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Editorial: A New Theological Journal—with a Difference

As we go to press, we welcome the publication of the first issue of the Evangelical Review of Theology, edited by one of our own associate editors, Bruce Nicholls. As Executive Secretary of the World Evangelical Fellowship Theological Commission, Bruce is in touch with theological thinking and developments all over the world, and so is in an ideal position to draw together an anthology of significant evangelical writing. So ERT is not another forum for the publication of new articles (and so not a rival for Themelios!), but ‘a digest of articles and book reviews selected from publications worldwide for an international readership, interpreting the Christian Faith for contemporary living.’

That last phrase sets the tone. The material in this first issue (October 1977) is concerned not with the perennial issues of the classical theological syllabus, but with evaluating trends in today’s world, political, ethical, ecclesiastical and educational as well as theological, covering from a Christian perspective Islamic and Marxist thought as well as Christian.

The list of periodicals represented is evidence of the impressive growth in evangelical theological publication in recent years. In particular, a good proportion of the contributions come from the Third World, and this orientation no doubt accounts for the rather untraditional look of its subject matter. ERT is itself edited and produced in India.

That ERT is possible at all is a cause for thanksgiving for all who are concerned to see the biblical faith articulated and applied to the varied questions and conflicts of the modern world. This thanksgiving increases when we see the type of material it contains. This is, on the whole, not the theology of the fundamentalist ghetto, still less the triumphalistic pronouncements of a cocksure theological power-group. It is a theology firmly anchored in biblical revelation, but open to the realities of a pluralistic world, ready to listen and to sympathize even where it cannot agree, more eager to win a hearing than to score points, self-critically trying to discover what it means to obey God, with our minds and with our actions, in his fast-changing world.

Readers of Themelios would therefore have much to gain from a regular subscription to ERT. If you do not have access to a wide range of theological periodicals (and what library takes all the periodicals represented in this first issue, I wonder?), here is a painless way to keep up with what is best in them—and it is painless: the general level of readability is high, even though the treatment is not slight. Of course the selection of articles reflects the personal interests of the editor and his assistants—of what journal is that not true? But, particularly for those whose daily reading is largely confined to the traditional syllabus, this is likely to prove a breath of fresh air.

If that sounds like a commercial—it is! Themelios has no illusions of omni-competence, and its editor is only too acutely aware how much lack of space restricts our own coverage; so we look forward to a long and mutually advantageous coexistence with ERT, and we urge our readers to get the best of both worlds!
Incidentally, the editor of *ERT* invites recommendations of articles and book reviews for inclusion in future issues, and even offers a year’s free subscription to those whose recommendations are accepted. Send clear copies to Bruce J. Nicholls, E-453 Greater Kailash II, New Delhi—110048, India.

*Dick France*
Can we dispense with Chalcedon?

Gerald E Bray

Gerald Bray, who reviews The myth of God incarnate elsewhere in this issue, here discusses the question underlying that book and much other recent christological debate, the adequacy of the classical statement of christology in the Chalcedonian Definition. Dr Bray, who is from Canada, is Librarian at Tyndale House, Cambridge. He holds a doctorate from the Sorbonne (in classical philosophy and literature), has recently completed a doctoral thesis at Cambridge (on Tertullian), and is the author of a forthcoming book on Tertullian's concept of holiness.

The problem stated

It should come as no surprise to discover that the Chalcedonian Definition, and in particular its relevance both to the teaching of Scripture and contemporary thought, occupies a large place in modern christological discussion. A confession which has been the touchstone of orthodoxy for fifteen centuries cannot lightly be ignored or abandoned. Yet increasingly there are voices raised calling for either a complete overhaul of the traditional formula, with the object of devising a new statement more in line with current theological ideas, or—from frequently—a recognition of a theological pluralism in the area of christology in which no one statement of faith could be claimed as definitive. Recently these voices, which are often backed by an impressive biblical and theological scholarship, have extended the debate to the church at large, and it would now seem that a thorough reassessment of Chalcedon's significance for the life of the church, possibly leading to a downward revision in its status, will not be long delayed.

If the Chalcedonian Definition is to be defended, one must begin with a consideration of its relationship to Scripture.

From the purely historical point of view, it is clear that the framers of the Definition believed themselves to be standing in a tradition of exegesis going back to the apostles themselves. The accusations of philosophizing which are levelled against them today are by no means new, however. Throughout the fourth and fifth centuries, the orthodox party had to contend with an opposition which accused it of deserting the plain words of Scripture in favour of a semi-Platonic construction.

Philosophical influences were present, of course, but they were not nearly as decisive as is generally assumed. Great care was taken to find scriptural support for every statement, and although there was often a tendency to allegorize, there is little or nothing in the Definition which cannot be supported, even now, from a biblical text. Even its most vehement detractors usually accuse the Definition only of selective exegesis and conceptual or presuppositional error; given the assumptions of the council, even they will usually agree that it was a masterpiece of dogmatic definition. The real force of modern objections lies elsewhere.

First, it is claimed that Chalcedon endorsed a formula which is untrue to the meaning of Scripture. At the heart of this argument lies the contention that Chalcedon thought in ontological terms, whereas the New Testament picture of Christ is largely or even exclusively functional. There is widespread agreement here that the transition from functionalism to ontology was made in the passage from a Palestinian Jewish to a Hellenistic milieu; the chief problem is to determine when this took place. Oscar Cullmann has argued that it was a post-biblical development, an idea now widely shared, in England at least; but R. H. Fuller traces the shift to the New Testament itself, and Martin Hengel puts it back to the very earliest period of Christianity.

Functional christology rests on a number of presuppositions which give it its validity in the eyes of its exponents. First of these is that the New Testament is the record of the divine plan of salvation (Heilsgeschichte) of which Jesus was the divinely-appointed agent. Some functionalists see this in a basically orthodox light, and speak of the Son's pre-existence and so on; others do not. In any case, it does not really matter. What counts is what Jesus did, not who he was. Functionalists assume that the work of Christ—whatever may be its relationship to empirical history—was the cul-

1 Thus Maurice Wiles, 'Does christology rest on a mistake?' in S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton, ed., Christ, faith and history (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 3–12.
mination and fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy and Jewish messianism. The exegetical key (which Chalcedon, of course, ignored) lies in the titles given to Jesus. By examining their significance, and the way in which the New Testament writers selected and conflated them, we may arrive at some understanding of what the Christ-event means for salvation.

On this view, all talk of the person and natures of Christ is beside the point, whether or not it is true. The Chalcedonian fathers arrived at their conclusions because they looked at texts from an ontological standpoint. But many passages, it is claimed, present a picture of Christ which is more accurately called ‘subordinationist’ or ‘adoptionist’. At Chalcedon these were either reinterpreted or ignored, with the result that the council cannot justly claim to have faithfully transcribed all that the New Testament says about Christ. Furthermore, the eclipse of Jewish apocalypticism, at least in the Hellenistic world, deprived the Christian theologians of the knowledge necessary to appreciate the background and meaning of the New Testament. With their essentially non-historical and non-relativistic approach, it is only natural that the framers of the Definition should have read the Bible as if it were a contemporary document, and read all their own presuppositions into it.

A second objection, which overlaps with functionalism, but is not identical with it, is the contention that Chalcedon betrays a confusion of thought-categories. This means that the Definition draws no clear distinction between the physical-historical frame of reference on the one hand and the metaphysical-mythological frame of reference on the other. Of itself, this confusion does not make Chalcedon unbiblical, of course, since the Scriptures are themselves confused at this point. But while Scripture, as the record of *Heilsgeschichte*, is necessarily mythological, Chalcedon is mistakenly so. According to this line of thinking, the fathers of the council were concerned to present a rationally justifiable account of the Christ-event, but made the mistake of treating New Testament myths, like the story of the virgin birth, as straightforward historical fact. Chalcedon began with the premiss that all christology must inevitably begin ‘from above’, with God. Because of this, the Definition necessarily stressed the divinity of Christ as essential to his nature and tackled on the impersonal humanity, if not quite as an afterthought, then at least as a secondary matter of lesser importance. The equilibrium between God and man which the Definition claimed in theory was thus compromised in practice, and made orthodox christology incurably docetic at its root.

As long as most men were prepared to believe in a world in which supernatural beings were more real and powerful than natural ones, Chalcedonian christology, though imperfect, was nevertheless an effective instrument for conveying the Church’s faith. The explosion of the traditional world-view however has destroyed its usefulness and it ought now to be scrapped as out of date.

But is it really necessary to revise our estimate of Chalcedon in the light of intellectual developments in the past two centuries? Is it true that the Definition reinterprets Scripture from an alien philosophical perspective with the result that it has produced a narrow, one-sided and docetic christology? Where does the ontological understanding of Christ come from? It is the answers to these questions which will determine the future course of our christology in the light of modern philosophical developments.

The appeal to Scripture
As we have already indicated, the authority of the Chalcedonian Definition rests ultimately on its claim to be a comprehensive analysis of biblical teaching. By ‘comprehensive’ we do not of course mean that it claims to be an exhaustive statement of everything Jesus did and taught—even the Gospels do not claim that much—but rather that it is inclusive of every factor necessary to do justice to the New Testament picture of Christ. It must also be said that the validity of our enterprise depends on the assumption that there is fundamentally only one picture of Jesus in the New Testament, whatever the diversity of approaches. This of course is precisely what is not agreed today, but without it, Chalcedon’s own claim to rest on the consensus of Scripture ought probably to be ruled out as invalid from the start.

It may however be argued that this is an extreme view, that in fact the different currents in Scripture are logically connected and led to the ontological development of Chalcedon either by a random (but nevertheless understandable) choice of alternatives or by an inner logic present in the kerygma from the beginning. It should not be forgotten, however, that from a purely Chalcedonian standpoint, both these views, however much they may differ from one another, are equally insufficient to do justice to its position with regard to the New Testament evidence. No doubt a Chalcedonian would prefer Martin Hengel’s belief that the transition from a functional to an ontological Christology occurred in the wake of the Easter-event to Oscar Cullmann’s

4 One of Wiles’ key points, op. cit.
insistence that such a transition is not to be found in the New Testament at all. But it must also be remembered that even Hengel's view inevitably drives a wedge between the teaching of Jesus and the thought of the early church, an idea which is basically foreign to Chalcedon. Hengel tries to make the wedge as thin as possible, and insists that the theological reflection of the pre-Pauline church was both necessary and inevitable, but we are still some distance from the Chalcedonian position.

The main reasons for this, I would submit, are presuppositional and concern questions of general critical method. Nowadays virtually all students of christology begin with the assumption that Jesus of Nazareth was a man who had, or thought he had, a special mission from God. What that mission was is hard to say, but it conflicted with contemporary secular and religious authority and he was eventually crucified. From this bare historical minimum some scholars have built up more or less conservative positions, including a belief in the resurrection as an historical event, and even, in a few cases, an acceptance of the incarnation as the ultimate affirmation of christology. But even the most conservative of these thinkers makes such a development necessarily post-resurrectional. Jesus himself may have said and done any number of things which would act as a catalyst in this process, but whoever arrived at the conclusion that Jesus was God did so by putting two and two together. Whether one thinks the final answer they got was three, four or five then becomes a matter of scholarly opinion, and immaterial from the Chalcedonian standpoint.

Modern reductionist tendencies, the so-called 'christology from below', together with a reluctance to pronounce any of Jesus' sayings as incontrovertibly genuine, have produced an intellectual climate in which the Chalcedonian Definition has no logical place. But were the fathers of the council therefore wrong in their assumptions and theological method? Does the New Testament really support modern critical theories in the way that their defenders claim? Here the crucial question is whether the New Testament shows signs of theological development into an ontological position. The Chalcedonian fathers might have agreed that it does, but they would have located this in the teaching of Jesus himself. It was Jesus who made the fundamental change from a functional to an ontological Christology, not his disciples or the early church. The apostles, on this view, were the transmitters of a teaching which they had received from Jesus; they were not creative theologians in their own right.

Now it would be hard to deny that the prima facie New Testament evidence lends support to this second view. Not everyone would agree, of course, but as long as considerable allowance is made for theological developments within the early church colouring the narrative, it is probable that the majority of scholars would be prepared to grant this much. Many indeed would go a good deal farther and grant that the historical Jesus claimed for himself such divine prerogatives as the power to forgive sins, while leaving open the question of his claim to ontological divinity. Traditionally research of this kind has concentrated on the synoptic Gospels, because of widespread doubts as to the historical reliability of John. These doubts have now diminished considerably, although it is probably still true to say that most scholars believe that the ontological bias of the fourth Gospel represents a modification of the original tradition. If this is true, then Chalcedonian christology, which relies heavily on the fourth Gospel, is derivative and does not represent Jesus' self-understanding.

Ontology in the Gospel of John

I should like to begin an investigation of this Gospel's evidence with some words of Barnabas Lindars: 'John, with his unerring capacity to pierce through to the inner meaning of the primitive logia, has the unique distinction of bringing to expression on the basis of them the deepest and most compelling interpretation of Jesus' self-understanding before God.' This statement represents perhaps the most conservative scholarly opinion today. But is it really tenable? Are not many of the 'primitive logia' themselves so shot through with ontological assumptions that it is inconceivable for them to have existed otherwise?

Let us take, for example, the story of Nicodemus. In spite of many difficulties there would appear to be little reason to doubt the essentially authentic character of this story—the awareness of a time before hostility between Jesus and the Pharisees had polarized into open warfare, the use of characteristic Semitic sayings like 'Amen, amen, I say unto you,' the intense Jewishness of the argument and Jesus' description of himself as Son of man all

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9 See H. Schlier, TDNT, under 'Amen'.
tell in its favour. Nicodemus perceived Jesus to be ‘a teacher come from God’ (Jn. 3: 2), which in effect meant that Jesus was a man of the same class as himself (cf. verse 10) but with special power to perform miracles. This is not good enough for Jesus however, who promptly begins a long discourse on ontology, first in general terms and then, with increasing concentration, focusing on himself. Nicodemus is led on by stages, but the final result is never in doubt. The whole story anticipates the conclusion in such a way that it does not seem possible that it could be a modification of anything. There is in fact nothing very extraordinary about it before verse 13, but it would be strange if this verse is a later addition put in by John, since it is the logical climax to the whole story. There is no question of a progression from a functional to an ontological christology, but only from a universal ontology to a particular one. Yet such a ‘Greek’ idea would hardly have been intruded into a conversation with a Pharisee! From the start, moreover, Jesus was busily scrapping Nicodemus’ presuppositions, not building on them—a fact which only confused him, and contributed further to the general incomprehension surrounding Jesus and his teaching.

The possibility that John constructed the Nicodemus story according to a preconceived plan is diminished when we look at the story of the woman at the well, which is completely different in every way except the ontological implications of Jesus’ words. The woman, struck by Jesus’ willingness to speak to her, inquires of him the reason for such unusual behaviour. Jesus sidesteps the question, as usual, and tries to focus her mind on his person (verse 10). When she misunderstands him completely, Jesus shifts his ground to the woman herself, by putting his finger on her past life. Now the woman is truly shaken, but she does no more than call Jesus a prophet, and asks him the most awkward—and at the same time the most obvious—theological question she can think of. Again, Jesus leads her into an ontological consideration—God is spirit and therefore desires spiritual worship. The woman, however, has still not got beyond the fact that Jesus knew her past life. But, in her understanding, the man who would reveal such things was the Messiah—could this be Jesus?

Even after Jesus admits this, however, she is still only half-convinced, and has seen nothing beyond the aspect of Jesus’ teaching which directly affected her. The villagers, however, pursued the matter further, and eventually arrived at the confession that Jesus was the saviour of the world. Many would no doubt agree with Cullmann that this is still a functional, not an ontological confession, but on what was this based? Certainly not on post-Easter reflection, but on Jesus’ teaching which, if it bore any relation at all to what he said to the woman, was essentially directed towards an ontological understanding. It seems probable, in fact, that the villagers confessed Jesus the saviour as a person, without any very clear idea—and certainly no experience—of what this would mean in practice. The absence of an explanation just where one would most expect it, only confirms this view.

The story of the woman shows us clearly that christological titles, although Jesus was prepared to accept them, could not adequately convey the full extent of his message because of the limitations of the thought-pattern in which they were embedded. This is a theme which recurs later in the Gospel (e.g. 7: 25–31). As we see from chapter 1, there were many people who were only too ready to slap a messianic label on an unusual figure, and this ties in well with what Josephus and others tell us of this period in Palestine. Thus Jesus could only publicize his claim with caution—a feature of his ministry which is amply confirmed in the Synoptic tradition, and in Mark in particular.

Jesus’ attitude to christological titles was therefore hesitant, but this is still a very long way from the attitude of John the Baptist, who not only refused to apply them to himself, but refused to use them in his descriptions of the coming one as well—an indication that John did not regard them as suitable for him either. Instead, John describes his mission at length in ways which indicate that he was expecting someone more than the popular version of the Messiah; indeed that the one expected was none other than God himself (1: 23). Later, anthropomorphic terms become more prominent, but there is still much to indicate that we are not to think of a man in the ordinary sense (1: 30). It is only when Jesus appears that the connection becomes clear, but the build-up cannot fail to raise questions which go far beyond the range of a functional christology.

The appearance of Jesus at this point in the Gospel turns our attention once more to his role. Both here and throughout the Gospel we are reminded of his favourite self-description, Son of man, and most would agree that this is an authentic touch. Our problem is to discover whether it is functional or ontological in meaning. Considered as a title, huios tou anthropou is vague and obscure, the more so because it was not developed by the early church. Lindars claims that John was unique in this respect, but while he talks freely of his bringing out the inner meaning, etc., he stops short.
of crediting John with an ontological understanding of the term. This hesitation would seem to be unnecessary, however, from a consideration of John 5:25–27. Here the Son of God is identified with the Son of man in a way which Lindars claims makes it necessary to understand the latter as the figure of Daniel 7:13. If this is correct, then it is testimony of the greatest importance. The Danielic Son of man was a heavenly figure whose functions on earth were extensions of his heavenly being; they were not its cause or justification (e.g. through obedience). The same point is made in John 3:13–16, with even greater clarity.

Furthermore, this understanding of Son of man cannot have been a purely Johannine insight. The independent witness of the synoptic Gospels makes the connection with Daniel explicit at the trial of Jesus (Mt. 26:64; Mk. 14:62; Lk. 22:69). The priests clearly understood Jesus’ remarks as blasphemy, and it is well known how difficult it is to account for Jesus’ condemnation if this is disregarded. If this is so, however, we have two independent witnesses to the fact that Jesus himself claimed to be the divine Son of man and that this was meant to be understood ontologically and not merely functionally.

Ontology—Hebrew or Greek?
The scandal and incomprehension which greeted Jesus’ remarks can in fact only be understood on the basis of Hebraic ontology. It is doubtless true that the Jewish concept of the Messiah was essentially functional, at least in mainstream Judaism, and this was inevitable given their concept of God. It is surely not necessary to remind ourselves that at least from the time of Moses, Hebrew religion had had a strong ontological base—not only was God the Absolute Existent, but there was a radical and unbridgeable separation between him and man in their respective natures. This did not preclude a certain functional unity of course—God was frequently portrayed in the Old Testament in anthropomorphic terms, and his voice spoke through human agents—but never was there any suggestion that God and man might or could be one. This rigid separation moreover carried through to all the many phases and branches of Judaism and nowhere, as far as I know, is any earthly figure apotheosized. Even those who come closest, like Enoch and Elijah, are carefully distinguished from God in his essence.

Now had Jesus been content to fit into this pattern, he might well have evoked scribal curiosity, after the manner of John the Baptist, but he would hardly have attracted the ontological interest which they evidently had in him. The root of the problem seems to have been that Jesus called God his father. There is no reason to doubt the historical accuracy of this and, in a sense, it is true that the Old Testament portrays the relationship of Israel to God as that of a son to his father. There is therefore no a priori reason why Cullmann should not be right to say that Jesus innovated only in individualizing this concept and applying it to himself.19 Unfortunately, this possibility recedes dramatically when we look at the reaction Jesus provoked. No-one valued the special position of Israel more than the scribes and Pharisees, and if this was what Jesus meant, no-one was in a better position than they to appreciate it. It is quite untrue to Scripture to suggest that their opposition to Jesus was from the beginning so intense that they were incapable of seeing so obvious a point.

It is quite clear however from the sequence of events in John 5:14–18 that this is not the kind of sonship Jesus had in mind. His was not a sonship of legal inheritance, but of essence—a familiar Semitic idiom, strange only in the context of a man claiming to be related to God in this way. The following verses make the intimacy of the relationship even plainer. However much these verses may lend themselves to a functional interpretation, I would submit that verse 21 is decisive for an ontological viewpoint. Here the construction ‘As the Father... so also the Son...’ establishes identity of action; what is true of the Father is equally true of the Son. But the phrase ‘to whom he will’ makes it plain that the Son is both equal to the Father and autonomous—an impossibility unless he is also God. Moreover, this is not a theological construction grafted on to Jesus’ original words—it is implicit in his whole concept of Sonship from the beginning.

It was when they realized this fundamental difference about Jesus’ claims that the Jewish leaders had him arrested and put to death. This was their solution to the ontological problem of Jesus—no man could be God, therefore he was a blasphemer. The early Christians, however, were faced with a problem scarcely less serious. For how could one accept a Hebraic concept of deity and yet still affirm that the man Jesus was God? At one extreme was the possibility that Jesus was not a man at all, but God in a borrowed body. At the other extreme was the view that Jesus was not really God, but merely some kind of divine man. Both these views were put forward in antiquity, but neither one, in its pure form at least, was the basis

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of any major heresy. The reason for this was that the problem for Greek minds lay elsewhere.

Jewish Christians had trouble accommodating a God-man, but their difficulties were as nothing compared with those of the Greeks. The Jews, after all, began with the right concept of ontological divinity, an idea which was largely missing in the Greek world. Greek Christians in fact were fighting two battles at once—on the one hand, they had to fight for a Hebraic conception of God; on the other, they had to keep the God-man Jesus intact.

Greek paganism, it is true, had no difficulty with divine-human intermediaries. Greek mythology and philosophy were both rooted in an ontological hierarchy of beings graded from top to bottom and shading into one another rather like a vertical rainbow. So god-men existed quite happily in the intermediate zone, but in principle divinization was possible for anyone, and the philosophical practice of Apathy, for instance, was designed to hasten the process.

The Hebrew God, however, did not fit this chain of being at all. (Marcion disagreed, but he was a unique case.) But many Greeks refused, or were unable, to abandon their philosophical ideas. So, the Hebrew God was put at one end of the chain, with an absolute barrier between his essence and any created thing. But because God was unique, he was alone at the head of the chain, with all creation lower down. Because of his absolute separation, he could not communicate directly with this creation, but needed a mediator (mesiteis). This mediator was like him in every way, except that he was created. As such he could move down the scale, make himself a little lower than the angels and become man, in order to raise man again to the number two spot in the hierarchy. This, essentially, was the philosophical background of Arius which led to his peculiar form of subordinationism. As a heresy it was very subtle, especially since there were many biblical texts which appeared to support his subordinationist position.

Arianism was by no means the only ancient heresy, of course, but it was the one which proved most difficult to refute. Not only did the orthodox party have to maintain the complete ontological otherness of God, which Arius was so concerned to assert; it also had to argue for the full divinity of the man Jesus in a way which would command full biblical support. They did this by relying heavily on the Gospels, especially John. The prologue to the fourth Gospel showed that there was more than one hypostasis in God. We cannot pause to examine the logic of trinitarian doctrine, but eventually equilibrium was established between the unity and the diversity within the Godhead in a way which avoided any suggestion of Platonic emanation. This was sufficient to condemn the subordinationism of Arius, but it left open the problem of the hypostatic union.

The Chalcedonian solution

Given that the second person of the Trinity was a pre-existent divine hypostasis, how could he be the man Jesus at the same time? Everyone agreed that God and man had come together in Christ, but it was impossible to agree as to how this had occurred. Every solution proposed seemed to lead either to dualism, in which God and man came together (synchorosis) without actually uniting, or to a tertium quid, in which the fusion of God and man produced a being who was neither the one nor the other but contained elements of both. The former solution safeguarded the distinction of the natures while sacrificing the unity of the person, the latter held up the unity of the person but compromised the separation of the natures. The first of these views was propounded by Nestorius, the second by Apollinarius, and later, in a somewhat different form, by the Monophysites of Alexandria.

The Chalcedonian solution to this dilemma was as follows. The divine and human natures were distinct and could not be confused in any way. Each nature was complete in itself and obeyed its own internal laws. The divine nature was eternal, the human nature assumed in the incarnation. Jesus, who was only one person, was therefore divine. On the other hand, his humanity was not a veil covering this divinity, in the way that ancient philosophy imagined the flesh to be covering the soul. All such dualism was ruled out by the virginal conception—usually called, mistakenly, the virgin birth—by which the divine hypostasis became man in the womb of the virgin Mary. Mary was therefore of necessity the Theotokos, or God-bearer. Nestorius had protested against this on the ground that Mary was not the mother of Christ’s divinity, but although this was certainly agreed to in principle, Nestorius’ preference of the title Christotokos for Mary could not be admitted because of its implied dualism. The union between God and man was such as to preclude the independent existence of the manhood—which is the meaning of Leo’s phrase ‘impersonal humanity’.

Furthermore, the two natures, though united, continued to possess the characteristics proper to them, which is why Jesus was portrayed in the Gospels as experiencing human suffering yet at the same time raising men from the dead, or walking on water. No attempt was made to explain this
further—Chalcedon contented itself with the mystery that Jesus was one person 'made known in two natures'. R. V. Sellers has pointed out the significance of this gnōrizomenos (made known) for understanding the true meaning of the Definition, and claims that it goes a long way towards answering many modern objections to the doctrine.11 Chalcedon did not claim to know how the hypostatic union occurred in terms of biology or genetics—such knowledge was in any case beyond human understanding. What it did claim was that the empirical, historical Jesus was a God-man, and that it had established, in the light of Scripture, the boundaries within which this perfect union must be seen in order to avoid compromising the evidence.

Chalcedon today

Is this solution still valid today? If so, is it still necessary? This is the question which most modern theologians, even those who are prepared to accept Chalcedon in its context, are now raising. Let us examine some of these objections to see whether they are in fact as cogent as their proponents claim.

1. Probably the most damaging modern objection to the Definition is the charge that it is fundamentally docetic. According to this way of thinking, it is impossible to be fully a man and yet God at the same time. Chalcedon tried to give equal weight to both, but in fact erred on the side of the divine nature. The Chalcedonian Christ is accused of being less than fully human because (a) he is sinless; (b) he is genetically absurd; (c) he lacks a human personality.

These objections arise, however, because their proponents have a defective understanding of what human nature is. In fact, it is precisely because of this defective ontology of man that a functional christology has seemed to be necessary. Those who take this line define humanity empirically—what I am, man is. But that is not the biblical view of man at all. In the Bible, sin, for example, is not a part of human nature but a corruption of it; its present universality is the result of inheritance by common descent, but it is not inherent in man's nature. It is true that solidarity with the human race requires descent from Adam, but Jesus had this through his mother. We all know what problems the Church has had over the question of Mary's sinfulness, but I would suggest that this was adequately nullified by the word Theotokos in the definition and by the almost contemporary statement in the Athanasian Creed which speaks of the hypostatic union 'not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God'. The power of the


greater assumed and consequently overcame the weakness of the lesser substance. This is not docetism, as is so often alleged, but the very opposite. Christ was not a freak, but the firstborn of a new creation, the prototype of the perfection to which every Christian aspires. The Chalcedonians did not take themselves as the norm of humanity, but Christ, the second Adam. Their concern was not to make him 'one of them', but to make themselves some of his.

The genetic argument is more difficult, particularly as the council was quite unaware of modern biology. Nevertheless, they clearly believed that the virgin birth was a miracle and that it did not impair Jesus' humanity. Adam, after all, had not come into being by the procreative process, nor had Eve. Natural procreation may be normal in our experience, but it is not necessary for humanity. Nor should we forget his uniqueness—Jesus was fully man, but he was certainly not merely man. One might possibly draw the analogy of dual nationality, where a man might have two distinct identities and yet remain the same person. When he is with us, we may assimilate him to ourselves, even to the point where we are surprised if we discover that the same person speaks a different language and carries within him a completely different set of cultural references. Such a man, of course, is neither a schizophrenic nor an impossibility; it is merely that we have failed to grasp the complete situation. So it is, on a different level, with Jesus. The fact that his Father is 'foreign' in some sense to us, does not exclude him from full participation in our life as one of us; it means rather that we must broaden our horizons to accommodate someone who is both like us and different at the same time.

The argument that the Chalcedonian Christ lacks a human personality is sheer misunderstanding. Leo the Great described Christ's humanity as 'impersonal' simply in order to emphasize that Jesus was never a mere man—in other words, that as God and man together, he was not a split personality. Of course, we must also pay attention to the meaning of the word 'person' which means simply an 'autonomous individuality', within which there is a wide range of variable characteristics composing the personality. These can and do change—sometimes quite drastically—without, however, compromising the objective existence of the individual concerned. Jesus' personality was provided for by the insistence that he had a human soul and a human will—though this second point was not clarified until later.

The failure of a christology based on principles like these may be seen from the case of John
Robinson. Robinson is as insistent as anyone could be in stressing the humanity of Jesus in empirical terms. For him, Jesus is not God incarnate but a God-filled human personality. Nevertheless, Jesus is still unique. Why? Because it is through him that we perceive God. As Robinson has written: 'It is in Jesus, and Jesus alone, that there is nothing of self to be seen, but solely the ultimate, unconditional love of God. It is as he emptied himself utterly of himself that he became the carrier of the "name which is above every other name".' But this is thoroughly docetic. Why? Because a functional christology like Robinson’s finds itself invariably in an ontological impasse. It tries to re-emphasize the humanity of Jesus by stripping him of his Chalcedonian divinity, but at the same time it wants to reassert that Jesus revealed God as no other man has ever done. In practice, of course, this is only possible by overcoming the humanity, which can only be a barrier to the perception of God. The more perfect the divine revelation is, the more the humanity is superseded, until it vanishes entirely. The Chalcedonian position is nothing like this—Jesus’ humanity in orthodox thought is not a barrier but a means to the perception of God.

Those who take Robinson’s line, if they are consistent, must eventually see that Jesus’ humanity does not and cannot disappear, from which they conclude that he was not unique as a revealer of God, since other great men have achieved remarkable degrees of self-abnegation. This line, recently propounded by John Hick and Dennis Nineham, among others, makes Jesus but one more extraordinary man, and is the end of Christianity as a distinctive, coherent religion. Yet it must be remembered that The myth of God incarnate is not a freak development, but the logical outcome of a functionalist christology.

2. The second major objection to Chalcedon concerns its supposed out-of-date Hellenism. According to this argument, the Definition was a fine thing in its day, but now with new philosophies and new cultures we need a new statement of faith.

Superficially this sounds very plausible—it is all a question of translation, we are told, of the need to find dynamic equivalents for ideas which are no longer current. Unfortunately, this point of view ignores the fact that the Definition presents us with a thought-world which claims eternal validity and relevance. We are too ready to assume that modern equivalents can be found for terms like ‘person’, ‘nature’ and ‘substance’. We forget that the early Christians did not just slide into Platonism—on the contrary, they were all too acutely aware of the dangers of doing just that and fought to keep as close to the Bible as possible in their terminology and expressions. It is true, of course, that words like ousia, physis and hypostasis were used in Greek philosophy, but not in the same way. Likewise other terms simply had to be invented, like homousios, or borrowed from quite different disciplines, like prosōpon. Christian dogmatic concepts may have been expressed in words taken from the surrounding culture, but they do not depend on it.

We have already argued that the ontological quest of the early church arose from an Old Testament view of God. In the same way, the need to express the reality of the incarnate Christ arose from, and was governed by, New Testament requirements. Chalcedon did not adopt philosophy; it took some basic philosophical words and forged a theology based on Scripture. Its logic is a systematization of the logic inherent in Scripture, not a philosophical corruption of primitive texts. For that reason, although it may be simplified for mass consumption, it can never be replaced. Ontological christology is part of the biblical revelation which cannot and must not be compromised in the name of historical and/or cultural relativism.

Conversion to Christ today can only mean what it meant to our ancestors—that we must put on a new mind and a new heart as men and women transformed by the transcendent power of the Christian gospel. This is the reality which is enshrined in the Chalcedonian Definition which will stand unchanged and unsurpassed as long as Christian faith endures.
The rise of apocalyptic

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Dr Bauckham is Lecturer in the History of Christian Thought at the University of Manchester. Since writing his Ph.D (Cambridge) on the sixteenth-century divine William Fulke, he has been much engaged in studying the book of Revelation in the wider context of apocalyptic literature. The following study arises from Paul D. Hanson’s recent book, The dawn of apocalyptic, but goes on to consider other recent advances in this area, and to evaluate the place of apocalyptic in the development of biblical literature.

Apocalyptic is currently a growth area in biblical studies. Fresh study, more reliable texts, new editions, even hitherto unpublished documents are enriching our understanding of the intertestamental apocalyptic literature. In addition, there has been fresh debate over the origins of apocalyptic and its relation to Old Testament prophecy, while in the wake of E. Käsemann’s notorious claim that ‘apocalyptic is the mother of all Christian theology’, the importance of apocalyptic as the intellectual matrix of primitive Christianity is increasingly recognized. More and more apocalyptic must be seen as a crucial historical bridge between the Testaments.

All this raises serious theological questions. Is apocalyptic a legitimate development of OT religion? The historical investigation of apocalyptic origins cannot avoid a theological assessment, which has its implications also for NT theology to the extent that apocalyptic was a formative factor in early Christian theological development. In this way the question of the theological continuity between the two Testaments themselves is involved in the problem of the status of apocalyptic. Moreover, as James Barr points out, the status of apocalyptic raises the question of the status of the canon in which it is only marginally represented. Can an intertestamental development be seen as providing theological continuity between the Testaments?

In this article we shall be concerned primarily with the rise of apocalyptic up to the flowering of Hasidic apocalyptic in the mid-second century BC.

We shall be asking (in Part I) the historical question of the origins of apocalyptic, in the light of some recent studies, and (in Part II) the theological question of the theological legitimacy of apocalyptic as a development of Old Testament religion.

I. ORIGINS

Apocalyptic in the prophets

The most important recent investigation of the origins of apocalyptic in OT prophecy is that of Paul D. Hanson. Hanson argues that apocalyptic eschatology developed in the early post-exilic period (late sixth and early fifth centuries) as a development rooted in the prophetic tradition. The extent of the development of apocalyptic in this period, as he estimates it, is indicated by his revision of the usual terminology: he uses the term ‘proto-apocalyptic’ for Second Isaiah, since he points in the apocalyptic direction; Third Isaiah and other prophetic material from the early Persian period (Zc. 9—13; Is. 24—27) he calls ‘early apocalyptic’; Zechariah 14, which he dates in the mid-fifth century and thinks marks the point at which apocalyptic eschatology is fully developed, is ‘middle apocalyptic’; Daniel, from the mid-second century, is already ‘late apocalyptic’. (To avoid confusion, in this article I shall use the term ‘apocalyptic prophecy’ to designate apocalyptic material within the OT prophetic books, i.e.


4 In this article I accept, as Hanson does, the usual critical conclusions as to the unity and date of the books of Isaiah, Zechariah and Daniel. Readers who maintain the traditional conservative views on these issues will naturally have to differ very radically from both Hanson’s and my own reconstructions of the rise of apocalyptic. For the consistency of these critical conclusions with an evangelical doctrine of Scripture, see J. E. Goldingay, ‘Inspiration, infallibility, and criticism’, The Churchman 90 (1976), pp. 6–23; idem, ‘The book of Daniel: three issues’, Themelios 2 (1977), pp. 45–49. The honesty of the pseu-

[We hope to publish a full article dealing with this issue in the September 1978 number—Editor.]
Hanson’s ‘early’ and ‘middle’ apocalyptic.) Hanson admits a chronological gulf between Zechariah 14 and ‘late’ apocalyptic, but the special characteristic of his thesis is that he considers apocalyptic eschatology to have already developed in all essentials before this gulf. This enables him to stress the continuity between prophecy and apocalyptic to an unusual degree, and to deny the importance of the non-Israelite influences (Iranian and Hellenistic) which have so often been regarded as contributing significantly to the development of apocalyptic. Such influences, he argues, enter the picture only at a late stage when apocalyptic’s essential character was already developed.

Of course such a thesis can only be maintained if an appropriate definition of apocalyptic is used. Hanson’s definition focuses on apocalyptic eschatology and relates it to prophetic eschatology, distinguishing the two in terms of the kind of balance which each maintains between myth and history. The characteristic of classical prophecy is the dialectic it maintains between the cosmic vision of Yahweh’s plans and the prophet’s responsibility to translate that vision into concrete historical terms. Prophetic eschatology is ‘a religious perspective which focuses on the prophetic announcement to the nation of the divine plans for Israel and the world which the prophet has witnessed unfolding in the divine council and which he translates into terms of plain history, real politics and human instrumentality’. What apocalyptic lacks is that last clause. The balance between vision and history is lost. Despairing of the realization of the vision in the historical sphere, the apocalypticists were increasingly content to leave it in the realm of myth. Apocalyptic eschatology is ‘a religious perspective which focuses on the disclosure . . . to the elect of the cosmic vision of Yahweh’s sovereignty—especially as it relates to his acting to deliver his faithful—which disclosure the visionaries have largely ceased to translate into terms of plain history, real politics, and human instrumentality’.

This apocalyptic eschatology developed among the disciples of Second Isaiah (to whose tradition belong not only Is. 56—66 but also Zc. 9—14) in the post-exilic Palestinian community. Second Isaiah’s prophecies of glorious restoration remained unfulfilled, and in the bleak conditions of the early Persian period the visionary group which maintained his eschatological hope increasingly presented it in purely mythical terms, in images of sheer divine intervention and cosmic transformation. To

the possibility of fulfilment through human agency and favourable historical conditions they became indifferent.

As the sociological context for the development of apocalyptic eschatology Hanson postulates an intra-community struggle between this visionary group on the one hand, and on the other hand the hierocratic group, a Zadokite priestly group which adopted a pragmatic approach to restoration. By contrast with the visionary programme of Second Isaiah and his followers, this latter group were at first inspired by the more pragmatic restoration programme of Ezekiel, and through the preaching of Haggai and Zechariah they succeeded in harnessing eschatological enthusiasm to their policies. After the rebuilding of the temple they won control in the community and thereafter discouraged all eschatological expectation as a threat to the stability of their achievement. The visionary group, on the other hand, consistently opposed the rebuilding of the temple in the name of their transcendent eschatology and waged the most bitter polemic against the hierocratic party. Their own political powerlessness encouraged their visionary indifference to the sphere of political responsibility.

Hanson’s reconstruction of this community struggle is speculative at best and probably the weakest part of his thesis. In particular it leads him to a polarization of the prophetic tradition of Second Isaiah, Third Isaiah and Zechariah 9—14 on the one hand, and on the other hand the tradition of Ezekiel and Zechariah 1—8. The former he regards as the tradition in which apocalyptic emerged, while the latter only used apocalyptic motifs to legitimate a pragmatic political programme. Such a polarization does far less than justice to the significance of Ezekiel and Zechariah 1—8 in the development of apocalyptic, as Hanson himself has begun to recognize in a subsequent modification of his treatment of Zechariah. To treat Zechariah 9—14 as belonging to the tradition of Third Isaiah rather than to the tradition of Ezekiel and Zechariah 1—8, is to ignore the evidence that these chapters are quite heavily dependent on Ezekiel and relatively little dependent on Isaiah 40—66. This in itself suggests that the emergence of apocalyptic must be


8 Interpreter’s dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary volume, pp. 32, 982f.


Hanson, The dawn of apocalyptic, p. 11.
Ibid.
reconstructed according to a less rigid classification of prophetic traditions.

This is not the place to attempt an alternative reconstruction in detail, but what seems needed is greater recognition of the common features of the various post-exilic prophecies. Despite the varying emphases there is a common conviction that the eschatological promises of restoration in Second Isaiah and Ezekiel remained largely outstanding despite the restored city and temple. In all of these prophecies there is therefore a degree of dependence on and reinterpretation of the earlier prophecies, and all are more or less apocalyptic (according to Hanson’s definition) in the extent to which they depict the coming salvation in terms of Yahweh’s direct intervention and radical transformation of historical conditions. The distinctive aspect of Haggai and Zechariah (1—8) is that they focused these apocalyptic hopes on the rebuilding of the temple and the leadership of Joshua and Zerubbabel. But these historical realities soon proved incapable of measuring up to the hopes aroused, and so those who subsequently kept alive the eschatological expectation were not opponents of Haggai and Zechariah but successors who sought to remain faithful to their prophecy.

There is, however, a great deal of value in Hanson’s analyses of Isaiah 56—66 and Zechariah 9—14. He shows convincingly how various features of apocalyptic eschatology emerge in these passages. Thus, judgment and salvation are no longer proscribed for the nation as a whole but respectively for the faithless and the faithful within Israel. The doctrine of a universal judgment is adumbrated in Isaiah 63: 6; 66: 16, and eschatology takes on cosmic dimensions. Beyond the judgment lies a new age radically different from the present age and inaugurated by a new act of creation: this idea has its background in Second Isaiah and is already developed in such passages as Isaiah 65: 17—25; Zechariah 14: 6—9. These elements compose the transcendent eschatology of divine intervention and cosmic transformation which forms the central core of apocalyptic belief.

Hanson also shows how this development entails the revivification of ancient mythical material, especially the Divine Warrior myth, to depict the coming eschatological triumph of Yahweh. Here Hanson follows the pioneering work of his teacher F. M. Cross, whose studies of Canaanite myth in relation to the Old Testament revealed the extent to which ‘old mythological themes rise to a new
crescendo’ in apocalyptic. Other studies have shown the extent to which Canaanite myth continues to be used even in Daniel and Enoch, while the apocalyptic assimilation of myth extended also to Babylonian, Iranian and Hellenistic material. This ‘remythologization’ of Israelite religion was not, however, a reversion to an historical worldview, but serves to represent an eschatological future which is now understood to transcend the categories of ordinary history.

Hanson has succeeded in demonstrating that the transcendent eschatology which characterizes apocalyptic emerged in post-exilic prophecy as an internal development in the Israelite prophetic tradition in response to the historical conditions of the post-exilic community. This is an important conclusion. On the other hand, there remains a significant gulf, which is not only chronological, between this apocalyptic prophecy of the fifth century and the Hasidic apocalyptic of the second century. Apocalyptic prophecy is not pseudonymous, though it is often anonymous. It does not include extensive surveys of history in the form of vatitina ex eventu. Its angelology is relatively undeveloped. The temporal dualism of two ages is emerging, but the spatial dualism of heaven and earth, which also characterizes intertestamental apocalyptic, is not yet apparent. Moreover, the transcendent eschatology of apocalyptic prophecy does not yet include the transcendence of death, so central to later apocalyptic belief.

In other words, although Hanson has demonstrated the continuity between prophecy and the apocalyptic prophecy of the early Persian period, there still remains a problem of continuity between this apocalyptic prophecy and the later apocalyptic of Daniel and the intertestamental literature.

To the origins of this later apocalyptic we now turn. We shall see that it is really the heir of post-exilic prophecy and owes its transcendent eschatology to that source. But we shall also see that this is not the whole story, for the alternative derivation of apocalyptic from wisdom has some validity, and there is moreover a significant dis

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17 Probably a doctrine of resurrection appears in Is. 26: 19, which Hanson considers ‘early apocalyptic’ (op. cit., p. 313f.), but he does not discuss it.
continuity between the self-understanding of apocalyptic prophecy and that of the later apocalyptists.

**Daniel and mantic wisdom**

The most radical rejection of the derivation of apocalyptic from prophecy is that of Gerhard von Rad, who argued that apocalyptic is not the child of prophecy but the offspring of wisdom. This proposal has been widely criticized, as being at least one-sided. In this section and the next, we shall argue that, while von Rad's thesis was too generalized and cannot be treated as an alternative to the derivation from prophecy, it does have some validity in relation to the background of the books of Daniel and Enoch. In both cases, however, the wisdom background needs more careful definition than von Rad gave it.

An important attempt to refine von Rad's argument is H. P. Müller's proposal to derive apocalyptic not from proverbial but from mantic wisdom. For alongside the wise men whose type of wisdom is represented by the book of Proverbs, the ancient Near East had also mantic wise men, whose function was to divine the secrets of the future by various methods including the interpretation of dreams, omens, mysterious oracles, and the stars. There is little trace of a class of mantic wise men in Israel, but two OT figures who rose to prominence in foreign courts did so by virtue of their successful competition with the court diviners in the practice of the mantic arts: Joseph at the court of Pharaoh and Daniel at the court of Nebuchadnezzar. It is the case of Daniel which suggests that one of the roots of apocalyptic lies in mantic wisdom.

Daniel was not a prophet in the sense of classical Israelite prophecy. His activity in chapters 2, 4, 5 consists in the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dreams and of the mysterious message on Belshazzar's palace wall. In each case he is called in after the failure of the other diviners at court. Clearly he belongs among them (2: 18), and as a result of his success becomes their chief (2: 48; 4: 9; 5: 11). His function is exactly theirs: the disclosure of the secrets of the future. Of course the source of his supernatural knowledge is the God of Israel, and his success is designed to bring glory to the God of Israel as the God who is sovereign over the political future. Daniel is the representative of the God of Israel among the magicians and astrologers of the Babylonian court, but he represents him in the practice of mantic wisdom (cf. 5: 12). It is, moreover, this aspect of the Daniel of chs. 1—6 which most plausibly accounts for the ascription to him of the apocalypse of chapters 7—12. We must therefore take seriously the claim that apocalyptic has roots in mantic wisdom.

There are strong formal resemblances between the symbolic dream with its interpretation in mantic wisdom and the apocalyptic dream or vision with its interpretation. The latter also has roots in prophecy (especially Ezekiel and Zc. 1—6), but the connexion with mantic wisdom is hard to deny in the case of Daniel, where Nebuchadnezzar's dream and its interpretation in chapter 2 corresponds so well to Daniel's dream-visions and their interpretation in chapters 7 and 8. Besides their dream-interpretation, the mantic wise men were doubtless responsible for the literary prophecies of the ancient east, such as the Mesopotamian 'apocalypses' which have been compared with Jewish apocalyptic in certain respects. These provide precedent, which cannot be found in Israelite prophecy, for the long reviews of history in the form of predictions from a standpoint in the past, such as we find in Daniel 11 and other Jewish apocalypses. The astrological

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21 In later times he could be loosely called a prophet (Mk. 13: 14), as could David (Acts 2: 30), in the sense that they have inspired predictions.


23 The device of *vaticinium ex eventu* is used in the texts published by Grayson and Lambert, Hunger and Kaufman, and in Hallo and Borger's *Sulgi* text. Most of these texts
aspect of mantic wisdom is naturally less well represented in Jewish parallel material, but it is noteworthy that interest in astrological prediction recurs at Qumran.

The argument about the date of Daniel may have been conducted too simply in terms of a choice between the sixth and second centuries. We may now be able to recognize the book's dual affinities, with Babylonian mantic wisdom on the one hand and with Hasidic apocalyptic on the other, which indicate the probability of a developing Daniel tradition,24 which has its roots as far back as the exile in Jewish debate with and participation in mantic wisdom, developed in the Eastern diaspora, and finally produced Daniel apocalypses on Palestinian soil in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes.26 This is all the more probable in view of the similar chronological development which the Enoch tradition underwent (see below).

The key to the emergence of apocalyptic in such a tradition is undoubtedly a growing concern with eschatology. Apocalyptic, like mantic wisdom, is the revelation of the secrets of the future, but in its concern with the eschatological future apocalyptic moves beyond the scope at least of Babylonian mantic wisdom.28 Thus, while Daniel's interpretation of the dream of chapter 4 and the oracle of chapter 5 belong to the typical activities of the Babylonian diviners, his eschatological interpretation of the dream of chapter 2 is already in the sphere of apocalyptic. Hence it is chapter 2 which provides the point of departure for the apocalypse of chapters 7—12, which interprets the future according to the pattern of the four pagan empires succeeded by the eschatological kingdom. But even this contrast between mantic wisdom and apocalyptic may be too sharply drawn. If Nebuchadnezzar's prognosticators would not have given his dream an eschatological sense, the Zoroastrian magi who succeeded them at the court of Darius might well have done.29 Precisely the four empires scheme of chapter 2, with its metals symbolism and its eschatological outcome, has close parallels in the Iranian material which has been plausibly suggested as its source.30 We touch here on an old debate about apocalyptic origins: the question of the influence of Iranian eschatology.31 Whatever the extent of the influence, it is clear that there are parallels, of which the Jews of the diaspora cannot have been unaware. Not even eschatology decisively differentiates Jewish apocalyptic from the products of mantic wisdom, insofar as eschatology developed also to some extent in non-Jewish mantic circles.

It becomes increasingly clear that apocalyptic, from its roots in mantic wisdom, is a phenomenon with an unusually close relationship to its non-Jewish environment. At every stage there are parallels with the oracles and prophecies of the pagan world. This is equally true as we move from the Persian to the Hellenistic age. Hellenistic Egypt has an 'apocalyptic' literature of its own: pseudeonymous oracles set in the past, predicting political events, eschatological woes, and a final golden age.32 There is an extensive Hellenistic literature of heavenly revelations and celestial journeys sometimes remarkably similar in form to those of the apocalyptic seers.33 It is not surprising that H. D. Betz concludes that 'we must learn to understand apocalypticism as a peculiar manifestation within the entire course of Hellenistic-oriental syncretism'.

Nevertheless this close relationship of Jewish apocalyptic to its non-Jewish environment is misunderstood if it is treated merely as syncretistic. Undoubtedly there is considerable borrowing of motifs, symbols, literary forms—not only by Jew from Gentile but also vice versa.34 Undoubtedly Judaism after the exile, especially in the diaspora but increasingly also in Palestine, was not immune from the moods and concerns of the international religious scene. The relationship, however, was not

24 D. Flusser, Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972), pp. 148–75. The Iranian sources are late, but are based on a lost passage of the Avesta and the parallels are too close to be fortuitous. Note how the passage from the Zand-i Vohuman Yasn (p. 166) incorporates precisely the connexion between mantic wisdom and apocalyptic in terms of symbolic dream/vision: Ahuramazda gives Zarathustra a vision of a tree with branches of four metals, which he explains as four periods. M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1 (London: SCM, 1974), pp. 182 ff., prefers to trace Dn. 2 to Hellenistic Greek sources.


28 Hengel, op. cit., p. 185: 'It is not improbable that Egyptian "apocalypticism" ... and its Jewish counterpart had a mutual influence on each other.'
one of passive absorption of alien influence, but of creative encounter and debate in which the essence of Israelite faith was reasserted in new forms.

This element of debate is already in evidence in the encounter with Babylonian mantic wisdom. Daniel, as we have seen, practises it among but also in competition with the Babylonian diviners, to show that it is the God of Israel who is sovereign over the future and gives real revelation of the secrets of destiny (2:27f., 46). Such a tradition of debate found one of its most natural expressions in the Jewish Sibylline oracles, in which an internationally known pagan form of prophetic oracle was adopted as a vehicle for a Jewish eschatological message. The message, drawn from OT prophecy, of God's judgment on idolatry and his purpose of establishing his kingdom, was attributed to the ancient prophetesses, the Sibyls, largely, it seems, with an apologetic aim, to gain it a hearing in the non-Jewish world. Of course the bulk of Jewish apocalyptic was written for an exclusively Jewish audience, but behind it lay a close but critical interaction with its non-Jewish environment such as the Sibyllines bring to more deliberate expression. This kind of relationship is hazardous. The appropriation of pagan forms and motifs can become insufficiently critical and the voice of authentic Jewish faith can become muffled or stifled. We cannot suppose that the Jewish apocalyptists never succumbed to this danger, but on the whole the risk they took was justified by the achievement of an expression of prophetic faith which spoke to their own age.

From its potentially ambiguous relationship with paganism, apocalyptic emerged in the crisis of hellenization under Antiochus, not as the expression of hellenizing syncretism, but as the literature of the Hasidic movement, which stood for uncompromising resistance to pagan influence. How did apocalyptic succeed in retaining its Jewish authenticity and avoiding the perils of syncretism? This is the point at which the derivation of apocalyptic from mantic wisdom fails us, and needs to be supplemented with the derivation from OT prophecy. The two are after all not entirely dissimilar. While Jewish practitioners of mantic wisdom were entering into competition with the Babylonian fortune-tellers, Second Isaiah, the father of apocalyptic prophecy, was also engaged, at a greater distance, in debate with his pagan counterparts, exposing the impotence of the Babylonian gods and their prognosticators (Is. 44:25; 47:13) by contrast with Yahweh's sovereignty over the future revealed to his servants the prophets (Is. 44:26; 46:9-11). The apocalyptic heirs of Jewish mantic wisdom were not prophets, but their concern with God's revelation of the future made them students of Old Testament prophecy, and the more they concerned themselves with the eschatological future, the more they sought their inspiration in the prophets. With the cessation of prophecy in Israel, the apocalyptists became the interpreters of OT prophecy for their own age. So while the form of their work was stamped by its continuity with pagan oracular literature, its content was frequently inspired by OT prophecy. Again we can see this in Daniel. His eschatological dream-interpretation in chapter 2 is, if not inspired by, at least congruous with the eschatological hope of the prophets. Taken as the fundamental idea of the apocalypse of chapters 7—12, it is then filled out by means of the interpretation of OT prophecy. Thus the Hasidic apocalyptists stood in a tradition with its origins in mantic wisdom, but filled it with their own dominant concern to achieve a fresh understanding of prophecy for their own time. In that sense they were also the heirs of post-exilic apocalyptic prophecy.

Enoch and the cosmological wisdom

We have traced the emergence of apocalyptic between the exile and the Maccabees, between prophecy and mantic wisdom, in the tradition which produced our book of Daniel. We must now look at the emergence of apocalyptic in another tradition which spans the same period, the Enoch tradition.

The discovery of the Aramaic fragments of Enoch at Qumran, now available in J. T. Milik's edition, is most important for the study of apocalyptic origins. With the exception of the Similitudes (1 En. 37—71), fragments of all sections of 1 Enoch have been found: the Book of Watchers (1—36), the Astronomical Book (72—82), the Book of Dreams (83—90), and the Epistle of Enoch (91—107). There are also fragments of a hitherto unknown Book of Giants.

These discoveries clarify the issue of the relative dates of the parts of the Enoch corpus. The generally accepted date of the Book of Dreams (165 or 164 BC) may stand, but the pre-Maccabean date of the Astronomical Book and the Book of Watchers, hitherto disputed, is now certainly established on palaeographic evidence. The Astronomical Book (now known to have been much longer than the abridged version in Ethiopic Enoch 72—82) cannot be later than the beginning of the second century.

and Milik would date it in the early Persian period.\textsuperscript{38} The Book of Watchers cannot be later than c. 150 BC, and Milik thinks it was written in Palestine in the mid-third century.\textsuperscript{39} He is almost certainly correct in regarding chapters 6—19 as an earlier written source incorporated in the Book of Watchers; these chapters he regards as contemporary with or older than the Astronomical Book.\textsuperscript{40} While Milik's very early dating of the Astronomical Book and chapters 6—19 is uncertain, the important point for our purpose is their relative date as the earliest part of the Enoch corpus. This means that apocalyptic was not originally the dominant concern in the Enoch tradition, for the apocalyptic elements in these sections are not prominent.\textsuperscript{41} The expansion of chapters 6—19 with chapters 1—5, 21—36 to form the Book of Watchers, had the effect of adding much more eschatological content to this part of the tradition. Then in the Maccabean period a full-blown Enoch apocalypse appeared for the first time in the Book of Dreams. So we have a development parallel to that in the Daniel tradition.

Also like the Daniel tradition, the Enoch tradition has its roots in the Jewish encounter with Babylonian culture, but in this case over a wider area than mantic wisdom.\textsuperscript{42} The circles which gave rise to the tradition had an encyclopedic interest in all kinds of wisdom, especially of a cosmological kind: astronomy and the calendar, meteorology, geography, and the mythical geography of paradise. In all these areas of knowledge they were indebted to Babylonian scholarship,\textsuperscript{43} while the picture of Enoch himself as the initiator of civilization, who received heavenly revelations of the secrets of the universe and transmitted them in writing to later generations, is modelled on the antediluvian sages of Mesopotamian myth.\textsuperscript{44}

But, once again as in the Jewish involvement in mantic wisdom, this Jewish encyclopedic wisdom is not only indebted to but also in competition with

\textsuperscript{38} Milik, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 7–9.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 22–23, 28.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., pp. 23, 31.
\textsuperscript{41} Eschatological material appears only in 10: 12—11: 2 (which may have been expanded when chs. 6—19 were incorporated in the Book of Watchers); 16: 1; 72: 1; 80.
\textsuperscript{42} The debate with mantic wisdom is reflected in 1 En. 7: 1; 8: 3.

its pagan counterpart. Civilization is represented as an ambiguous phenomenon, with its sinful origins in the rebellion of the fallen angels (1 En. 7: 1; \textit{cf.} 69: 6–14) as well as an authentic basis in the divine revelations to Enoch.\textsuperscript{45} The true astronomy which Enoch learns from the archangel Uriel is not known to the pagan astrologers who take the stars to be gods (80: 7) and distort the calendar (82: 4ff.). The true wisdom which Enoch teaches is inseparably connected with the worship of the true God. So the scientific curiosity of the Enoch circles retains a genuinely Jewish religious core.

Von Rad’s derivation of apocalyptic from wisdom relied heavily on the evidence of 1 Enoch, but he was mistaken to generalize from this evidence. Only in the Enoch tradition was encyclopedic wisdom (as distinct from the mantic wisdom of the Daniel tradition) the context for the development of apocalyptic. Von Rad explained this development simply from the wise men’s thirst for knowledge, which led them to embrace eschatology and the divine ordering of history within the sphere of their wisdom. There may be some truth in this, but the increasing dominance of eschatology in the Enoch tradition demands a more specific explanation. Perhaps the most promising is that the Enoch tradition shows from the start a preoccupation with theodicy, with the origin and judgment of sin. The myth of the Watchers, the fallen angels who corrupted the antediluvian world, is a myth of the origin of evil. Though the Watchers were imprisoned and the antediluvian world annihilated in the flood, the spirits of their offspring the giants became the evil spirits who continue to corrupt the world until the last judgment (15: 8—16: 1). Already in the earliest section of the Book of Watchers (6—19), eschatology emerges in this context: the judgment of the antediluvian world presages the final judgment\textsuperscript{46} when the wickedness of men will receive its ultimate punishment (10: 14=4QEn\textsuperscript{91}: 5:1ff.) and supernatural evil be entirely eliminated (16: 1; 19: 1). With the expansion of the Book of Watchers, the emphasis on the final judgment increases. Enoch, who in chapters 6—19 was primarily the prophet of God’s judgment on the Watchers at the time of the flood, now becomes, naturally enough, the prophet of the last judgment (1—5). Also, for the first time in Jewish literature, a doctrine of rewards and punishments for all men

\textsuperscript{45} So the Enoch writings do not identify Enoch with an antediluvian sages of pagan myth. They present Enoch in opposition to the pagan heroes and sages, who are identified rather with the fallen angels and their offspring the giants: \textit{cf.} Milik, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 29, 313.
\textsuperscript{46} In 10: 20, 22 it is clear that the deluge and the final judgment are assimilated, \textit{cf.} also the description of the deluge as ‘the first end’ in 93: 4 (Epistle of Enoch).
after death is expounded (22QEn 1:22):45 this too expresses a concern with the problem of evil, the problem of the suffering of the righteous at the hands of the wicked (22: 5-7, 12).

So the Enoch tradition included a strong interest in the problem of evil, which was first expressed in the antediluvian legends of chapters 6-13, but also gave rise to increasing preoccupation with eschatology. This was its point of contact with apocalyptic prophecy, which therefore began to provide the content of Enoch's prophecies of the end.46 Apocalyptic prophecy was also much concerned with theodicy, specifically with the problem of Israel's continued subjection to the Gentile powers, but this specific problem does not (at least explicitly) appear in the Enoch tradition until the Book of Dreams, in which the tradition at last related itself to the prophetic concern with Israelite salvation history. The special mark of the Enoch tradition, linked as it was to prehistoric universal history, was its treatment of theodicy as a cosmic problem. This proved a reinforcement of a general tendency in apocalyptic to set the problem of God's dealings with Israel within a context of universal history and cosmic eschatology.

The pre-Maccabean Enoch tradition left a double legacy. On the one hand, much as in the Daniel tradition, the tradition became a vehicle for the interpretation of OT prophecy. In the Hasidic Book of Dreams and the (probably later) Epistle of Enoch, we have classic expressions of the apocalyptic view of history and eschatology, inspired by Old Testament prophetic faith. On the other hand, however, Enoch's journeys in angelic company through the heavens and the realms of the dead, discovering the secrets of the universe, are the first examples of another aspect of later apocalyptic literature. We need to distinguish two types of apocalypse. There are those which reveal the secrets of history: the divine plan of history and the coming triumph of God at the end of history. These could be called 'eschatological apocalypses'. But there are also apocalypses which reveal the mysteries of the cosmos: the contents of heaven and earth, or the seven heavens, or heaven and hell. These could be called 'cosmological apocalypses'.47

The Hasidic apocalypses—Daniel, the Enochic Book of Dreams, the Testament of Moses48—are theocratic apocalypses. But the cosmological interest did not die out, and was by no means divorced from eschatological apocalyptic, since the secrets of heaven were believed to include the pre-existing realities of the eschatological age. Cosmology really came into its own in the late Hellenistic apocalypses of the Christian era, such as 2 Enoch and 3 Baruch, in which the eschatological hope has disappeared and apocalyptic is well on the way to the pure cosmology of gnosticism. As the revelation of cosmic secrets the apocalypse became the typical literary form of Gnosticism.

So we see once more how apocalyptic, from its origins in the Jewish encounter with the Gentile cultures of the diaspora, retained a somewhat ambiguous position between Jewish and Gentile religion. Its continuity with OT prophetic faith cannot be taken for granted. Each apocalyptist had to achieve this continuity by creative reinterpretation of prophecy in apocalyptic forms. His success depended on the vitality of his eschatological hope inspired by the prophets, and when this hope faded apocalyptic easily degenerated into cosmological speculation of a fundamentally pagan character.

**Apocalyptic as interpretation of prophecy**

The continuity between prophecy and apocalyptic occurred when the apocalyptists assumed the role of interpreters of prophecy. They did not always do this nor always to the same extent, for as we have seen there are other aspects of apocalyptic literature, but this was the dominant aspect of the major tradition of eschatological apocalypses. In this tradition the transcendent eschatology of post-exilic prophecy was taken up and further developed.

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45 On this passage see Milik, op. cit., 219. In view of the mention of Cain's descendants (22: 7), 'the souls of all the children of men' (22: 3) must mean all men, not just all Israelites, as R. H. Charles thought: The Book of Enoch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), p. 46. So a doctrine of general rewards and punishments after death was already developed in pre-Maccabean apocalyptic tradition. This is a decisive refutation of the thesis of G. W. E. Nickelsburg, Jr, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism (Harvard Theological Studies 26: Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), who argues that a doctrine of rewards and punishments after death developed at the time of the Antiochian crisis with reference only to the martyrs and persecutors of the time. His discussion of 1 Enoch 22 assumes a post-Maccabean date (p. 134 n. 15, p. 143), which the 4QEn fragments now render impossible. 1 Enoch 22 (cf. also 10: 14; 27: 2f.) is therefore of crucial importance for the origins of Jewish beliefs about the after-life, as is the fact that the Enoch tradition, unlike other apocalyptic traditions, never expresses belief in bodily resurrection, but rather the doctrine of spiritual immortality which is also found in Jubilees and probably at Qumran. This is a striking instance of the continuing distinct identity of the various apocalyptic traditions.


47 This distinction in different, terminology, is made by I. Willi-Plein, VT 27 (1977), p. 79.

48 For the date of the Testament of Moses, see n. 52 below.
in a conscious process of reinterpreting the prophets for the apocalypticists' own age.

The apocalypticists understood themselves not as prophets but as inspired interpreters of prophecy. The process of reinterpreting prophecy was already a prominent feature of post-exilic prophecy, but the post-exilic prophets were still prophets in their own right. The apocalypticists, however, lived in an age when the prophetic spirit was quenched (1 Maccabees 4:46). Their inspiration was not a source of new prophetic revelation, but of interpretation of the already given revelation. There is therefore a decisive difference of self-understanding between prophets and apocalypticists, which implies also a difference of authority. The authority of the apocalypticists' message is only derivative from that of the prophets.

So when Jewish writers with a background in the mantic wisdom of the Daniel tradition or the cosmological wisdom of the Enoch tradition inherited the legacy of post-exilic prophecy, they did so as non-prophetic interpreters of the prophetic tradition which had come to an end. There may of course have been other groups without a wisdom or diaspora background who stood in greater sociological continuity with the prophetic tradition, maintaining the eschatological hope of the disciples of Second Isaiah and influencing the Enoch and Daniel traditions. The strong influence of Isaiah 40—66 on the apocalyptic of the Book of Watchers and Daniel is suggestive in this respect. To such a group we might attribute the eventual compilation of the book of Isaiah. But even in such a tradition a theological discontinuity occurred (perhaps gradually) when consciousness of independent prophetic vocation disappeared.

The puzzling apocalyptic device of pseudonymity is at least partly connected with this apocalyptic role of interpreting prophecy. The Testament of Moses, which may well be a Hasidic work contemporary with Daniel, is the least problematic example: as an interpretation of Deuteronomy 31—34 it puts its interpretation of Moses' prophecies into Moses' mouth. Similarly Daniel 7—12 has been attributed to Daniel because its fundamental idea is the scheme of the four empires followed by the eschatological kingdom, which derives from Daniel's prediction in chapter 2. Of course the apocalypticist does not interpret only the prophecies of his pseudonym, but the pseudonym indicates his primary inspiration. Pseudonymity is therefore a device expressing the apocalypticist's consciousness that the age of prophecy has passed: not in the sense that he fraudulently wishes to pass off his work as belonging to the age of prophecy, but in the sense that he thereby acknowledges his work to be mere interpretation of the revelation given in the prophetic age. Similarly the vaticinia ex eventu the apocalypticists adopted a form which was common in pagan oracular literature and made it a vehicle of their self-understanding as interpreters of Israelite prophecy.

II. THEOLOGICAL ISSUES

The problem of theological evaluation

Discussion of the origins of apocalyptic cannot really be isolated from a theological evaluation of apocalyptic. Implicitly or explicitly, much recent discussion has involved the judgment that apocalyptic is a more or less degenerate form of Israelite faith. Von Rad, for example, was clearly led to deny the connexion between prophecy and apocalyptic because he believed the apocalyptic understanding of history compared so badly with the prophetic, and even Hanson, despite his strong argument for the continuity of prophecy and apocalyptic, still treats pre-exilic prophecy as the high point of OT theology, from which apocalyptic is a regrettable decline, however much it may be an understandable development in post-exilic circumstances.

Moreover, the general theological outlook of the scholar can determine which new theological developments in the rise of apocalyptic he selects as the really significant ones. An older generation of scholars regarded the development of Jewish belief in life after death as a major landmark in the

40 This is argued most recently by Willi-Plein, art. cit. Cf. also D. S. Russell, The method and message of Jewish apocalyptic (London: SCM, 1964), ch. 7.
41 See n. 46 above.
43 There are two possible dates for the Testament of Moses (also called Assumption of Moses): c. 165 BC (with ch. 6 as a later interpolation) or early first century AD. The former is supported by J. Licht, JJS 12 (1961), pp. 95—103; Nickelsburg, op. cit., pp. 43—45, and in Studies on the Testament of Moses, ed. G. W. E. Nickelsburg (Cambridge, Mass.; SBL, 1973), pp. 33—37; J. A. Goldstein in ibid., pp. 44—47.
44 In later apocalypses, such as those attributed to Ezra and Baruch, there is no longer any question of interpreting the pseudonym's prophecies. The authors of 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch doubtless chose their pseudonyms because they identified with the historical situation of Ezra and Baruch after the fall of Jerusalem.
history of revelation, and so, however unsympathetic they may have been to other aspects of apocalyptic, this feature alone guaranteed the positive importance of apocalyptic. Recent scholarship in this area has paid remarkably little attention to this central apocalyptic belief, so that von Rad barely mentions it, and Hanson can argue that apocalyptic eschatology was in all essentials already developed before the introduction of a doctrine of immortality or resurrection.

Almost all modern attempts either to denigrate or to rehabilitate apocalyptic focus on its attitude to history. So discussion of Wolfhart Pannenberg's evaluation of apocalyptic in his systematic theology has centred on whether he is correct in supposing that apocalyptic gave real significance to universal history as the sphere of God's self-revelation.\textsuperscript{44}

To a large extent recent discussion has rightly concentrated on the apocalyptic view of history in relation to eschatology, since this takes us to the heart of the problem. The real issue is whether theology may seek the ultimate meaning of human life and the ultimate achievement of God's purpose beyond the history of this world. For many modern scholars, pre-exilic prophecy is the OT theological norm partly because it did not do this, while apocalyptic is a serious decline from the norm, even a relapse into paganism, because it did. Thus for Hanson the transcendent eschatology of apocalyptic prophecy is 'myth' not merely in the literary sense (which is undeniable) but in a sense akin to Bultmann's. In their literal expectation that Yahweh was going to establish his kingdom by direct personal intervention rather than human agency, and in a way which involved radical transformation of this world beyond the possibilities of ordinary history, the disciples of Second Isaiah were mistaken. Such language of divine intervention and cosmic transformation could only be valid as a mythical way of illuminating the possibilities of ordinary history. So when the apocalyptists did not translate it into pragmatic political policies but took it to mean that ordinary history would really be transcended with the arrival of salvation, they were engaged in an illusory flight from the real world of history into the timeless realm of myth.

For the Christian the validity of transcendent eschatology is in the last resort a problem of NT theology. While the apocalyptic hope was certainly modified by the historical event of Jesus Christ, the NT interprets this event as presupposing and even endorsing a transcendent eschatology of divine intervention, cosmic transformation and the transcendence of death. The final achievement of God's purposes and the ultimate fulfilment of humanity in Christ really do lie beyond the possibilities of this world of sin and suffering and death, in a new creation such as apocalyptic prophecy first began to hope for on the strength of the promises of God. Of course the new creation is the transformation of this world—this distinguishes Christian eschatology from the cosmological dualism of Gnosticism—but it transcends the possibilities of ordinary history. So it seems that a serious commitment to the NT revelation requires us to see apocalyptic eschatology as essentially a theological advance in which God's promises through the prophets were stirring his people to hope for a greater salvation than their forefathers had guessed. This must be the broad context for our evaluation of apocalyptic.

It still remains, however, a serious question whether the apocalyptists in fact abandoned the prophetic faith in God's action within history, and the prophetic demand for man's free and responsible action in history. Have they in fact substituted transcendent eschatology for history, so that history itself is emptied of meaning, as a sphere in which God cannot act salvifically and man can only wait for the End? To answer this we must look more closely at the apocalyptic attitude to history in the context of the post-exilic experience of history to which it was a response.

### The negative view of history

The apocalyptic attitude to history is commonly characterized by a series of derogatory terms: radically dualistic, pessimistic, deterministic. The apocalyptists are said to work with an absolute contrast between this age and the age to come. This age is irremediably evil, under the domination of the powers of evil, and therefore all hope is placed on God's coming intervention at the end, when he will annihilate the present evil age and inaugurate the eternal future age. In the history of this age God does not act salvifically; he has given up his people to suffering and evil, and reserved the blessings of life in his kingdom wholly for the age to come. So the apocalyptists were indifferent to the real business of living in this world, and indulged their fantasy in mere escapist speculation about a transcendent world to come. It is true that they engage in elaborate schematizations of history and emphasize God's predetermination of history, but this is purely to show that God is bringing history to an end, while their extreme determinism again has the effect of leaving man with no motive for responsible involvement in the course of history.

This is the wholly negative view of history commonly attributed to the apocalyptists. Like so much that is said about apocalyptic, it suffers from hasty generalization. It would not be difficult to make it appear plausible by quoting a secondhand collection of proof-texts, and especially by preferring later to earlier apocalyptic, and emphasizing texts which are closer to Iranian dualism at the expense of those most influenced by OT prophecy. We have seen that the apocalyptic enterprise, with its potentially ambiguous relationship to its non-Jewish environment, was hazardous, and the above sketch has at least the merit of illustrating the hazard. But it does no justice to the apocalyptists to draw the extreme conclusions from a selection of the evidence.

The apocalyptic view of history must be understood from its starting-point in the post-exilic experience of history, in which the returned exiles remained under the domination of the Gentile powers and God's promises, through Second Isaiah and Ezekiel, of glorious restoration remained unfulfilled. Those who now denigrate apocalyptic rarely face the mounting problem of theodicy which the apocalyptists faced in the extended period of contradiction between the promises of God and the continued subjection and suffering of his people. The apocalyptists refused the spurious solution of a realized eschatology accommodated to Gentile rule and the cult of the second temple: they insisted on believing that the prophecies meant what they said, and undertook the role of Third Isaiah's watchmen, who are to 'put the Lord in remembrance, take no rest, and give him no rest until he establishes Jerusalem' (Is. 63: 6f.).

So the apocalyptists did not begin with a dogma about the nature of history: that God cannot act in the history of this world. They began with an empirical observation of God's relative absence from history since the fall of Jerusalem. It did not appear to them that he had been active on behalf of his people during this period. Consequently the common apocalyptic view, which goes back to Third Isaiah, was that the exile had never really ended. Daniel 9 therefore multiplies Jeremiah's seventy years of exile into seventy weeks of years to cover the whole period since 586. It was of the history of this period that the apocalyptists took a negative view. Daniel's four world empires are not a scheme embracing all history, but specifically history since Nebuchadnezzar and the exile. The Enochic Book of Dreams contains an allegorical account of the whole history of the world since creation (1 En. 85—90), but again the negative view characterizes only the period since the end of the monarchy. In this period (89: 59—90: 17) God is represented as no longer ruling Israel directly but delegating his rule to seventy 'shepherds', angelic beings who rule Israel successively during the period from the fall of Jerusalem to the end. The number seventy indicates that the author is reinterpreting the seventy years of exile of Jeremiah's prophecy. God in the vision commands the shepherds to punish the apostates of Israel by means of the pagan nations which oppress Israel during the whole of the post-exilic period, but in fact they exceed their commission and allow the righteous also to be oppressed and killed. God is represented as repeatedly and deliberately refusing to intervene in this situation. Evidently this is a theologically somewhat crude attempt to explain what the author felt to be God's absence from the history of his people since the exile. Later the idea of angelic delegates developed into the idea of Israel's being under the dominion of Satan during this period. It was the 'age of wrath' (CD 1: 5) in which Satan was 'unleashed against Israel' (CD 4: 12).

This view of post-exilic history came to a head in the crisis of Jewish faith under Antiochus Epiphanes. This was the climax of the age of wrath, 'a time of trouble such as had never been' (Dn. 12: 1; cf. Testament of Moses 8: 1). The Hasidic movement, which produced the apocalypses of this period, was therefore a movement of repentance and suffering intercession, seeking the promised divine intervention to deliver the faithful. This was not a retreat from history but precisely an expectation that God would vindicate his people and his justice on the stage of history, though in such a way as to transcend ordinary historical possibility.

The apocalyptists faced not only the absence of God's saving activity from history since the exile, but also the silence of God in the period since the cessation of prophecy. 'There is no longer any prophet, and there is none among us who knows how long' (Ps. 74: 9). Behind apocalyptic lurks a fear that God had simply abandoned his people, and against that fear apocalyptic is a tremendous reassertion of the prophetic faith. In apocalyptic God's silence was broken by the renewal of his past promises in their relevance to the present. God had not abandoned his people; his promised salvation was coming. Sometimes, perhaps, the apocalyptists broke God's silence with speculations of their own, forced too much contemporary relevance out of

the prophecies, answered too precisely the unanswerable 'how long?'** But their work ensured the survival of hope.

It is true that the act of divine deliverance for which the apocalyptists looked far transcended the great events of the salvation-history of the past. So the image of a new exodus is less common in apocalyptic than the image of a new creation. In the Enoch literature the dominant type of the end is the deluge, in which a whole universe was destroyed.** This universalization of eschatology resulted in part from the historical involvement of post-exilic Israel in the destiny of the world-empires, and in part from the pressure of a universal theodicy which looked for the triumph of God over every form of evil: we saw how this developed in the Enochic Book of Watchers. The apocalyptists dared to believe that even death would be conquered. So they expected an act of God within the temporal future which would so far transcend his acts in past history that they could only call it a new creation.

This is the expectation which gives rise to the temporal dualism of apocalyptic: its distinction between this age and the age to come which follows the new creation. The terminology of the two ages does not emerge in apocalyptic until a late stage, becoming popular only in the first century AD, as the NT evidences.** This is significant because it shows that apocalyptic did not begin from a dualistic dogma, but from an experience of history. For this reason the contrast between the two ages is never absolute. There is no denial that God has been active in the past history of Israel, and this can even be emphasized, as in the Enochic Book of Dreams. His coming eschatological intervention transcends, but is not wholly different in kind from his past acts.** Even in late apocalyptic where the dualism is sharpened, this world remains God's world. It is not totally given over to the powers of evil. So the temporal dualism of apocalyptic is not cosmological dualism.

Apocalyptic eschatology does not therefore arise from an abandonment of the prophetic faith that God acts in history. It would be better to say that the apocalyptists held onto this faith in the face of the doubt which the universal experience of history provokes. Because they believed he had acted in the past they hoped for his action in the future. But they saw the world in terms which demanded the hope of total transformation as the only appropriate expression of faith in a God who rules history.

In a sense, then, the prophetic faith could only survive the post-exilic experience by giving birth to eschatological faith. We may be grateful for that. Nevertheless, there was surely a danger. The apocalyptists might be so intent on eschatology that they could forget that God does act in history before the end. They might despair of history altogether, and the experience of God's absence from their own history might become the dogma of his absence from all history.

So the Hasidic apocalyptists have often been contrasted with their contemporaries the Maccabees. The former are said to have deduced from their eschatology a quieter attitude of waiting for divine intervention, so that they held aloof from the Maccabean revolt and were unable to see the hand of God in the Maccabean victories. We can see how this might have happened, but it is not really clear that it did. It is true that the book of Daniel refers to the Maccabees only as 'a little help' for the martyred Hasidim (11:34), but this need not be as disparaging a reference as is often thought. More probably it indicates that Daniel was written when the Maccabean resistance had only just begun. The Enochic Book of Dreams, written a year or so later, regards the Maccabean victories as the beginning of God's eschatological victory and Judas Maccabaeus as a practically messianic agent of God's eschatological intervention (1 En. 90: 8–18). The truth would seem to be that the apocalyptic hope mobilized support for the Maccabees. Of course the Maccabean revolt did not turn out actually to be the messianic war, though it was a notable deliverance, but it does not follow that the apocalyptists must have concluded that their expectations of it were entirely misplaced. The fact that the Hasidic apocalypses were preserved without modification, and Daniel was even canonized, suggests otherwise. An historical event like the Maccabean deliverance could be regarded as a provisional realization of God's promises, an act of God within history which anticipated and kept alive the hope of the greater deliverance still to come. Transcendent eschatology need not empty history of divine action; it can on the contrary

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** In fact the apocalyptists were less addicted to setting dates for the end than is often thought: L. Hartman, NTS 22 (1975-76), pp. 1–14.

** In Enoch 83 makes the flood a cosmic catastrophe; cf. n. 44 above.

** In 1 Enoch the terminology of the two ages appears only in the Similitudes, now almost universally admitted to be no earlier than the first century AD. The classic statement of the doctrine of the two ages, from the end of the first century AD, is 4 Ezra 7: 50: 'The Most High has made not one age but two.' For possible rabbinic examples from the first century BC, see M. Delcor, Le testament d'Abraham (Leiden: Brill, 1973), pp. 41f.

** A typological view of history is still quite clear in 2 Baruch, a late first-century AD work which reflects growing dualism. 2 Baruch 63 tells of the deliverance of Jerusalem from Sennacherib in terms which prefigure the end.
facilitate the recognition and interpretation of God’s action in history.

Again I do not wish to say that this was always the case. In this as in other respects the apocalypticists were walking a theological tightrope, and there was no guarantee that they would keep their balance, other than their study of OT prophecy. It seems that in the end they did not. The overwhelming disappointment of Jewish apocalyptic hopes in the period AD 70–140 proved too great for the healthy survival of the apocalyptic hope. The great apocalypses of that period—the Apocalypse of Abraham, 2 Baruch, and 4 Ezra—are the last great eschatological apocalypses of Judaism. In 4 Ezra in particular we can see the strain under which the apocalyptic theodicy was labouring. There is a deepening pessimism, an almost totally negative evaluation of the whole history of this age from Adam to the end, a stark dualism of the two ages. This apocalypticist does not surrender his eschatological faith, but we can see how short a step it now was to cosmological dualism and outright gnosticism.

Apocalyptic eschatology at its best spoke to a contemporary need. It was not identical with the faith of the pre-exilic prophets, but nor was the experience of history in which it belonged. Perhaps it is true that transcendent eschatology was gained at the cost of a certain loss of awareness of the significance of present history. This loss was recovered in the NT revelation, but it is worth noticing that it was recovered in a way which so far from repudiating the apocalyptic development, took it for granted. The significance of present history was guaranteed for the NT writers by their belief that in the death and resurrection of Jesus God had already acted in an eschatological way, the new age had invaded the old, the new creation was under way, and the interim period of the overlap of the ages was filled with the eschatological mission of the church. So it is true that the apocalyptic tendency to a negative evaluation of history is not to be found in NT thought, but this is not because the NT church reverted to a pre-apocalyptic kind of salvation history. It is because the apocalyptic expectation had entered a phase of decisive fulfilment.

**Apocalyptic determinism**

We have still to answer the charge of determinism against the apocalyptic view of history. Von Rad made this a major reason for denying apocalyptic an origin in prophecy. He correctly stresses the apocalyptic doctrine that God has determined the whole course of the world’s history from the beginning: ‘All things which should be in this world, he foresaw and lo! it is brought forth’ (Testament of Moses 12: 5). This is the presupposition of the comprehensive reviews of future history and of the conviction that the end can come only at the time which God has appointed (Dn. 11: 27, 29, 35f.). It is the secrets of the divine plan, written on the heavenly tablets of destiny, which the apocalypticist is privileged to know: ‘what is inscribed in the book of truth’ (Dn. 10: 21); ‘the heavenly tablets . . ., the book of all the deeds of mankind, and of all the children of flesh that shall be upon the earth to the remotest generations’ (1 En. 81: 2). Von Rad correctly points out that this differs from the prophetic conception, in which Yahweh makes continually fresh decisions, and issues threats and promises which are conditional on men’s sin or repentance (Je. 18: 7–10). Granted that the apocalypticists share the prophetic concern for Yahweh’s sovereignty over history, is their deterministic way of expressing it a denial of human freedom and responsibility and so a retreat from human involvement in history?

Determinism certainly belongs more obviously in the context of apocalyptic’s continuity with the pagan oracles than it does in the context of its debt to OT prophecy. Pagan divination was generally wedded to a notion of unalterable fate. There are no threats or promises calling for an ethical response, simply the revelation that what will be will be. The forms of oracle which apocalyptic shares with its pagan neighbours, including the *vaticinium ex eventu*, tend to reflect this outlook. Their popularity in the centuries when apocalyptic flourished may partly reflect the fact that the nations of the Near East had lost the power to shape their political future. A genre which made the seer and his audience mere spectators of the course of history corresponded to the mood of the time.

Again we can see the hazardous nature of apocalyptic’s relationship to its environment. In its attempt to express in this context the sovereignty of the personal and ethical God of Israel there was the risk of confusing him with fate. The avoidance of this risk depended on the apocalypticists’ ability to place alongside a passage like Daniel 11, with its deterministic emphasis, a passage like Daniel’s prayer in Daniel 9, with its conviction that God judges his people for their rebellion and responds in mercy to their repentance and to the prayers of intercessors like Daniel. It is no solution to this paradox to excise Daniel’s prayer as later inter-
potation,\textsuperscript{44} for the conviction that God would respond to repentance and intercession was at the heart of the Hasidic movement and appears in all their apocalypses. All their pseudonymous seers were noted intercessors: Daniel (Dn. 9; Testament of Moses 4: 1–4), Enoch (1 Enoch 83f.), Moses (Testament of Moses 11: 14, 17; 12: 6).\textsuperscript{45} Belief in the divine determination of all events clearly exists in tension with the conviction that the covenant God responds to his people’s free and responsible action. The former does not result in fatalism because it is only one side of the apocalyptic faith.

Positively, the apocalyptic belief in divine determination of history functioned to support eschatological faith in the face of the negative experience of history. In an age when it was tempting to believe that God had simply abandoned the historical process and with it his promises to his people, the need was for a strong assertion of his sovereignty. This functions, first, to relativize the power of the pagan empires in stressing that it is God ‘who removes kings and sets up kings’ (Dn. 2: 21). So his purpose of giving the kingdom to his own people is assured of success at its appointed time. Secondly, the apocalyptic belief emphasizes that in the last resort the promise of eschatological salvation is unconditional, as it was also for the prophets. For their sins, Moses predicts, Israel ‘will be punished by the nations with many torments. Yet it is not possible that he should wholly destroy and forsake them. For God has gone forth, who foresaw all things from the beginning, and his covenant is established by the oath’ (Testament of Moses 12: 11–13). Similarly Second Isaiah had met the despair of the exiles with the message of Yahweh’s sovereignty over the nations and his irrevocable purpose of salvation for his people.

So the determinism of apocalyptic must be judged not as an abstract philosophy, but by its function within its context, which is precisely to counter fatalistic despair, to lay open to men the eschatological future, and call men to appropriate action.

\textsuperscript{44} As von Rad does: \textit{Old Testament theology} II, p. 309 n. 19.

In terms of that function the gulf between the prophetic and apocalyptic concepts of history is by no means so unbridgeable as von Rad assumes.\textsuperscript{46}

**Apocalyptic and the canon**

We have defended the apocryphists as interpreters of prophecy for their own generation. A literature as varied as the apocalyptic literature must be evaluated with discrimination rather than generalization, and we have recognized the theological hazards which the apocryphists did not always avoid. But they lived in an age whose dominant mood encouraged just such a flight from historical reality as eventually issued in gnosticism. So if their hold on the full reality of OT salvation history seems sometimes precarious we should not be surprised. It is more surprising that they kept hold of it as well as they did. They faced the problem of believing in the God of the prophets against the evidence of history. Their transcendent eschatology was both a solution, in that the problem of history demands a solution which transcends history, and an aggravation of the problem, as apocalyptic hopes remained unfulfilled. But with NT hindsight, we can see that this was their theological role between the Testaments: to keep Jewish faith wide open to the future in hope.

The apocryphists occupy an essentially intertestamental position. They interpret the prophets to an age when prophecy has ceased but fulfilment is still awaited. They understand their inspiration and their authority to be of a secondary, derivative kind. Their transcendent eschatology, which is apocalyptic’s theological centre, is already developed in post-exilic prophecy,\textsuperscript{47} and the apocryphists’ role is to intensify it and enable their own generation to live by it. It was by means of apocalyptic that the OT retained its eschatological orientation through the intertestamental age, in this sense apocalyptic is the bridge between the Testaments, and it corresponds to the character of apocalyptic that it is represented, but not extensively represented, in the OT canon.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Wisdom in Israel}, p. 270.
\textsuperscript{47} Probably even resurrection: Is. 26: 19. But the development of this doctrine remains a very significant development in the intertestamental period.
A bibliographical guide to the study of the Reformation: Part 2: Development

A Skevington Wood

The first part of Dr Wood’s Guide appeared in Themelios, 2. 2 (January 1977). Dr Wood has recently been appointed Principal of Cliff College, near Sheffield, England.

The first part of this survey covered the beginnings of the reform movement in Germany and Switzerland. Part II traces the spread of Protestantism and also deals with the Radical Reformation. Readers should consult the first three sections of Part I for an indication of source material, reference works and general histories bearing on the entire period. As before, the catalogue is confined in the main to fairly recent books in English. The place of publication is London if no other is mentioned.

I. The spread of Protestantism

a. England


For a bird’s eye view, T. M. Parker, The English Reformation to 1558 (OUP, 1950) in the Home University Library series, is admirable. For fuller measure it would be difficult to improve on A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (Collins Fontana, 1967): it is comprehensive, reliable and invigoratingly fresh in its approach. An even more detailed treatment from a Roman Catholic historian is offered in P. Hughes, The Reformation in England, 3 vols. (Holliis and Carter, 1950-54). F. M. Powicke’s The Reformation in England (OUP, 1941) is a memorable essay.

The essential unity of the various elements involved is stressed in C. H. and K. George, The Protestant mind of the English Reformation (OUP, 1961). F. J. Smithen, Continental Protestantism and the English Reformation (Clarke, 1927) should be balanced by a consideration of A. G. Dickens, Lollards and Protestants in the diocese of York 1509-1558 (OUP, 1959), which produces evidence from the archives that the English Reformation is to be regarded as ‘a diffused but inveterate Lollardy revivified by contact with Continental Protestantism’. J. A. F. Thomson, The later Lollards 1414-1520 (OUP, 1963) underlines the same argument.

H. C. Porter, Reformation and reaction in Tudor Cambridge (CUP, 1958), based on original material relating to the colleges, concludes that the Genevan exile exercised no unusual influence.

Not to be missed on any account is E. G. Rupp, Studies in the making of the English Protestant tradition (CUP, 1949). Professor Rupp is one of the very few historians who might qualify as a contributor to Punch, such is the witiness of his style. Less scintillating but of considerable value is W. A. Clebsch, England’s earliest Protestants (Yale University Press, 1964)—now obligatory reading on the theology of Tyndale and the other early leaders’, according to Professor Dickens. A useful summary is found in P. E. Hughes, The theology of the English Reformers (Hodder and Stoughton, 1965). C. W. Dugmore, The mass and the English Reformers (Macmillan, 1958) recognizes a link with patristic doctrine prior to the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and refuses to interpret Cranmer as a Zwinglian tout court.

A masterly account of a complicated subject from one who regards Anglicanism as a genuine middle way is contained in F. E. Hutchinson, Cranmer and the English Reformation (Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), reprinted as a paperback in 1966. J. G. Ridley, Thomas Cranmer (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) is an extensive study arising from a re-examination of contemporary sources. It is unimpressive in its doctrinal sections, however, and readers will prefer G. W. Bromiley, Thomas Cranmer, theologian (Lutterworth, 1956).

An often neglected figure is featured in A. G. Dickens, Thomas Cromwell and the English Reformation (EUP, 1959) in the Teach Yourself History series. C. H. Williams, William Tyndale

b. Scotland


c. France


d. Italy and Spain

research, shows more interest in politics than in theology.


e. Netherlands

Although obviously in need of updating in parts, J. L. Motley, The rise of the Dutch Republic, 3 vols. (Collins, 1901) is still valid if fulsome. P. C. A. Geyl, The revolt of the Netherlands 1555-1609 (Williams and Norgate, 1958), in a convincing interpretation, shows that religion was not necessarily the major reason for the upheaval. C. V Wedgwood, William the Silent (Cape, 1944) has justifiably established itself as a classic.

f. Scandinavia

E. H. Dunkley, The Reformation in Denmark (SPCK, 1948) effectively surveys the terrain and suggests further reading. The development of Norwegian Protestantism is described in the closing chapter of T. B. Willson, History of church and state in Norway from the tenth to the sixteenth century (Constable, 1903); there is an equivalent chapter on the Reformation in J. Wordsworth, The national church of Sweden (Mowbray, 1911). The latter may be supplemented by C. J. I. Bergen-dorf, Olavus Petri and the ecclesiastical transformation in Sweden 1521-1552 (Macmillan, 1928). The manual of Olavus Petri 1529, ed. E. E. Yelverton (SPCK, 1953) is a significant liturgical document, being the first vernacular service book of the Reformation.

g. Poland

A substantial treatment from the last century retains considerable value as an informative record: W. S. Krasinski, Historical sketch of the rise, progress and decline of the Reformation in Poland, 2 vols. (Murray, 1834-40). P. Fox, The Reformation in Poland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1971) focuses on social and economic aspects.

II. The Radical Reformation

a. General

It is currently fashionable to distinguish the Magisterial Reformation of Luther, Calvin and Zwingli from the Radical Reformation representing a complex of movements often unified only by a common desire to carry ecclesiastical change to its utmost limits. E. A. Payne offers an excellent brief introduction in chapter 4 of The new Cambridge modern history, II, The Reformation 1520-1559, ed. G. R. Elton (CUP, 1958). Volume XXV in the Library of Christian Classics comprises a selection of documents related to the Radical Reformation in northern Europe under the title Spiritual and anabaptist writers, ed. G. H. Williams and A. M. Mergal (SCM, 1957). An indispensable and definitive monograph is G. H. Williams, The Radical Reformation (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), which claims that, so far from repudiating the Reformation, Radicals actually aimed to advance it. Rather more tendentious but nevertheless in its own way stimulating is L. Verduin, The Reformers and their stepchildren (Exeter: Paternoster, 1964) which examines eight of the abusive terms hurled at 'the men of the second front'.

b. Enthusiasts

The two lengthier sections of E. G. Rupp, Patterns of Reformation (Epworth, 1969) deal with 'Mr ABC'—Andreas Bodenstein von Carlstadt—and Thomas Münzer. On the latter, E. W. Gritsch, Reformer without a church (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967) is the only full-scale biography in English and incorporates extensive excerpts from Münzer's extant works. R. J. Sider, Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt: the development of his thought 1517-1525 (Leiden: Brill, 1974) is impressively comprehensive, presenting a modified interpretation. J. S. Preus, Carlstadt's Ordinaciones and Luther's Liberty: A Study of the Wittenberg Movement 1521-22 (OUP, 1974) takes a similar line, to such an extent that some scholars now think that the newly redressed balance itself needs to be redressed.

c. Anabaptists

Many of the otherwise disparate Radical groups were linked by their uniform opposition to the practice of infant baptism and their insistence on the re-baptism even of fellow Protestant believers. The proceedings of a recent Colloquium organized by the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Strasburg has now been published: The origins and characteristics of anabaptism, ed. M. Lienhard (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977). C.-P. Clasen, Anabaptism: a social history 1525-1618 (Cornell University, 1972) covers Switzerland, Austria, Moravia and southern and central Germany, tending to play down the strength and influence of the movement.

C.-P. Clasen omitted the Dutch anabaptists from his survey mentioned above since he regarded the source material as too inaccessible. Others, however, have attempted the task from a somewhat different angle. W. E. Keeney, *The development of Dutch anabaptist thought and practice 1539-1564* (Nieuwkoop: de Graaf, 1968) finds common ground, despite obvious differences, between the lay theology of Menno Simons and Dirk Philips and that of the mainstream reformers, while C. Krahn, *Dutch anabaptism: origin, spread, life and thought 1450-1600* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968) concludes that the Reformation in Holland between 1520 and 1566 is virtually synonymous with anabaptism. Krahn covers the neglected area of the Northern Provinces: the South is treated by A. L. E. Verheyden, *Anabaptism in Flanders* (Scottdale: Herald, 1961).

d. Anabaptist Sects


e. Spiritualists

According to G. H. Williams, there are three main groupings among the dissenters of the Radical Reformation: the anabaptists proper, the spiritualists, and the evangelical rationalists. The second of these is so called because of its stress on the leading of the Holy Spirit as the ultimate channel of divine authority. Despite some defects, the best introduction is still R. M. Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Macmillan, 1914). J. Wach, *Types of religious experience, Christian and non-Christian* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951) devotes a chapter to the leading and neglected spiritualist Caspar Schwenckfeld, whom he regards as one of the most attractive figures of the Reformation. S. G. Schultz, *Caspar Schwenckfeld von Ossig 1489-1561* (Norristown: Schwenckfelder Church, 1946), by an associate editor of the multi-volume *Corpus Schwenckfeldianorum*, presents him as an apostle of the middle way. A review of his theology is found in P. C. Maier, *Caspar Schwenckfeld on the person and work of Christ* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959). J. H. Seypell, *Schwenckfeld, knight of faith* (Pennsburg: Schwenckfelder Library, 1961) identifies the freedom of the will and eucharistic doctrine as primary issues in the reformer's thought.