper selves, there is something of cardinal importance, something which furthers smooth human relations. That something is 'concord', to which we now turn.

**Human concord**

Where context is concerned, the highly acclaimed virtue can be said to be human concord or harmony. Hamaguchi presents three characteristics of concord in this situation. Before looking at these, let us see briefly how deeply 'concord' is embedded in the Japanese mind.

In Japan, the word 'wa', or 'concord', is of considerable importance. It is associated, above all, with the name of the country, Japan. Until the seventh century, Japan was called 'Wa' by the people of the Asian continent. The Chinese character for this 'Wa' meant 'small'. However, as the Japanese came to understand the meanings of Chinese characters, which were introduced into Japan and came into use among a small number of people in the fifth or sixth centuries, some preferred a different Chinese character. This is also transliterated 'Wa' and has the same Chinese pronunciation as 'Wa' meaning 'small', but itself has the meaning of 'concord'.
Moreover, this 'Wa' assumed an official presence in the first Japanese written law, the Seventeen-Article Constitution of 604, ascribed to Prince Shotoku (574–622). The first article of this constitution is overlaid with an affirmation of concord; 'Concord is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honoured.' This urgent need for concord fundamentally derives from the discords and conflicts prevalent in those days. Before Prince Shotoku came to power and established a centralized state, the powerful clans were notoriously in serious conflict. It was these chaotic social conditions that led Prince Shotoku towards a primary insistence on concord, and the avoidance of wanton opposition. Although this understanding of concord is relatively negative, in that it means 'avoiding discord', this article means that 'concord' has firmly become the watchword of Japan as a term with positive meanings as well. Nowadays, consciously or unconsciously, almost all Japanese communities, such as families, groups of friends, fellow workers, think of concord as indispensable to keeping them together. It is especially the leader, or the head, who is expected to play a major role in maintaining concord.

Hamaguchi clarifies the spirit of the concord infiltrated into the Japanese mind in this way, by contrasting it sharply to the individualism described by Steven Lukes. Firstly, individualism is based on self-centredness and attempts to maintain and develop the established inviolable self; contextualism is grounded on mutual dependence and reciprocal help. Secondly, individualism stresses self-reliance and the need for all one desires in life to be met by oneself; contextualism has a high view of mutual reliance which presupposes that all concerned should be trustworthy. Thirdly, individualism regards interpersonal relations as a means for promoting self-interest, and does not maintain inconvenient relationships; contextualism regards interpersonal relations as ends in themselves. In sum, to be in relation to others is of essential value, and to maintain and develop such relations is meaningful for life.

It is easy to point out, from the perspective of contextualism, the problems associated with individualism. Firstly, excessive self-centredness can infringe the rights of others. Secondly, excessive self-reliance can lapse into self-righteousness. Thirdly, those who treat others as means to an end will sooner or later be faced with a situation where they themselves are treated as a means. These things count in favour of contextualism. Within its perspective, firstly, one may expect others' help. Secondly, one may have self-respect by being trusted. Thirdly, one may realize that one's dignity is valued when one is treated as an end in oneself.

These characteristics of concord have been cultivated and developed historically for such a long time, through being embedded in the social economy of rice agriculture, that this framework of thought is deeply rooted in the Japanese mind. We now come to an important question: how can it be used to understand the triune God in the Japanese context?

At this point, it will help the later argument if we consider the possibility that 'betweenness' and 'concord' could be used as concepts which respectively differentiate and unify. Kimura argues that betweenness is a metaphorical field from which the relation between self and non-self comes into existence. This field can be said to cause a differentiation, as well as an interrelation, between self and non-self. This is naturally so, since, as Watsuji shows, in dialectical thought the relational whole depends on some difference between those parts that engage in the relation and on the wholeness that embraces the differences. As the Japanese terms for 'between' ('aida', or 'ma') originally designate some space differentiating something or someone from something or someone else, betweenness can be, relatively speaking, particularly appropriately used as a differentiating concept. On the other hand, concord can be used as a unifying concept in that, as Hamaguchi argues, the concord maintained in contextualism is grounded on mutual help and reliance. Here, where the relation itself is regarded as essential, this concept plays a role in connecting humans and deepening the relation. We shall extend the scope
Christian concepts of the triune God

How can we relate these Japanese concepts of humanity and community to Christian concepts of the triune God? Jesus Christ was a man in a particular place and time. I do not take this to mean that he accommodated himself to Jewish culture and to no other, but that he can and will accommodate himself to any culture. Athanasius's classic study on the Incarnation and redemption, *On the Incarnation*, shows the depth and breadth of Christ's work. In Athanasius's argument, a motif of some importance emerges. The one and the same Word both created the world and humanity and recreated corrupted humanity by assuming flesh. If the Word who made all things universally in creation also recreated them in redemption through the Incarnation, this implies that the scope of redemption is also universal. In order to emphasize the universal range of redemption, Athanasius states that Christ's redemptive work was 'in the stead of all', 'on behalf of all' and 'for all'. According to him, the Word became flesh and dwelt 'to us', 'into us', 'among men' and 'with them'. This variation on the 'among us' of John 1:14 points to his interpretation that the Word in flesh relates closely to humanity in every possible way.

How can we develop Athanasius's argument in a Japanese context? As he argues, the Word condescended and accommodated himself to humanity, in order to teach it higher subjects effectively. In the words of a contemporary writer, God 'chose a personal, interactional, receptor-oriented approach within the frame of reference of those he sought to reach.' If we apply the divine receptor-oriented approach to the Japanese concept of humanity conceived in terms of human betweenness, it is possible to interpret the incarnation in terms of Christ being not merely a human but also a human betweenness. That is, the Word became a human and dwelt between us as a human. Christ became a man between man and man. This interpretation is theologically defensible. As we have shown, Athanasius used several prepositions in order to express the ways in which Christ dwelt in relation to us. This latitude in the way of conceiving the relation of Christ to humanity allows us, in a Japanese context, to use our culturally orientated term 'between'. Therefore, for us, the Word became a human and dwelt between us as a human betweenness. In fact, this interpretation is exactly identical with John 1:14 in the two recent Japanese translations of the Bible, the New Revised and the New Collaborated versions. Both translations run 'wataishi tachi no aida ni', literally translated as 'between us'. Christ between man and man is a 'ningen' and, as such, is intimately connected with humanity in Japanese culture.

The human betweenness of Christ is closely related to the divine betweenness which the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit maintain. We shall next direct our attention to the betweenness of God.

Triune betweenness

Gregory Nazianzen, who contributed immensely to the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity, interestingly enough refers to the relations and 'betweenness' of the triune God. Let us clarify these concepts by focusing on his *Five Theological Orations*.

According to Eunomius, the 'Father' is a name denoting an essence or an action. But Gregory argues against this, as follows. If 'Father' denotes essence, there must be a distinct essence from that of the Son. If it names an action, the same would follow: the Son would be made by the Father's action and the essence of the Son, as someone made, would be different from the essence of
the maker." Gregory proceeds to introduce the concept of relation: 'Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action ... But it is the name of the relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father." These relational names of the Father and the Son 'denote an identity of nature between him that is begotten and him that begets' (XXIX.16). Although, on earth, the begetting 'happened according to flesh', the Son's earthly mother is a virgin, and this is called 'spiritual generation', by which Gregory seems to mean the begetting through the Holy Spirit (XXIX.4)." If this begetting is not merely fleshly, but essentially spiritual, 'begotten of' does not mean 'begotten after', which implies a temporal relation, although 'in respect of cause' the Son is not unoriginat (XXIX.3). The internal relations within the Trinity, therefore, are beyond such categories as time and space, for they are essentially neither fleshly nor temporal, but, rather, spiritual and eternal.

Gregory further introduces the concept of betweenness into these spiritual and eternal triune relations. As he proceeds to explain what the Holy Spirit is, he uses 'mesos' or 'between'. He summarizes concisely as follows: the Holy Spirit who 'proceeds from the Father Is not a creature; he who is not begotten is not the Son;' and he who is 'between [mesos] the unbegotten and the begotten is God' (XXXI.8). First, Gregory had already confirmed that the Holy Spirit from the Father is not God and, as such, 'consubstantial' with the Father (XXXI.10); and that the Spirit, as well as the Son, is 'co-eternal' with the Father (XXIX.3). Secondly, he made clear that the Spirit is not the Son. The names 'Father' and 'Son' come from the facts of unbegottenness and begottenness respectively, while the name 'Holy Spirit' comes from the fact of the procession (XXXI.9). Thirdly, he explained that the Spirit is between the Father and the Son. Now, what Is this 'between'? According to Gregory, between them 'nothing ... is peculiar' except the names. Father and Son, 'because all things are in common' (XXX.11). This betweenness exists precisely because there is a difference between the Father and the Son. If there were no difference at all, there would be no betweenness at all, simply outright identity. Therefore, betweenness is the relation which arises from begetting: when it is stated that the Spirit is 'between' them, he is contrasted with this relation. In other words, the distinctive procession of the Spirit is stated in comparison with the begetting relation between the Father and the Son. This means that the procession happens in a way different from the begetting, so that the proper name of the Holy Spirit is secured."

How can we develop Gregory's doctrine of the triune relations and that of 'betweenness' in a Japanese context? We can begin by finding some similarities between his view of the triune God and the Japanese view of humanity. In Gregory's trinitarian view, God is what he is in the tri-personal relation: in the Japanese anthropological view, humans are what they are in their relation. In both cases, the category of 'relation' refers to what is intrinsic, not optional, and divine and human persons are defined not according to any individualities, but by their relations. As Watsuij refers to the dialectical relation of community (whole) and humanity (parts), so Gregory refers to the dialectical relation between three persons and one substance."

Of course, we must also note the differences regarding relation. Kimura states that relation, or betweenness, precedes the self and the non-self, not In a temporal sense, but ontologically, in the sense that betweenness is the ground of their existence. Gregory would not say this in the case of the triune God, since the origin of the existence of the Son and Holy Spirit lies not in their relation, but In the Father, from whom the former is begotten and the latter proceeds.

The supremely interesting point is that, in both cases, the term 'between' is used. Now if, as Gregory states, there is a betweenness of Father and Son, and the Spirit is also between them, we may say that the betweenness is shared by the Spirit as well. For the triune God, beyond corporeal and temporal categories, carries neither dissolution nor separation within himself. So 'betweenness' is a (spatial) metaphor. Further, if the betweenness is shared by all three, we should also have the
betweenness which the Father and Spirit share and that which the Son and the Holy Spirit share, as well as that which the Father and the Son share. Thus, the Spirit is between the Father and the Son, and the Father is between the Son and the Spirit, and the Son is between the Father and the Spirit. Three what? Augustine asked, about the Trinity. We can answer: Three betweennesses. But it is important to emphasize that although the trine God shares betweenness, the three betweennesses I have mentioned differ according to the different relations. The Father-Son betweenness differentiates Father and Son through the begetting. This begetting or begotten betweenness is different from the processional betweenness that relates Father and Spirit. Betweenness, then, is also a differentiating factor in the trine God.

If, in a Japanese context, we can consider humans, living between other humans, as human betweennesses, we can apply the category of 'betweenness' to the trine God as well, considered as consisting of three betweennesses. As we said, the Word became a human and dwelt between us; that is, the Word became a human betweenness. The betweenness which the Word assumed on earth can be interpreted as a reflection of that betweenness inherent in the trine God. Because God is divine betweenness, he became human betweenness. Relational humanity is possible for God because deity is relational.

**Triune concord**

What should we say, when asked: 'One what?' One possibility, consonant with Japanese conceptuality, is to answer: 'One concord.' But is the use of the term theologically supportable? To examine this, we shall have recourse to Novatian's *The Trinity*.

In order to counter the Patrispan view that the Son is the Father and the Adoptionist view that the Son is only man, Novatian introduces the concept of concord. Whereas he adduces scriptural passages to maintain that God is one (XXX, XXXI passim), he points out that in John 10:30, 'I and the Father are one', the word 'one' (unum) 'is in the neuter gender, denoting harmony of fellowship [societatis concordiae], not unity of person' (XXVII.3: cf. XXXI.22). In order to clarify the distinction between them who are 'unum', he also has recourse to a scriptural illustration, where Paul refers, in 1 Corinthians 3:6ff., to 'harmonious unity' (concordiae unitas) (XXVII.6). Paul states: 'I planted, Apollos watered.' Now he and Apollos are not one and the same person. By using the term 'concord', on the one hand Novatian corroborates, over against Patrispanism, the existence of two persons, the Father and the Son, who maintain concord.

This concord carries another implication in the relationship between Father and Son. Novatian paraphrases the concord between them in terms of 'identity of judgement', and he seems to explain what he means concretely in *The Trinity* XIII.6: ... If Christ sees the secrets of the heart [cor], Christ is certainly God, since God alone knows the secrets of the heart [cor]. This passage is based on Matthew 9:4, John 2:25 and 1 Kings 8:39, and these passages are situated in a context where God or the Son make a certain judgment on humanity by discerning what they have in their hearts. That is, Father and Son share a common way of thinking in making judgment, in discerning the heart. But what they share in judgment is not merely a way of thinking, but also a content. This close relation of Father and Son has much to do with the Son's origin.

When Novatian confirms that the Son is the Word of God, of divine nature, he adduces the scriptural passage that 'my heart [cor] has brought forth a good Word' (XV.6, XVII.3). The 'Word', or the 'Son', is the embodiment of the Father's heart, with the result that their judgment is necessarily the same on account of having the same origin. That is, Father and Son are in concordant
relationship, not only in the sense that the divine judgment is the same, in the
discernment of human hearts [cor], but also in the deeper sense that they share a
common [con-] heart [cor]; i.e., that retain 'con-cordia' on account of their origin.
Therefore, Novatian's concept of the concord between them can hardly be delineated
only 'in terms of moral unity'. Rather, he seems to look beyond this moral union
towards something more metaphysical ...
Thus Novatian refutes the Adonationists, too, by corroborating the Son's divinity and his unity with the Father.

Novatian does not refer much to the Holy Spirit. But he places the Spirit, who proceeds from God, on a par with the Father and the Son, and puts special emphasis on his personal, distinctive outward work. We can understand, from this, that the divine concordant relation between the Father and the Son can be applied to God the Holy Spirit as well. That is, the Trinity is one in terms of the divine concord. The similarities to the Japanese concept of concord are clear. As the Japanese concord was officially introduced to counter political discord, Novatian's concord is introduced to explain that there is no discord of two gods which, the heretics allege, is entailed in the divinity of the Son. Japanese concord emphasizes the mutuality and worth of the human relation itself; Novatian's trinitarianism emphasizes that the mutual relations to which begetting and procession give rise are essential in the life of the Trinity.

**Conclusion**

I have argued for three betweennesses.

1. The begetter/begotten difference comes through the eternal process of begetting. The fact that the Spirit is between Father and Son means that the Spirit operates within this differentiation, playing a role corresponding to that played in the virginal conception, the role of the river of life.

2. Interpreting betweenness as a differentiating concept enables us to speculate about a second betweenness, where the processor/processed difference comes through the eternal process of procession. The fact that the Son is between Father and Spirit means that the Son operates within this differentiation, playing a role corresponding to that sent when he sent the Holy Spirit from the Father.

3. The difference between the begotten and the processed is now established. The fact that the Father is between Son and Spirit means that the Father operates within this differentiation, sending both Son and Spirit in different ways, corresponding to the begetting and proceeding.

Divine betweenness is thus a concept which renders the distinctions between Father, Son and Spirit in terms of relations of origin. What are distinct are called the three divine betweennesses.

I have argued, too, for one concord. Although we have the unbegotten/begotten difference between Father and Son, there is concord between them. The same holds good for the difference between Father and Spirit in terms of procession and between Son and Spirit, respectively begotten and proceeded. Because they have the same origin (the Father), the Son and the Spirit are concordant with the Father. Concord is the concept that describes their divine unity. Thus the triune God is one concord.

I therefore propose that the Japanese formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity be this: God is three betweennesses, one concord.

---

rendered here in their Japanese order, with the surname first and the Christian name last.

3 Watsuji Tetsuro. *Ethics as the Study of Man* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1934). Subsequent page references to this work are given in the text.


6 Watsuji, op. cit., p. 35. In Japan, this way of thinking (distinguishing parts in the whole and the whole in the parts) has been prevalent in earlier periods and remains in contemporary everyday language (Watsuji, op. cit., pp. 8, 20). For example, ‘heita’ can refer either to ‘troops’ or to a single member of the troops; a single term has a dual (member and group) meaning. Likewise, we can call a human member of the community ‘ningen’, a word that used to mean ‘community’. Interestingly, we can find a similarity in Hebrew thought: ‘The Hebrew concept designates ... the concrete at the same time as the “abstract”, the particular as well as the collective.’ T. Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek* (London: SCM, 1960), pp. 70ff. For individuality and community with regard to Abraham and Christ, see J. Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* 2nd edn (London: SCM, 1977), p. 68.


8 Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (London: Collins, 1961), pp. 244ff. For the self and the other as correlates, see J. Macmurray, *Persons in Relation* (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), p. 86: ‘Self and Other are correlates, and the discrimination of the one involves a collective discrimination of the other ... Moreover, in discriminating myself from the Other, it is always as belonging to the Other.’


10 Macmurray, op. cit., p. 80.

11 Ibid., p. 164.

12 Kimura, op. cit., pp. 75ff.

13 The implication of this becomes clearer when we consider that the Japanese language has more than ten words for the first person, ‘I’, whereas Western languages have only one. One Japanese term is chosen in relation to the one with whom ‘I’ am talking. We shall not show here how this eventually leads to conceptual relationality in some ways that differ from those of Martin Buber and John Macmurray.


15 Hamaguchi, op. cit. Page references to this work are also given in the text.

16 Ibid., pp. 14ff. Elsewhere, he points out that Japanese culture presupposes that in the beginning is the situation (iropo), while Western culture presupposes that in the beginning is the norm (nomos). See Japan, the *Society of Contextualism* (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimpsha, 1982), p. 197.


20 Cf. Araki Hiroyuki, *Thinking Japan from the Japanese Language* (Tokyo:


According to statistics compiled about twenty years ago, 71.7% of the Japanese think that human relationships themselves give meaning to life; see Hamaguchi, Japan, the Society of Contextualism, pp. 52, 153ff. In this respect, Martin Buber would have a high opinion of the Japanese view of human relations: see his I and Thou, pp. 112f.: "The purpose of relation is the relation itself – touching the You." John Macmurray discovers relation as an end in itself in the relation between mother and baby: see Persons in Relation, p. 63.


"The renewal of creation has been the work of the self-same Word that made it at the beginning" (op. cit., 11).


But it is important to note that 'there is no suggestion in the thought of Athanasius of the kind of "universalism" advocated by Origen or by Gregory of Nyssen' (p. 182; cf. p. 284). See, too, A. Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body (Bristol: The Bristol Press, 1990), pp. 40ff. In the words of D. Ritschl, salvation is 'subjective acceptance' of 'the objective work of God in the Incarnation', Athanasius Versuch einer Interpretation (Zurich: Evz-Verlag, 1964), p. 43. So Torrance holds that Origen and Gregory of Nyssen advocate a kind of 'objectivism' which diminishes the importance of this subjective dimension.

See Athanasius, op. cit., 1–9.

Ibid., 15.


In rendering this in English, we prefer 'between' to 'among', because 'between' is 'still the only word available to express the relation of a thing to many surrounding things severally and individually, "among" expressing a relation to them collectively and vaguely'. So the 1989 edition of the OED. Christ between man and man relates humans 'severally and individually' rather than 'collectively and vaguely'.


Themelios Vol 22.2

On account of the life-giving role of the Holy Spirit and the fact that on earth he played a main role in Mary’s conception (Lk. 1:35), it would be more difficult to dissociate the Holy Spirit’s role from the Son’s begetting. See L. Boff, Trinity and Society (Kent: Burns & Oates, 1988), p. 6: “The Son, sent by the Father, becomes flesh by virtue of the life-giving Spirit.” Boff even adds ‘Spiritusque’ to ‘Filioque’: ‘The Father “begets” the Son Spiritueque, that is, in communion with the Holy Spirit’ (p. 147). And according to Thomas A. Small, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son: the Son is eternally begotten of the Father through the Holy Spirit: see C.E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991). p. 169.

Cf. G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1959). p. 140. Gregory does not seek to illuminate further the relation between the Father and the Son. This relation is ‘the divine and ineffable generation’ (XXI.4), ‘a thing so great and august in the eyes of all those who are not altogether grousing and material in mind’ (XXIX.11). ‘The begetting of God must be honoured by silence’ (XXIX.8).

For the atemporal nature of the Trinity, see XXIX.3. Cf. Norris, op. cit., p. 142. For the incorporeality of the Trinity, see Gregory, XX VIII.7ff.: cf. Norris, op. cit., p. 44. These considerations led Gregory to reject any ranking in or dissection of the trune persons (XXIX.12).

This important phrase is missing from Hardy, op. cit., p. 198.

In order to highlight this, Gregory states that ‘the proper name of ... the unbegottenly proceeding or going forth is “the Holy Ghost” (XXXI.19).


‘No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illuminated by the splendour of the Three: no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the One’ (XI.41). As Gunton says of this: ‘The interesting point about Gregory is ... a dynamic dialectic between the oneness and the threeness of God is of such a kind that the two are both given equal weight in the processes of thought’ (op. cit., pp. 149f.).


This means that the betweenness of the Father and the Son cannot be identified with the Holy Spirit himself. This is one of the differences between Gregory’s doctrine of the trune God and that of Augustine. See V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James & Co., 1957). p. 81.


To use physical terminology, the three is the three ‘mesons’, derived from the Greek ‘mesos’. Yukawa Hideki (1907-81), a Japanese physicist, is the first Japanese Nobel prize laureate (1949), who is known for his theory of mesons. It seems to me that Japanese intellectual culture, which esteems betweenness highly, had something to do with his idea and way of thinking. Whether we speak of ‘betweenness’ or ‘meson’, the point is that these terms inherently entail relation to others. Things are ontologically situated between something and something else.

Interestingly, Gregory refers to God’s betweenness after the final judgment.
too; after separating the saved from the lost, God will stand 'in the midst of gods, that is, of the saved' (XXX.4). The gods are the saved that have been deified. The trinite God is the divine betweenness not only in terms of himself internally but also in relation to the saved whom he himself deified.

Politically schismatic, Novatian was orthodox in the doctrine of the Trinity. We use G.F. Diercks (ed.), Novatian Opera (Turnhout: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1972), and the translation of Novatian, The Trinity, by R.J. De Simone (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 1972). References are given in the text.

This concord between Father and Son is 'the association of love [caritatis societas] itself existing between them' [XXVII.4]. Gregory speaks of the trinite God as 'a monarchy ... that is made of an equality of nature, and a union of mind [gnomes sumpnonal] and an identity of motion, and a convergence of its elements to unity' (XXIX.2). Here 'gnome' is equivalent to the Latin 'sententia', judgement.


According to Prestige, 'It is Theophilus who first employs the actual language of Logos immanent and expressed': op. cit., p. 126.

According to Novatian: 'Owing to His origin to the Father, He could not cause any disunion [discordial] in the godhead by making two gods' (XXXI.13).

